А.О. Борисова, М.В. Арделян, О.М. Муравйова, Л.В. Саватєєва

LECTURE NOTES ON PHILOSOPHY FOR FOREIGN STUDENTS

Навчальний посібник

для іноземних студентів

з англійською формою навчання

Харків

2015

МІНІСТЕРСТВО ОСВІТИ І НАУКИ УКРАЇНИ

ХАРКІВСЬКИЙ ДЕРЖАВНИЙ УНІВЕРСИТЕТ ХАРЧУВАННЯ ТА ТОРГІВЛІ

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Introduction

Our lectures are meant to help students understand what philosophy looks like. This guide doesn't pretend to describe everything about philosophy. It provides perspectives about what philosophy is about.

This work contains basic ideas that everyone interested in philosophy should consider. Our understanding of philosophy is one partly moral. Philosophy tells us how we should argue and how we can be free to think for ourselves to improve our lives. This entire work is indebted to our philosophical education.

Several arguments are presented throughout this guide. We may not agree with all of the arguments presented, and students should also feel free to question them. What is important is to have examples of potentially persuasive arguments for us to consider on our own. It should also be noted that some of the arguments are also presented to have the opposite effect and help us understand what bad arguments look like.

Our lectures may not make you a philosopher. But they provide you with everything you need to become one. A covert purpose of our classes is to bring philosophy to you, even more importantly to bring you to philosophy.

Lecture 1. What is Philosophy? Why Learn Philosophy? Good Arguments.

What is Philosophy?

You have probably heard the word "philosophy" used many times. People say things like, "That's my philosophy," "What's your philosophy?" and "That's your philosophy!" When used in this way, philosophy seems to mean little more than "opinion" or "perspective." This is not what philosophy means in the classroom.

Philosophy is the quest for the best opinions possible and the best life possible. Everyone has an opinion, but we can't just assume that our opinions are right. We should question our own beliefs and seek justifications for them.

Philosophy in the classroom is focused on good arguments. Good arguments require: 1) an understanding of logic and 2) an understanding of justifications. In philosophy you are not allowed to believe whatever you want because you have to be able to justify your beliefs. In everyday life, the word "argument" is often taken as a kind of confrontation. We "argue" with people when we have a "fight" with them.

Arguments generally are disagreements and can relate to power struggles. The following is an example of how some people view arguments:

You: The new Star Wars movies weren't very good.

Friend: Yes, they were. They had great special effects.

You: No, they weren't. They had boring characters.

Friend: They were good movies.

You: No, they weren't!

Friend: Yes, they were!

Fortunately, this is not what "argument" means in philosophy.

Arguments in philosophy require "a connected series of statements intended to establish a proposition". These kinds of arguments can indeed be heated and insulting. We could often describe philosophical arguments as being "adversarial." Such intellectual arguments often require criticisms, which are meant to be helpful to others (constructive criticism), but people rarely want to find out that they are wrong about their beliefs.

Insofar as a philosophy class has to do with arguments, it is not separate from any other kind of class. Many classes give you arguments to believe one thing or another, and it is often important for you to think of your own arguments. Many upper division classes will expect you to be able to write argumentative papers.

Philosophy is a subject quite unlike any other. General, natural and social subjects try to gain knowledge of parts of the world through controlled observation or experiment. Knowledge gained in this way is called empirical knowledge.

For example, one tries to measure how much force it takes to destroy a neutron. This assumes the idea of force and neutrons. Suppose one tries to understand why people fall in love; this presupposes the concept of love. Finally it is clear that in the practice of law, whole sets or families of concepts are presupposed, such as the notion of a correct and fair procedure.

Philosophy is the non-empirical study of such concepts; it is an activity usually aimed at clarifying, redefining, or at creating new ones. Such clarifications and understandings are non-empirical in the sense that, in principle, the resulting knowledge could not be gained through the observation alone. To answer the question "What is love?" it is not sufficient simply to study or observe people who are in love though it might be help. One has to engage in reflective thinking about the meaning of the term and the nature of love itself. For example, one has to answer questions such as "Is loving someone different from being in love with him or her?" and "Are there differences between loving and liking someone, and what are they?"

So questions such as "Do ghosts exist?" and "Is life in the Andromeda galaxy?" are purely empirical. Even if we do not know the replies to those questions in principle they would have to be answered through the observation alone. In other words, they are not philosophical questions because they are empirical rather than conceptual. In contrast, "What is a ghost?" or "What counts as life?" are conceptual.

Answer the following questions:

1. What does the word "philosophy" mean in everyday life?
2. What is philosophy as a science?
3. What does the word "argument" mean in everyday life?
4. What does "argument" mean in philosophy?
5. How could we describe philosophical arguments?
6. What arguments require criticism?
7. Why is it important for you to think of arguments?
8. Why is philosophy unlike any other subjects?

Why Learn Philosophy?

It might be useful to consider what we can get out of learning philosophy. This can help us be receptive to making connections between everyday life and philosophy.

1. It can help you live a thoughtful life.
2. It can help you think clearly and critically.
3. It can help you understand arguments.
4. It can help you master argumentation to get what you want out of life.
5. It can help you understand how to justify your arguments.
6. It can help you avoid deception.

In addition, people who have devoted their life to philosophy have revolutionized the world. Socrates invented the dialectic method and developed the idea of moral virtue, Plato helped to invent political science, Aristotle invented logic and helped to invent empirical science, the Stoic philosophers invented propositional logic, and logicians invented computers.

The list goes on and on. By devoting your life to philosophy, you can find out what people have already thought of and it can help you think of ideas that have never been thought of before.

Good Arguments

In order to know what philosophy is, you must understand what arguments are. Philosophy can be very clear, easy to understand, and it can be used to show us what we have reason to believe.

There are the following three good arguments for your amusement:

1) The Argument for Predictions, 2) the Argument for Coherence, 3) the Argument for Criticism. We hope each of these arguments will be easy to understand and easy to agree with. Each argument will be organized into separate thoughts that are numbered one after another. The final thought is the conclusion of the argument.

1) Argument for Predictions

1. A scientific theory will fail to predict future events unless (a) there is a coincidence or (b) the theory is accurate.

2. If a theory almost never fails to predict the future, then the success of the predictions are very unlikely to be from coincidence.

3. Therefore, scientific theories that never fail to predict the future are very likely to be accurate.

Whenever we see that something has always been the case, we are often justified to believe that it will continue to be the case in the future.

Whenever people drop rocks, the rocks fall from gravity. We expect that gravity will continue in the future. We can imagine that the law of gravity could "turn off," but we have no reason to expect that to happen anytime soon. Science uses this kind of justification in order to attempt to predict the future. Whenever a theory fails to predict the future, we have reason to be suspicious of that theory. If the law of gravity didn't always help us predict that dropped rocks will fall, then we would question whether or not the law of gravity is true. Anyone who disagrees with the Argument for Predictions would have a very hard time explaining our knowledge of science. The reason that Newtonian physics was rejected was because it failed to predict many events that happen, and Einstein's theory of relativity could predict almost all of those events. It is always possible that a false scientific theory could keep getting lucky to predict the future, but this doesn't happen very often.

Philosophical theories3 are not always used to predict the future. Instead, theories can be used to explain facts and speculate about what other facts we should accept. For example, John Stewart Mill's theory of utilitarianism explains why certain actions are good and others are bad; and we could also use utilitarianism to help us figure out what actions are good or bad that we wouldn't be sure about otherwise. It could attempt to tell us whether or not abortion should be legal.

2) Argument for Coherence

1. An explanation compatible with all of your knowledge could be true.

2. An explanation incompatible with some of your knowledge is false.

3. Some explanations are incompatible with more of your knowledge than others.

4. Therefore, if all relevant explanations are incompatible with some of our knowledge, then the explanation compatible with the most knowledge is the best.

The Argument for Coherence shows us that it is possible to have a false explanation, but it can still be the best explanation available. The most coherent explanation is the explanation that is the most compatible with your other beliefs. Coherence is also called "logical consistency." A person who believes things that cannot be true at the same time is incoherent, or "logically inconsistent." We can use the Argument for Coherence to show why science is not about falsification. We are not going to consider a scientific theory to be falsified until a better theory is introduced. This better theory should be more coherent with the facts than the falsified one. Scientists might say, "This theory has fewer anomalies than the alternative." The most coherent theory is accepted in science.

In philosophy, we also accept the most coherent theories. Theories will often be judged as being incompatible with "facts" we know from personal experience.

The Argument for Coherence could be judged as taking our beliefs too seriously. Perhaps we have little or no knowledge. Instead of worrying about knowledge, we could worry about our justified beliefs. Justified beliefs have evidence, but we might not claim to be absolutely certain that they are true.

The argument would be reformulated as the following:

1. An explanation compatible with all of your justified beliefs is probably accurate.

2. An explanation incompatible with some of your justified beliefs is probably inaccurate.

3. Some explanations are incompatible with more of your justified beliefs than others.

4. Therefore, if all relevant explanations are incompatible with some of our justified beliefs, then the explanation compatible with the most justified beliefs is the best.

3) Argument for Criticism

1. Suppose there are people who will make the same mistake every day of their lives.

2. If they do not know that they are making a mistake, then they could not choose to stop making that mistake.

3. If they listened to criticisms of their behaviour and attempted to criticize their own behaviour, then they could have found out what mistake they are making.

4. Therefore, if they were open to criticism, they might have been able to choose to stop making that mistake.

This argument shows that criticisms help us improve our behaviour. For example, you might not be willing to do things that your friends enjoy doing.

This could be seen as unfair by your friends and could damage your relationships with them. If one of your friends tells you about this problem and you think they are being insulting, then you will probably continue the same rude behavior in the future.

Many people dislike criticism because it can be insulting. I do not pretend that criticisms aren't insulting. I have been insulted by perfectly good constructive criticism in the past. Criticism reveals our faults. We like to think we are smart and we want people to admire us. This can be especially true in a work environment. Bosses often don't like you to argue with them or to criticize them. Unfortunately, this is greatly irrational as shown by this argument. Many of us know from

personal experience that bosses have good reason to listen to our criticisms. Some bosses do listen to our criticisms and concerns, and we often appreciate them for it.

Criticism is very important in philosophy. In order to be sure that we have good arguments, we must take criticisms seriously. If it shows that our argument fails, then we have little reason to use it anymore. Most arguments that you write in a philosophy class are criticisms against other arguments.

Answer the following questions:

1. Why is it so important to learn philosophy?
2. What are the main arguments of learning philosophy?
3. How did philosophers revolutionize (change) the world?
4. Is it important and interesting for you to study philosophy?
5. What are the main arguments in philosophy?
6. How do you understand the argument of prediction?
7. How do you understand the argument of coherence?
8. How would the argument of coherence be reformulated?
9. What do you know about the argument of criticism?
10. Do you like when somebody criticizes you?
11. What do you feel when you are criticized?

Lecture 2. Philosophical Topics. Sophists and Philosophers.

Philosophical Topics. Sophists and Philosophers.

At one time "philosophy" referred to study of every kind of knowledge, including science and theology. Theology is the speculative study of the supernatural. "Theos" actually refers to a personal God, so theology usually refers to religious speculations from theistic religions. We no longer treat philosophy in this way, and philosophy is reserved for only certain topics of conversation.

Philosophy has been removed from science and theology. When you take a philosophy class, you don't learn much about science or theology. Science is reserved for studies of the material world and empirical evidence and theology has been reserved for studies of the supernatural that greatly lack evidence.

You can take a philosophy class to learn about logic (argument structure), ethics (morality), epistemology (knowledge), and metaphysics (reality). It is not always clear if science gives metaphysical explanations or not. Philosophers get to talk about parts of reality that aren't explained by science, such as the nature of mind.

Logic and mathematics are probably the most reliable forms of knowledge. If you do a math problem wrong, we can usually find out why it was wrong pretty easily. If you have a false theory about mathematics, we will eventually be able to find out that it is false. Science is usually considered to be very reliable as well. We can't always be sure when a scientific theory is right or not, but we know if it works well or not. Either a scientific theory is able to make risky predictions, or the predictions fail. Either we can use scientific theories to make technological achievements or we cannot.

It is much less obvious when a philosophical theory is inaccurate, but that does not mean that it's impossible to find fault in such theories. Philosophy makes use of personal experience. Either a philosophical theory can work with your personal experience or not. We have a good reason to be suspicious of a philosophical theory that conflicts with much of your personal experience. Sometimes philosophy uses even less evidence", such as our intuitions. If a theory seems very wrong and people have a hard time believing it, then it would be found to be unintuitive. Intuition is usually not taken as seriously as other kinds of evidence.

Philosophy classes will avoid "supernatural" objects as much as possible. When we say, "supernatural" we envision something that we cannot experience and have little evidence for. It is almost impossible to find fault with a description

of the supernatural. One person says God is omniscient (all-knowing), but another says that She is not. It is very difficult to know who is right about these questions.

Answer the following questions:

1. What did philosophers study at one time?
2. What are philosophical topics?
3. What does Logic study?
4. What does Science study?
5. What forms of knowledge are the most reliable?

Sophists and Philosophers

Philosophy is a Greek word that means "love of wisdom". It is derived from the word philos, the love of friends, and sophia, wisdom. Professor Don Ciraulo suggested that a better translation might be, "love of wisdom with friends." The word "philosophy" was originally used by Socrates who called himself a philosopher to distinguish himself from the sophists (wise men). Philosopher means "lover of wisdom".

Socrates did not say he was wise. Instead, he said he loved wisdom. The sophists were self-proclaimed wise men who taught people how to argue well, and the sophists often used questionable argumentative methods to trick people into agreeing with them. The sophists were much like politicians and lawyers today. They would often attempt to win arguments at any cost.

The philosopher wishes to be honest, but the sophist often wishes to deceive. Some sophists seemed like pretty nice people, but they apparently did not live up to the philosophical vision that Socrates had.

Many people like to believe they are right, but the philosopher does not. The philosopher wishes to know the truth rather than believe what is false.

The philosopher likes to learn from others and takes an interest in how people criticize arguments. If an argument that concludes that "war is necessary" is successfully criticized by a good argument, the philosopher would no longer be sure if "war is necessary" or not. Early philosophers were not sympathetic to sophistry and or unexamined opinions. People who wanted to prove that their beliefs were true were called "lovers of opinion," or "philodoxers". "Doxia" means "opinion" in ancient Greek.

Much of ancient philosophy was concerned with how to live life well. The emphasis current philosophy gives to arguments could be considered to be excessive. I agree with this position, but arguments are essential for some people to

learn how to live life well. I hope that you will find out how to make use of arguments to think for yourself and improve your life.

Answer the following questions:

1. What does the word “Philosophy” mean?
2. Who used the word “a philosopher” for the first time?
3. What does the word “a sophist” mean?
4. What does the philosopher wish to know?
5. Does the philosopher wish to be honest?
6. Can the sophist deceive?
7. Do philosophers believe to unexamined opinions?
8. What was ancient philosophy concerned with?
9. Why are arguments essential for some people?

Lecture 3. Virtues of Philosophy. Appropriate Scepticism. Appropriate Open-Mindedness. Dogma. Fanaticism Is Philosophy Oppressive?

Virtues of Philosophy. Is Philosophy Oppressive?

Practicing good philosophy requires us to learn the virtues of (1) appropriate skepticism and (2) appropriate open-mindedness. These virtues are extremely related, and could be said to be part of the "philosophical spirit." They may be the most important virtues in the world, but they have no official names.

Appropriate Skepticism

Skepticism is the tendency to disbelieve, or doubt. A sceptical person will not easily be convinced to believe something. A person who is completely un-skeptical would be gullible and would believe everything they hear. A person who is completely skeptical would disbelieve absolutely everything.

Appropriate skepticism requires a balance between these two extremes. We should not only be skeptical of the beliefs of others, but also of our own beliefs. In order for us to take criticism seriously, we must have appropriate skepticism. This will allow us to doubt ourselves and consider the possibility that the criticism could be given for a good reason. We have already given an argument that tells us why it is a good idea to take criticism seriously in section 1.1.

Without fairly appropriate skepticism, we may become unwilling to practice philosophy. If we don't think any beliefs could be true, then there may be no point to practice philosophy. The belief, "philosophy matters" would be rejected. The opposite can also happen. If we believe everything we hear, then philosophy would be completely unnecessary because it would be attempting to give someone evidence for a belief when none is required.

Appropriate Open-Mindedness

Open-Mindedness is the tendency to believe, or the tendency to take ideas seriously. An open-minded person will be willing to consider what other people have to say. A person who is completely open-minded would be gullible, but a person who is completely closed-minded would become dogmatic or completely skeptical.

Open-mindedness is also important in order for us to take criticism seriously. Without an open mind, we will not be able to take any criticisms as having a serious possibility of being correct. Instead, we would think that we already know the truth. People who already know the truth don't have any reason to listen to anyone else. It is not possible for anyone to practice philosophy who is extremely open-minded or closed-minded. People who are gullible don't need good arguments in order to believe what they hear, and people who are close-minded don't have any reason to listen to other people because they already know not to trust anyone's opinion. Open-mindedness is related to skepticism in at least three ways. One, a person who is open-minded about the fact that beliefs could be false would also be skeptical of beliefs in general. Two, people who completely lack skepticism will be too open-minded because they will believe everything they hear.

Three, a person who is too closed-minded because he will not believe anything he hears is overly skeptical.

Dogma

People who lack these philosophical virtues tend to be dogmatic. People who are dogmatic are very open-minded to the fact that they know the truth, but they are very closed-minded to the fact that anyone who disagrees with them might know the truth. Dogmatic people have no use for philosophy because they think they already know the truth. Such people are not necessarily terrible human beings. Sometimes they luck out and seem to "know the truth" pretty well.

Fanaticism

The greatest danger of lacking the philosophical virtues is becoming fanatical. People who are dogmatic and are willing to harm others for their beliefs are fanatical. People who are fanatical think they can justify oppressing others, or even killing others for a "greater good." Sometimes even philosophers will agree that harming others can be a good idea, but only in the most extreme of circumstances.

Answer the following questions:

1. What virtues must we learn practicing philosophy?
2. What are the most important virtues in the world?
3. What is skepticism?
4. Is it easy for a skeptical person to believe something?
5. What does an unskeptical person believe?

6. What does an appropriate skepticism require?
7. Why must we have appropriate skepticism?
8. What tendency is open-mindedness?
9. Why is open-mindedness important?
10. How is open-mindedness related to skepticism?
11. What people tend to be dogmatic?
12. Why do dogmatic people have no use for philosophy?
13. What people do we call fanatical?
14. Why is fanaticism dangerous?

Is Philosophy Oppressive?

A common concern about philosophy is that philosophy might be oppressive. We tend to be highly repelled by authority figures because of our history dealing with tyrants and slavery. People might fear that philosophy gives some people too much authority to oppress others. Philosophers want to tell you what to believe, which could be oppressive. The fact of the matter is that philosophy is no more oppressive than medical science. Some people find medical science to be oppressive, but that is only because it is sometimes abused. We can see that philosophy is not meant to be oppressive when we know the difference between what is authoritarian and what is authoritative.

The word "authoritarian" refers to power or rule. Those who have power can oppress others by using that power. A king could be an authoritarian ruler. A king can abuse his power by telling people what they must believe.

No justification is required for the beliefs that kings demand. We have good reason to worry about authoritarian power, because such rulers require little justification for their actions.

The word "authoritative" refers to expertise. Those who have the most experience in a field are authoritative. Philosophers spend their time and energy to figure out how to help us live better lives. They offer justified advice that we usually don't take, and we are certainly not forced to take it.

This is analogous to medical professionals. It is usually a great idea to take medical advice from doctors because of their expertise. The same goes for philosophers. Philosophers strive at not being oppressive because it requires us to be honest. If philosophers were oppressive, then they could freely try to deceive us and make use of the same argumentative tricks that the sophists made use of.

People are very defensive about their "right to their own opinion." Some people think, "I'm an American and I can believe whatever I want, and you can't

tell me anything different!" This is certainly true, and philosophers do not argue against it. A person who thinks this could also refuse medical advice from a doctor, but they would usually be foolish to do so. The right to "believe whatever you want" can be abused and turn into "the right to be stupid." I strongly support the right to be stupid as well, but it doesn't sound as exciting when put in those words.

Answer the following questions:

1. Why do some people consider philosophy to be oppressive?
2. In what case can we see that philosophy is not meant to be oppressive?
3. What does the word "authoritarian" mean?
4. Why do we have reason to worry about authoritarian power?
5. What does the word "authoritative" mean?
6. What is the main task of philosophers?
7. What is the difference between philosophers and sophists?
8. What are people very defensive about?
9. What do some people think about themselves?
10. Do people have the right "to believe whatever you want"?
11. Can the right "to believe whatever you want" be abused? Why?

Lecture 4. Dialectic. The Search for Truth. Philosophical Skepticism. Philosophical Relativism. Why Philosophical Relativism Is Wrong?

Dialectic

Dialectic is sometimes referred to as a Socratic method of having a philosophical discussion. One person tries to justify a position and the other continually attempts to challenge the justification that is introduced. This is analogous to a bigger kind of dialectic – the philosophical progress throughout history.

Philosophy is not just a matter of opinion. Philosophy requires justifications. Once we read what philosophers have to say, we can use their ideas for ourselves and develop them even further. Philosophy not only uses justification, but it requires us to have an understanding of a topic's history in order to assure that our justification is considerate of objections and criticism.

Dialectic Example 1: Gravity

This kind of progress has also been found in science. At one time, the fact that objects fall was explained by Aristotelian teleological physics. "Teleology "refers to a view that relates to goals. Physicists do not currently want to explain why anything happens in terms of goals. Aristotle said that objects fall because they had a goal of reaching the centre of the universe. Eventually, we decided that objects that fall should be explained in terms of Newtonian physics, which said that objects fall from gravity (or the gravitational pull of mass). Newtonian physics was also found to be inadequate, and now we explain why objects fall in terms of Einstein's theory of relativity. Objects are now said to fall because of warped space. (Don't ask how that works.)

Has science made progress? Yes. Do you think science has already figured out everything about gravity? Probably not. This kind of intellectual progress is certainly not a matter of opinion. Either a theory works best or it doesn't.

Once we find out that a theory fails to explain certain anomalies, we reject it and adopt a new theory that makes some use of all the theories of the past, but attempts to describe the universe in even better terms.

We could model gravitational scientific progress with the following chart:

A3 not-A3

A2 not-A2

A1 not-A1

A1: Aristotelian Physics

A2: Newtonian Physics

A3: Einstein's Theory of Relativity

At any given time there is at least one theory, which are the A1, A2, and A3 symbols; and there is a set of criticisms, challenges, and objections to that theory, which is the not-A1, not-A2, and not-A3. I want to suggest that the progress in science can be shown in the upward direction seen on the chart. The older views are seen near the bottom because newer views build on top of the older views and take those views into consideration.

A1 is our starting point, and stands for Aristotelian physics. A1 was found to be flawed (not-A1) and a new theory is suggested, A2 (Newtonian physics), which makes much use of Aristotelian philosophy. Not only Aristotle observed that objects fall, but he had a suggestion similar to inertia, Newton's first law of motion. Then A2 was found to inadequately deal with many anomalies (not-A2) and it was replaced by A3 (Einstein's Theory of Relativity), which also makes use of a great deal of Newtonian physics.

We can now speculate that we will probably replace scientific theories that explain gravity many more times in the future. Einstein's theory already has anomalies that it might not be able to explain . Right now we use questionable theories of dark matter and dark energy to explain many astronomical anomalies.

Dialectic Example 2: Freedom

How does dialectic relate to current philosophical issues? I will introduce a simple example where we can easily understand the ideas in question. Imagine two people having a discussion, Charlie and Xena. Charlie finds that freedom is important, so we should not oppress people with unjustified laws. Xena will find weaknesses in Charlie's speculations and offer criticisms. Charlie: We are not free unless we can do whatever we want. Freedom is extremely important, so we should not have laws oppress people by taking away their freedom.

Xena: So we should allow people to murder each other? Some people want to murder others, and that would be required for freedom. We need laws to protect people. Charlie: Okay. We are not free unless we can do whatever we want that doesn't hurt anyone. We can still have laws make it illegal to hurt people.

Xena: If that is true, then we can't let people smoke cigarettes because it hurts people. We know that this would lead to a lot of problems. We tried making alcohol illegal during prohibition and that turned out to be a bad idea.

Charlie: Right. Then we are not free unless we can do whatever we want that doesn't hurt anyone other than ourselves. We can still have laws that make it illegal to hurt others.

Xena: If that is true then we would have to legalize suicide. Perhaps that will not bother you but onsider this. If you can't hurt anyone else, then people wouldn't be allowed to drive cars because car pollution and car accidents hurt people. Making cars illegal would lead to a lot of problems.

Charlie: I am perfectly happy legalizing suicide, but I can't accept that we would have to make cars llegal. I propose that we are not free unless we can do whatever we want that doesn't intentionally hurt others. When we drive cars, we don't hurt anyone on purpose. The people who get hurt are only hurt accidentally. We can still make it illegal to hurt people on purpose.

Xena: I don't see why it matters so much whether or not we hurt people on purpose or accidentally once we know that we are hurting people. Anyone who chooses to use cars is endangering the lives of others. Even if we don't drive cars to intentionally hurt others, we know people do get hurt. How many people must die before a course of action will be considered inappropriate? A million? We must avoid harming others as much as possible, even when people do it unintentionally.

Charlie: I will have to think more about this objection. In order to map-out the dialectical progress of this conversation, we will say that Charlie is "A," and Xena is "not-A."

A4 not-A4

A3 not-A3

A2 not-A2

A1 not-A1

We can show what position each of the symbols stand for:

A1: We are not free unless we can do whatever we want. We should not have laws because they oppress people.

not-A1: This idea of freedom would require us to legalize murder, which should never happen.

A2: We are not free unless we can do whatever we want that doesn't hurt anyone. We can still make it illegal to hurt people.

not-A2: This idea of freedom would justify outlawing cigarettes, but that would cause a lot of problems.

A3: We are not free unless we can do whatever we want that doesn't hurt anyone other than ourselves. We can make it illegal for people to hurt others.

not-A3: This conception of freedom would justify making cars illegal, but cars are important.

A4: I propose that we are not free unless we can do whatever we want that doesn't intentionally hurt others. We can still make it illegal to hurt others intentionally.

not-A4: One, whenever we drive cars we intentionally endanger people's lives because we know cars can hurt people. Two, unintentionally hurting others should be avoided as much as possible. There are two important things to notice with dialectic. (1) People don't have to completely give up their position when faced with a criticism. Instead, they can add to their position. Charlie only changed one part of his point of view at a time. At one point he agrees that we should not be allowed to hurt anyone. At another point he modified his position to say that we should not be allowed to hurt anyone except ourselves. (2) Philosophical progress is greatly indebted to criticism. Charlie would not have noticed that his view of freedom was flawed until Xena challenged it. We should be able to see that philosophy is just not a matter of opinion. Not only does philosophy require justifications, but it also requires us to understand our justifications in terms of a historical context. We must take into consideration arguments and objections given throughout history in order to give the best solution to a philosophical problem.

Answer the following questions:

1. What is dialectic referred to?
2. What does philosophy require?
3. How was gravity explained by Aristotle?
4. Why do objects fall according to Newtonian physics?
5. What does teleology refer to?
6. What is freedom?
7. What is the first main thing to notice with dialectic?
8. What is the second important thing with dialectic?
9. Can we do whatever we want?
10. Must we avoid harming other people?

The Search for Truth

Some people at this point might have assumed that philosophy is the quest for truth. This might be true, but philosophy requires nuance and we need to realize that philosophy might not always need to give us "the truth" to be important in our lives. Even if philosophy doesn't give us "the truth," it still gives us better and more justified beliefs, which are often more accurate than other beliefs that aren't based on philosophical thought.

What is “truth?” Aristotle thought that statements are true when they correspond to reality. The statement “the cat is on the mat” is true if there is a real cat on a real mat. Aristotle's understanding of truth might seem to work well in science. Scientists want to describe reality as it exists and they try to model reality. A model that corresponds to reality well could be said to be “true.” We think scientific theories can sometimes describe reality almost exactly as it actually exists, which helps us know how to make functional computers, safe cars, and effective medicine. We usually use the word “true” to refer to something quite modest and there could be degrees of truth. Accurate beliefs correspond to reality well and inaccurate beliefs don't. The belief that most people with eyes can see things seems accurate enough to be called “true.” However, the idea of “absolute truth” seems to require more than generalizations. Instead, something like theories that can model reality with absolute precision seems required. Philosophers would be thrilled to attain absolute truth, infallible certainty, and a complete understanding of reality because it would help them become more rational, ethical, and so on. However, this is probably too much to ask for and philosophy doesn't guarantee that we will ever attain absolute truth, infallible certainty, or a complete understanding of reality. Instead, philosophy merely helps us be more reasonable and ethical because it helps us attain justified beliefs and justified beliefs are more likely to be accurate than unjustified ones.

Philosophy might be able to help give us many accurate beliefs, but there's no guarantee that philosophy can help us model reality with absolute precision. Of course, the same thing is true of science – it attempts to model reality as well as possible, but it might never model reality with absolute precision. At the same time I want to say that science and philosophy are still important.

We can't require that philosophy give us absolute truth or provide us with infallible methods of attaining knowledge just like we can't require that of science. Even if science fails to provide us with infallible certainty or absolute truth, it is still accurate enough to make several successful predictions necessary to provide us with functional computers, safe cars, and effective medicine. Even if philosophy fails to provide us with infallible certainty or absolute truth, it is still effective enough to help us attain justified beliefs, avoid dogmatism, avoid fanaticism, and live better lives. It helps us become more rational, ethical, appropriately open-minded, and appropriately skeptical.

Answer the following questions:

1. What is truth according to Aristotle?
2. What can be called “true”?
3. What does “absolute truth” require?

4. Does philosophy give us absolute truth?
5. What does philosophy help us to become?

Philosophical Skepticism

There are two kinds of skepticism that I am concerned with: (1) The position that we cannot know the truth from philosophy, and (2) The position that philosophy doesn't accomplish anything. The second kind of skepticism is usually motivated from the first. If we don't find the truth from philosophy, then philosophy is a waste of time!

The first of these kinds of skepticism is not a problem. I have already explained why we don't need to know the truth to find great value in living a philosophical life. To expect to get the truth is more than we need. Science might have never given us the truth, but we have found it very useful nonetheless. It has given us the power to create televisions, cell phones, and space shuttles. The same goes for philosophy. Perhaps philosophy does not give us the truth, but it gives us the tools of living a better life – philosophers have developed a kind of technology for getting more out of life. It may be that the reason that science and philosophy do not need to arrive at the truth is that we are still feeling out the universe and we are only discovering a small part of it at a time. It might be that at least some of our theories are accurate. Some theories might resemble the truth more than others without giving us the absolute truth.

Once we resolve the first kind of skepticism, it is hard to see why anyone would endorse the second kind of skepticism. Why would anyone think philosophy is a waste of time? My answer is that they are ignorant of philosophy and have never seen how philosophy makes a great use of common sense. It is not people "just making stuff up" in a haphazard way.

Philosophy requires justifications. It is our ignorance of philosophy that makes it dangerous to argue with bosses, that makes us overly sensitive to criticism, and that makes us worried that justifying our opinion to others will be "too oppressive and intolerant."

Philosophical skepticism is widespread in our society. You probably have a lot of experience with people who refuse to use philosophy. You may have tried to explain to someone your point of view, and then they replied, "That's your opinion!" This was, of course, meant to shut you up. There are many common dismissive responses people give to stop philosophy, such as…

1. It is a matter of opinion.
2. That's a value judgment.

3. Who's to say?

4. Let's agree to disagree.

5. Truth is relative.

These dismissive responses should not be tolerated in a philosophical environment. They are clichés with little or no meaning just to end the conversation. It may be that in real life it is often important to try to stop philosophical conversation because so many people can't deal with the possibility that their beliefs may be wrong, or perhaps some people just feel the need for you to think they are smarter than they really are. I am not thrilled with this reality, but it is something that can be important to consider on occasion.

We must take a look at each of these clichés to show what they really mean.

It is a matter of opinion or "that's your opinion!" This is meant to suggest that there is no possible evidence or justification for the opinion. Instead of saying why a justification for an opinion fails, the person merely denies the possibility that it could succeed. In philosophy, opinions are uninteresting. Only justifications are interesting.

That's a value judgment. This is supposed to suggest that value judgments don't mean anything. Is that so? If it is, then no one could be justified to say, "It is wrong to torture babies for fun." The fact that an opinion is a value judgment doesn't invalidate it. It is true that many people disagree about certain value judgments, such as whether or not abortion should be legal, but that doesn't mean that value judgments shouldn't be given for such controversial topics.

Who's to say? This question is meant to imply that no one is to say. No one can know the truth about whatever you are arguing about. The person who asks, "Who's to say?" may also be tempted to ask, "What makes you so special? You think you can know anything? You think you are better than I am?" These questions are meant to say that you are arrogant or pompous for making ambitious arguments. These questions are irrelevant to philosophy because we are to say. That's who's to say. Telling someone that they are arrogant to attempt to use philosophy is insulting, but that doesn't invalidate a person's philosophical arguments.

Let's agree to disagree. This position is much more polite than the others, but it does not attempt to resolve the philosophical problem at hand. If people always "agreed to disagree," then science would have never been thought of and we wouldn't be enjoying our favorite TV shows. Television could not have been invented without science, and science is part of our philosophical history.

Truth is Relative. This is sometimes meant to mean the same thing as "it is a matter of opinion," but it could also mean, "The truth depends on the person." Philosophers have rarely been very happy with this possibility. How could truth

depend on a person? It is either true or it isn't. I will explain the problem of relativism in detail in the next section.

Philosophical Relativism

Philosophical relativism as I will present it is the view that truth is relative. This does not merely mean what is true for one person is not true for another. It also means the truth of reality is different for one person than another. A dismissive response that refers to philosophical relativism is, "That's your reality!" The relativist believes that each person has a separate reality. It is often the case that philosophical relativism is meant to mean, "What is true for you is whatever you believe to be true." Someone might decide that something determines what is true other than beliefs, but what can that be? Reality? Reality cannot determine what is true for the relativist because each person has a separate reality. If philosophical relativism is true, then philosophy would be a waste of time. There would be no expert opinions and everyone's opinion would be equal.

If whatever you believe in is true for you, then people who believe that abortion is immoral are right; but someone who believes that abortion is good is also right. If you are a Christian, then your religious beliefs are true in your reality, but if you are an atheist, then the religious beliefs of Christians will be false in your reality.

There are some things that might be relative. If something is a "matter of taste," it can be seen as relative. We may disagree that tastes give us relative truth. Chocolate tastes good to one person, but it might not to another. Is everything relative, like tastes? No. You can only make televisions if you use science. That fact is not going to be true in someone's reality. Many people accept philosophical relativism because it is "politically correct." Something is politically correct if it is something that can be said or done without making anyone upset. This is often related to the media, such as making sure that kids' television shows have various ethnic groups to assure that "no one is left out". To say that truth is relative means that "everyone is right!"

People can believe whatever they want. This point of view is intended to encourage tolerance. We might like to think everyone can follow a different religion, and it might be nice to think that every religion can be right.

Why Philosophical Relativism Is Wrong

Tolerance and political correctness will not be good reasons to endorse philosophical relativism because not everyone is tolerant. Anyone who isn't tolerant or "believes that someone is wrong" will be right. The fact that "tolerance is good" is only true in some people's realities. That means that because Hitler didn't approve of tolerance, tolerance was bad in his reality.

We not only lack reasons to agree to philosophical relativism, but philosophical relativism cannot make logical sense. Consider the following argument against philosophical relativism.

Arguments against Philosophical Relativism:

1. If relativism is right, then all truths can be different for each person.

2. So, the fact that "all truths are different for each person" can be false for some people.

3. Therefore, philosophical relativism cannot be true.

This argument makes it clear that relativism attempts to give us a truth, but if all truths are relative, then that truth is also relative. Anyone who denies the truth to relativism will be right. How can relativism be right if it is false in so many realities?

There are many negative consequences to accepting philosophical relativism as well. Philosophy would be a waste of time. Relativists already know what is true because what is true in their reality is whatever they believe. Why should such a person practice philosophy? They already know all the truths concerning their own reality. All the arguments that I presented would only be true for some people, so we might as well trick people into accepting our arguments and stop listening to criticisms. There will be many horrific positions if we accept relativism. Not only could we say that "we can create televisions without science", but we could also agree that the statement "torturing babies for fun is good" is true in some people's realities. We would also have to say that "murder is good," "slavery is good," and "racism is good" would all be true for some people's realities.

Answer the following questions:

1. Describe two kinds of skepticism.
2. What do we expect to get learning philosophy?
3. What does science help us to create?
4. What tools does philosophy give us?
5. Why do some people think that philosophy is a waste of time?
6. What are the main common responses people give to stop philosophy?
7. Why cannot many people deal with the philosophy?

8. What does the cliché “That’s your opinion” mean?
9. What does the cliché “That’s a value judgment” mean?
10. What does the cliché “Who’s to say” mean?
11. What does the cliché “Let’s agree to disagree” mean?
12. What does the cliché “Truth is relative” mean?

Lecture 5. Ancient Philosophy. Introduction. Early Ancient Greek Philosophers.

The history of western philosophy is divided into the five phases: ancient, medieval, modern, nineteenth century and twentieth century. Such a division suggests a very general story of western philosophy, and this story consists in oversimplified and selective generalizations. We would like to recount very briefly some aspects of it.

Ancient Philosophy. Introduction

Philosophy began in ancient Greece around the year 580 B.C., when thinkers such as Thales (624-545 B.C.) and Anaximander (610-545 B.C.) argued that everything must be composed of some basic substance, such as water or air, or what we might call today atoms. The main aim of these first thinkers was to explain in a systematic and principled way natural phenomena such as the formation of mountains and living beings. From these quasi- scientific roots, philosophy soon spread in many different directions. For example, thinkers such as Parmenides (515-450 B.C.) and Zeno of Elea (490-430 B.C.) questioned the very possibility of this naturalistic enterprise by arguing that the universe had to be an unchanging seamless whole. The pre-Socratics formulated for the first time many fundamental philosophical debates, including the nature of values. When the Sophists, such as Protagoras (490-420 B.C.), argued that all ethical claims were relative, Socrates (469-399 B.C.) challenged their views, and in so doing developed a style of argumentation and questioning that many generations of philosophers have seen as a model.

Socrates' most famous pupil, Plato (427-347 B.C.), immortalized his teacher's distinctive philosophical approach in his early dialogues, some of which also dramatize the trial, imprisonment, and death of Socrates on a charge of impiety. Later, Plato became the first thinker to try to address all the problems raised by the pre-Socratics with a single systematic theory, which argued for the existence and importance of nonmaterial universals, or the Forms, that define the essence of everything. In his more mature dialogues, Plato tried to demonstrate the relevance of the theory of Forms for areas as diverse as politics, aesthetics, education, knowledge, perception, and ethics, as well as its relevance in transcending the limitations of pre-Socratic thought.

Plato's most famous pupil, Aristotle, tried to combine the insights of pre-Socratic thinking with aspects of the thought of Plato by arguing that reality consists of substances that must have both form and matter. Forms are not nonmaterial universals, as Plato supposed, but instead they are the way matter is

organized. From this idea, Aristotle developed a less otherworldly conception of the classification of knowledge, physics, psychology, metaphysics, ethics, and politics, which continued to rival Plato's vision long after both were dead.

In Plato's political philosophy, a good political community is one that promotes the well-being of all the citizens. The basis of political power is not the consent of the governed, because people may not understand well what is in their best interests and may accept a system that is not beneficial to them. In contrast, the leaders must have such understanding, and it is their duty to educate the people. In Plato's republic, the leaders have great power, but this does not mean that they should abuse it. For this reason, Plato recommends abolishing private property and the family for the ruling class. The city-state should be designed for the happiness of all the citizens and not for just one group.

Ancient Greece was not a single country but rather a collection of small city-states, spread throughout the Aegean, which shared a language and a culture. An important part of this common heritage was the mythology that Homer expressed in the Iliad and Odyssey in around 700 B.C. Another aspect of this shared culture was athletics: the Olympic Games, first held in 776 B.C., were also festivals in which people from all over the region participated. As its wealth increased, Greek civilization developed its distinctive drama, architecture, and other art forms, as well as the first scientific philosophy. As it spread eastward, this civilization came into conflict with the great and growing Persian Empire.

In 491 B.C., a Greek force of about 20,000 soldiers won the historic battle of Marathon against a Persian army of possibly more than 100,000. Then, in 480, after years of preparation, the Persian king Xerxes sent a huge army and navy against Greece. Remarkably, because Athens and Sparta worked together and because of their superior organization, the Greeks were able to resist this onslaught with an especially decisive sea battle at Salamis. These events mark an important turning point in European history, after which victorious Athens enjoyed a golden age of greatness. Because of its newfound wealth, stability, and self-confidence, Athens attained new intellectual and cultural heights. Pericles, who held political office from 467 to 428 B.C., led this process: he instituted many reforms that made Athens a democracy, as well as an economic and cultural centre. During this golden period, the arts flourished. In 447, Pericles initiated the construction of the Parthenon. This was the period of the great tragic plays of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, and later the comedies of Aristophanes. This was also the time of the great philosophers such as Parmenides, Zeno, Democritus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, the Sophists, and Socrates. In Periclean Greece, Herodotus and Thucydides produced their major historical works, and Hippocrates wrote his systematic medical texts.

However, under the leadership of Sparta, the other Greek city-states, such as Megara and Corinth, challenged Athens' military and economic supremacy. This initiated the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.), which Sparta eventually won. The ensuing war led to the crowding of Athens' population into the city walls, and a devastating plague resulted. Pericles was blamed, convicted, and removed from office. In that same year, 429, he died. The turning point in the war was the Sicilian Expedition of 415-413. Under the leadership of Alcibiades, Athens hoped to capture the rich city of Syracuse on Sicily, which was a colony of Corinth, Athens' great commercial rival. In this debacle, Athens lost half of its military and naval power. This loss ignited a conflict between aristocracy and democracy in Athens, and, in 411, various oligarchic councils replaced the democratic assembly. Thereafter, Athens lost its fleet and its citizens suffered starvation during a blockade.

Athens' defeat in 404 marks the beginning of the end of the golden age of classical Greece. There was no stable peace under Spartan control. In 387, Sparta signed a pact with the Persians that gave Sparta the protection of the Persians but ceded all the Greek cities in Asia to Persian control. This led to discontent among the Greek city-states and Thebes won a famous victory against Sparta, which allowed Athens to regain supremacy of the region by around 360 B.C. However, even though it was home to Plato and Aristotle and despite its economic prosperity, Athens did not repeat the artistic and cultural achievements of its Periclean past.

The Early Ancient Greek Philosophers

The early ancient Greek, or pre-Socratic, philosophers were interested primarily in the study of nature. They tried to describe and explain systematically natural phenomena. This makes them both the first philosophers and scientists. However, no such distinction existed 2,500 years ago: the early ancients did not separate questions that are best answered conceptually through reasoning, and those that are best addressed empirically through observation. Their philosophy was based on the assumption that nature is orderly and can be classified, explained, and understood methodically. They tried to make sense of nature without any appeal to the whims of the gods. The pre-Socratics assumed that nature is organized according to certain principles. Their main aim was to discover those principles.

This aim required them to invent or form concepts that are now usually taken for granted. For example, they used the word 'cosmos' to stand for the universe as

an orderly whole. They employed the word ‘nature’ (or phusis, from which we have derived ‘physics’) to stand for things that grow, as opposed to artifacts, which are made. The aim of explaining natural phenomena also requires the concept of natural essences. Natural things have certain fundamental properties or an essence, in terms of which their other properties can be explained. The pre-Socratic enterprise also employs the notion of systematic explanation: the idea of explaining as much as possible, assuming as little as possible.

These first thinkers tried to advance arguments in favor of their positions. For this reason, they deserve to be called the first philosophers, who discovered that careful reasoning can yield knowledge of nature. Such a discovery can belong only to those who distinguish reasoning from speculation. The idea of giving arguments for one’s claims was novel. In this respect, we might contrast the pre-Socratic philosophers with the mythical stories of Hesiod’s Theogony. Hesiod’s poem, which was probably written in the eighth century B.C., charts the genealogy of the gods, starting with Chaos, Gaea (Earth), and Eros (Love). Its mythology became a generally accepted part of Greek culture. The poem personifies natural forces and objects and tries to explain the origin of some natural phenomena, such as day and night, the mountains, the sea, and people. For example, it describes how the mating of Earth and her son, Uranus, the Heavens, produced the first race, the Titans.

In contrast, the early philosophers attempted to provide a single explanation of all natural phenomena and to substantiate their claims with some reasoning. The idea that claims about the nature of the universe and morality should be supported by some argument or reasoning destroys the assumption that they should be accepted for the reason that an authority advances them. Arguments are revolutionary, because they allow for more freedom of thought than acceptance based on authority.

Answer the following questions:

1. When and where did philosophy begin?
2. What was the main aim of the first philosophers?
3. How did Plato immortalize Socrate?
4. What did Aristotle try to combine?
5. What are the main ideas of Plato’s philosophy?
6. Why are the early ancient Greek philosophers considered to be the first philosophers?

Lecture 6. The Development of Early Ancient Greek Philosophy. Pythagoras. Heraclitus. Zeno.

The Development of Early Ancient Greek Philosophy

Early ancient Greek philosophy first unfolds as a story of the conflict between various visions concerning the basic principles of nature. Philosophy was born in what is today Turkey. The first philosophers, Thales (624-545 B.C.) and Anaximander (610-545 B.C.), lived in the coastal town of Miletus, which was in the Greek province of Ionia. To identify the basic principles around which nature is organized, they studied many varied natural phenomena, from planets to plants.

In the second phase of pre-Socratic thought, Ionian philosophy became more metaphysical. Pythagoras (570-497 B.C.) taught that the soul is immortal and that it transmigrates even into the bodies of animals. He formed a school to teach people how to live in accordance with his semi-mystical views. Around 500 B.C., Heraclitus wrote a series of caustic and mystical aphorisms that express an intriguing metaphysics based on change and the duality of opposites.

In the third phase, Parmenides and his followers argued forcefully that the very idea of a science of nature was an error. These thinkers from Elea, the Eleatics, argued that there could not be a plurality of things. Parmenides wrote a poem arguing for the existence of a single, indivisible, changeless thing. Zeno supported this position with many arguments, including his famous so-called paradoxes. The works of Parmenides and Zeno constitute a fundamental objection to pre-Socratic naturalistic thought.

The fourth phase consists in various responses to Parmenides and in attempts to continue with the Milesian or Ionian tradition of natural philosophy. One of the main authors of this period is Democritus, who argued for the existence of indivisible atoms.

In the fifth phase, the Sophists embraced relativism and Skepticism, and rejected the project of discovering truths about nature, substituting for it the aim of teaching the art of persuasion.

The Greek philosopher Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) discussed the views of many of the pre-Socratic thinkers, and so his writings are an important source of information. Aristotle's pupil, Theophrastus (371-287 B.C.), wrote a work called On the Senses, which discusses the views of several pre-Socratic philosophers. Plutarch (45-120 A.D.) wrote papers and treatises about history, biography, literature, and philosophy, which contain quotations from the pre-Socratics. In the third century A.D., Diogenes Laertius wrote a work called the Lives of the

Philosophers, which have survived and which is a valuable source of information about the pre-Socratics.

Answer the following questions:

1. When and where was philosophy born?
2. Describe the pre-Socratic phase of philosophy.
3. What did Parmenides argue for?
4. Who was the main author in the fourth period?
5. What did the sophists of the fifth period embrace?

PYTHAGORAS (570-497 B.C.)

Biographical History

Pythagoras was born on the island of Samos in the eastern Aegean, located between Miletus and Athens. Around the age of 30, he moved to Croton in southern Italy, where he established a community of followers. The community grew and acquired political importance in the region. As a consequence of this, after about 20 years, there was an uprising against the Pythagoreans.

Pythagoras wrote nothing, but his later followers wrote much, attributing to him many views. It is from his followers that we have the picture of Pythagoras as a brilliant mathematician, who invented the theorem that, in any right-angled triangle, the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the square of the other two sides. He was portrayed as applying his mathematics to music and astronomy and, thereby, developing a metaphysical system based on numbers. However, it is difficult to define exactly what Pythagoras himself thought because the later Pythagorean schools tend to attribute to the master their own teachings. By the fourth century A.D., Pythagoras was considered the greatest of all philosophers, eclipsing even Plato and Aristotle because of his influence on both of these thinkers. As we shall see, Pythagoras had an especially important influence on Plato.

Philosophical Overview

After his death, his disciples split into two groups: the mathematikoi and the akousmatikoi.

The first group was interested in the study of mathematics, music, and astronomy. The key to their ideas is that the universe consists of a harmony that should be studied mathematically. In this, they rejected the Ionian idea of trying to

discover the basic stuff of the universe, replacing it with the study of form. In this study, the numerical ratios between sounds in the musical scales provided an analogy for the harmonious development of the whole universe. In other words, according to this group, we can understand the universe by knowing the numerical relations that express the harmonic ratios according to which everything changes.

The second Pythagorean School was called the akousmatikoi, and it followed Pythagoras' religious teaching concerning the soul and the right way to live. They regarded Pythagoras as a spiritual master who taught the existence of the immortal soul that may be reborn in animal form. This doctrine of the transmigration has two important implications. First, it implies that personal identity is constituted by the soul. A person literally is his or her soul. Second, it laid down some guidelines for the moral way of life or for a moral code. Pythagoras' doctrine of the soul means that we are not mortal beings but rather immortal souls, and that we are not really at home in our bodies. It also means that the animals are our kin and, for this reason, the Pythagoreans considered the eating of flesh as a form of cannibalism. Pythagoras probably conceived of the world as divided into good and evil, and claimed that each person must struggle to be a good moral agent.

Answer the following questions:

1. When and where did Pythagoras live?
2. From where does harmony in nature originate, according to Pythagoras?
3. What role do 'the limited' and 'the unlimited' play in the Pythagorean notion of numbers?
4. What reasons did the Pythagoreans give for the claim that numbers were the substance of everything?
5. How did Pythagoras discover the relationship between numbers and musical intervals?
6. Explain the difference between the two Pythagorean schools.
7. What is the nature of the soul according to Pythagoras?
9. Are numbers a feature of things in the way that heat and coldness are?

HERACLITUS (540-480 B.C.)
Biographical History

Heraclitus was born in Epheseus, a town on the western coast of Ionia, between Miletus and Colophon. Heraclitus was of noble birth, but he gave up all of his political opportunities to pursue philosophy. He wrote his main philosophical work in about 500 B.C. Of this, over 120 fragments remain. These sayings are

culled from other later writers, such as Sextus Empiricus, who quote Heraclitus. This means that we do not know the order of the short sayings of Heraclitus. Of course, this order affects the interpretation of his philosophy, and consequently it is a contentious issue among scholars.

Philosophical Overview

Heraclitus was a polemical and enigmatic thinker who was scornful of the popular beliefs of the many and who rejected the authorities of the time. He wrote in a playful, poetic style, sometimes using apparently paradoxical sentences and, other times, employing memorable aphorisms. This, coupled with his rebellious attitude, makes Heraclitus a source of inspiration for many diverse later writers.

Heraclitus's philosophy ranges over many topics, including the nature of knowledge, theology, and ethics. However, the most influential aspect of his work is his philosophy of nature. The Philosopher claimed that everything happens in accordance with a general law of nature (the Greek word is logos). In the existing collection of fragments, several indicate his understanding of this law, and they form the basis of his natural philosophy. First, he famously claims that everything is in flux, even when the change is imperceptible. Second, he affirms a doctrine of the unity of opposites, according to which everything is necessarily characterized by both of two opposing features, such as, 'A road: uphill, downhill, one and the same' . According to Heraclitus, this unity of opposites is a fundamental pattern of the universe. It is in these terms that we should understand the cosmos as a process. Third, Heraclitus asserts a monism, according to which the underlying nature of the universe is fire. However, if Heraclitus means to assert that there are no permanent entities because everything is flux, then it may be incorrect to think of fire as a permanent underlying substance out of which everything is composed. In such a case, Heraclitus' view would be probably that the cosmos is a process, rather than a static substance. The process would be one of burning and quenching, of heating up and cooling. It would be in this sense that everything is fire.

Answer the following questions:

1. Where and where did Heraclitus live?
2. In what style did Heraclitus write?
3. What topics does his philosophy range over?
4. 'Eyes and ears are poor witnesses for men if their souls do not understand the language'. Why does he think that this is true?
5. What did Heraclitus claim?
6. How should we understand the cosmos according to Heraclitus?

7. Why does Heraclitus claim ‘the way up and down is one and the same’?

8. What does a Greek word ’logos’ mean?

9. What does Heraclitus mean by asserting that one cannot step into the same river twice?

ZENO OF CITIUM
Biographical History

You may not be as familiar with him as with most of the others on this list, but Zeno founded the school of Stoicism. Stoicism comes from the Greek “stoa,” which is a roofed colonnade especially that of the Poikile, which was a cloistered piazza on the north side of the Athenian marketplace, in the 3rd Century BC. Stoicism is based on the idea that anything which causes us to suffer in life is actually an error in our judgment, and that we should always have absolute control over our emotions. Rage, elation, depression are all simple flaws in a person’s reason, and thus, we are only emotionally weak when we allow ourselves to be. Put another way, the world is what we make of it.

Epicureanism is the usual school of thought considered the opposite of Stoicism, but today many people mistake one for the other or combine them. Epicureanism argues that displeasures do exist in life and must be avoided, in order to enter a state of perfect mental peace (ataraxia, in Greek). Stoicism argues that mental peace must be acquired out of your own will not to let anything upset you. Death is a necessity, so why feel depressed when someone dies? Depression doesn’t help. It only hurts. Why get enraged over something? The rage will not result in anything good. And so, in controlling one’s emotions, a state of mental peace is brought about. Of importance is to shun desire: you may strive for what you need, but only that and nothing more. What you want will lead to excess, and excess doesn’t help, but hurts.

Answer the following questions:

1. Who founded the school of Stoicism?
2. What does the word ‘stoicism’ mean?
3. What is stoicism based on?
4. What does Epicureanism argue?
5. What is the difference between Stoicism and Epicureanism?

Lecture 7. The Sophists. Protagoras. Democritus. Plato. Aristotle.

The Sophists

The Sophists do not constitute a school of thought in the way that the Milesians do. They are individual thinkers who shared a common general outlook rather than specific claims. It was more of a movement than a school. The Sophists included Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, and Antiphon, among many others. They had a critical attitude to prevailing moral and religious beliefs, and they articulated cultural relativism. Sophists claimed that there are no objectively true moral claims, and that moral beliefs arise solely through social convention. They contrasted convention (nomos) with the objectivity of nature (phusis).

Sophism resulted in part because of the increasing prosperity and political sophistication of Athens in the fifth century B.C. This led to a demand for forms of education that went beyond the elementary training in literature, music, arithmetic, and gymnastics offered in the schools of the time. In response, the Sophists worked as travelling teachers, offering instruction in rhetoric and persuasion, and transmitting their analyses of morality and politics.

Following Plato, some writers tend to portray the Sophists as superficial thinkers who taught for financial gain. However, the term ‘sophist’ originally came from the word ‘sophia,’ meaning wisdom. The Sophists were regarded as people of wisdom. However, later the term ‘Sophist’ became associated with the word ‘sophon’ which means cleverness. In this way, the Sophists came to be portrayed as purveyors of cleverness, rather than philosophers, lovers of wisdom.

PROTAGORAS (490-420 B.C.)
Biographical History

Protagoras was the first Sophist. He came from Abdera, an Ionian colony on the coast of Thrace. As a child, he may have been educated by the Persians. As a young man, he went to live in Athens, and in 443 B.C., he was asked by Pericles to form a constitution for a colony in southern Italy. He knew Democritus. Although he probably wrote 18 works (12 of which are listed by Diogenes), there only remain a few sentences and phrases of these works. However, Plato discusses Protagoras’ thoughts at length, especially in the dialogues, Protagoras and Theaetetus. From these and other sources, it is possible tentatively to reconstruct his philosophy.

Philosophical Overview

Protagoras is well known for his claim that man is the measure of all things. This saying raises many questions of interpretation. Does it mean humans as a species or individual people? Does it mean that things are or how they are? Protagoras probably meant that the phenomenal qualities of a thing depend on the individual perceiver. This interpretation can be specified in three ways:

1. That the very existence of a phenomenal object depends on the mind of the observer; for example, the water you see only exists in your mind.

2. That the object perceived exists independently of the perceiver, but the phenomenal qualities it has only exist in the mind of the perceiver (i.e., the water itself is neither hot nor cold, but if you perceive it as hot, then the heat exists only in your mind).

3. That the water itself is both hot and cold and that perceived objects have contradictory properties.

Protagoras thought that for every argument in favour of a proposition, there is another argument for the opposite statement. He taught his students how to make the apparently weaker argument stronger. Plato objected to this on the grounds that such a procedure teaches people to win a victory in a debate, but not how to discover truth. However, Protagoras also was a teacher of virtue. He trained his students to exercise good judgment in the management of their own lives and of the city. He taught them to act in a way that would have beneficial effects. Therefore, Protagoras' view was probably that, in debate, a wise person would use his or her oratory skills to promote the view that will have overall the most beneficial effects.

Answer the following questions:

1. What famous Philosophers-Sophists did this movement introduced?
2. Where did Sophism lead to?
3. How did some writers portray the Sophists?
4. Who was the first Sophist?
5. What is Protagoras well known for?
6. What did Protagoras teach his students?

DEMOCRITUS (470-360 B.C.)
Biographical History

Democritus was born in Abdera in Thrace in northern Greece. During his long life, he traveled widely in the ancient world, although the reports that he visited India are probably false. He was a pupil of Leucippus, who was the first atomist. The Greek word 'atomos' means something that cannot be cut or divided. Allegedly, Democritus lived to the age of 110, and he was one year older than Socrates. He was a prolific writer. Diogenes Laertius lists over 60 works written by Democritus, including his famous Maxims. His interests extended far beyond natural philosophy and atomism. He discussed the nature of humans as cultural and social beings, what we would call today anthropological studies. He wrote treatises on poetry, mathematics, and various technical matters, such as farming, diets, medical judgment, and military tactics. He also wrote nine works on moral and political philosophy.

Philosophical Overview

According to Democritus, space is infinite in extent, and there are an infinite number of bodies. However, those bodies are not infinitely divisible; they are indivisible atoms. These atoms have a size and a shape, and they are solid. Sometimes, when they collide, the atoms cohere together to form more complex compound bodies. In this way, they form the building blocks of everything we perceive. However, individual atoms lack properties such as taste, colour, and smell (which John Locke later called the secondary qualities).

Democritus claimed that atoms cannot be destroyed and are unchangeable. In this respect, Parmenides was right. Each atom is like an unchanging Parmenidean world. However, in opposition to Parmenides, Democritus argued that these atoms are constantly moving and that, through this motion, they constitute our familiar world. To support this claim, Democritus argued directly against Parmenides' premise that we cannot refer to what does not exist. According to Democritus, the nonexistent is no more than empty space or a vacuum, about which we can speak and think. Everything that exists is composed of atoms that occupy and fill that otherwise empty space, and, because of this, anything that does not exist must be identical to empty space.

One of the most remarkable features of Democritus' philosophy is his theory of perception. Diogenes Laertius cites works by Democritus on flavours, colours, and shapes, as well as a general treatise on the senses. Democritus realized that his atomism has dramatic implications for perception. The only real things are atoms.

Since these are colourless, colour and other similar perceptual properties must be illusions. Consequently, our senses continually deceive us; the world itself is very different from how we perceive it to be.

Answer the following questions:

1. When and where did Democritus live?
2. How did Democritus discuss the nature of humans?
3. What is space like, according to Democritus?
4. What does Democritus' theory of perception say?

SOCRATES (469-399 B.C.)

Socrates, Plato's mentor, is perhaps the most famous of all philosophers. Why is Socrates so well known? He was not the first philosopher; he did not write a philosophical treatise. Our knowledge of Socrates comes from four principle sources: Plato's dialogues, in 20 of which Socrates is the main character; Xenophon, who wrote the Memorabilia, which claims to record several Socratic conversations; Aristophanes, who wrote a comedy, the Clouds, featuring Socrates; finally, Socrates is mentioned many times by Aristotle. Socrates is portrayed best in the early dialogues of Plato, which reveal something of his extraordinary character.

Socrates' fame is due to the remarkable force of his personality, which is in many ways the embodiment of the philosophical approach. Socrates does not profess to have special knowledge. On the contrary, he claims to be ignorant. He is fascinated by philosophical questions and, rather than forming fixed views, he asks brilliantly penetrating questions. He engages those around him in thinking and, in these dialogues, he goads his interlocutor into offering a definition of a key idea, such as justice, courage, or knowledge. He persists with his questioning until either he arrives at a satisfactory answer or he has shown that the proposed theory cannot be true because it contains a hidden contradiction. Socrates' method, often called elenchos or argumentation and refutation, challenges us to face our ignorance and stimulates us to think more deeply. In summary, Socrates' way of being makes him the best known of all philosophers.

This does not mean that Socrates did not advance any philosophical claims. His views are reflected in Plato's early dialogues, a point that is confirmed by the works of Xenophon and Aristotle. Among the early dialogues are the following: the Laches, Charmides, Hippias Major, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Protagoras, as well as the Gorgias, which was probably the last work of this early

period. Plato has no part himself in any of his works; Socrates usually takes the leading role, and in the early dialogues, Plato restricts himself to portraying Socrates' way of thinking and conveying the master's views. It is only in the dialogues of the middle and later periods that Plato argues for his own theories. As portrayed in the early dialogues, Socrates was almost exclusively concerned with the question 'How should a person live his or her life?' In the Laches, Charmides, Hippias Major, and Euthyphro, he searches for an answer to these questions, but the dialogues end inconclusively.

Socrates was concerned with virtue or excellence, regarding which he advances three main claims. First, he argues that knowledge of goodness is necessary and sufficient for virtue. This implies that no one does wrong intentionally: we always will what we perceive as good. As a consequence, there is no such thing as weakness of the will (akrasia). Second, Socrates argues for the unity of the virtues. A person who is virtuous cannot lack any of the virtues; for example, a just person must be also courageous and temperate. Third, Socrates argues that there can be no higher good than virtue: a virtuous person is bound to be happier than one who is not. Given these three claims, we can see why Socrates and Plato thought that study of the good was supremely important for our lives.

Socrates' questioning was perceived as threatening and rebellious. In 399 B.C., he was charged with corrupting the youth of Athens and not recognizing the gods of the city. Once convicted, he was condemned to drink the poisonous hemlock that killed him. These dramatic scenes are immortalized in some of Plato's dialogues. The Euthyphro portrays Socrates on his way to court; the Apology, the trial itself; the Crito shows Socrates' refusal to escape from prison; and the later Phaedo, the last conversation and death of the old master.

Answer the following questions:

1. Why is Socrates so well known?
2. What main question was Socrates concerned with?
3. What are three main Socrates' claims?
4. Why was Socrates condemned to death?

PLATO (427-347 B. C.)
Biographical History

Plato was only 28 when his beloved teacher Socrates was condemned to death. These events affected profoundly the young philosopher, who left Athens

shortly afterward. For nearly ten years, he traveled in southern Italy and Sicily, where he began writing his famous dialogues.

Plato came from a prominent aristocratic Athenian family. His mother was a descendent of Solon, the great seventh-century B.C. poet and statesman, who initiated constitutional reforms, wrote many of Athens' laws, and celebrated Athenian democracy in popular poems. Plato received the best education available to prepare him for a great political career. He excelled in poetry, music, and wrestling. However, he grew up during the 27-year Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta and, when Athens surrendered in 404 B.C., the young Plato grew disillusioned. He spurned the idea of a life dedicated to politics. Instead, he turned to philosophy, having been influenced by the Sophist Cratylus, and having studied the Eleatics, Protagoras, and Heraclitus. Finally, he became a pupil of Socrates.

After his stay in Sicily following the death of Socrates, Plato returned to Athens and established his famous school, the Academy, a center for the advancement of wisdom and learning. At around the age of 60, Plato received an invitation to train the newly appointed king of Syracuse, Dionysius, to become a philosopher-king, following the model of Plato's work, the Republic. When the political climate of Syracuse became unfavorable, Plato was sent away. Four years later, he returned to Syracuse, but had to flee again because of political intrigues.

Philosophical Overview

Plato is the first philosopher to have an integrated view of philosophy as a separate discipline. He combines all of the elements of philosophy discussed by the pre-Socratics and Socrates, and more besides, into one global vision, which encompasses the theory of knowledge, metaphysics, and the philosophy of language, mind, mathematics, science, art, education, morality, and politics. Philosophy reveals the existence of and the need for objects that are inaccessible to the senses, and these Forms show us how we should transform our own individual lives and the politics of the state. From this vision, philosophy emerges as the most important of all disciplines. This grand vision is based foremost on the existence of the Forms. These are abstract, eternal, and changeless entities that exist independently of us, but can be known through thought, and that define the essence of things in the world. A question such as 'What is Justice?' seeks to understand the Form of Justice. The basis of morality and wisdom is to know the Form of the Good. The existence of the Forms in a way synthesizes Heraclitus and Parmenides. The world of appearances or of the senses is in flux, but the world of the eternal Forms is changeless.

It is difficult to underestimate the influence of Plato on the history of thought, especially his views concerning the reality of the Forms and the nature of the soul and knowledge. Additionally, we have seen already how the ideas of Pythagoras and Parmenides entered western thought through Plato. This influence came in three major waves: the first, around 380, in wedlock with Christianity; the second, around 1450, in opposition to the doctrine of the Church; and the third in the form of seventeenth-century rationalism.

Answer the following questions:

1. When and where did Plato live?
2. What family was he born to?
3. What education did he receive?
4. Why is Plato considered to be one of the best philosophers?
5. Why is it difficult to underestimate the influence of Plato on the history of thought?

ARISTOTLE (384-322 B. C.)

Aristotle's work achieved a greatness that perhaps surpasses even that of Plato's. During the medieval period, thinkers would refer to him as 'The Philosopher'. Aristotle's thought had a deep influence on the development of Christian theology and ethics. He systematized the whole of knowledge, dividing it into different subject matters in a way that is still generally accepted today. In many areas of study, we still rely on concepts that Aristotle first developed. Moreover, Aristotle emphasized the role of systematic empirical investigation, which is one of the basic foundations of science.

Biographical History

Aristotle's father, who was personal physician to the king of Macedonia in northern Greece, sent the 17-year-old Aristotle to the Academy. About 20 years later, in 347 B.C., Plato died. Plato's nephew, Speusippus, became the head of the Academy, and Aristotle left Athens to embark on a new independent life of intellectual exploration. He moved to Assos, and later to the island of Lesbos, in northeastern Greece. During this period, Aristotle made many biological observations. He collected information regarding about 500 animal species.

In 343 B.C., he was invited by Philip of Macedonia to return to his homeland to tutor his son, Alexander the Great, then aged 14. Aristotle remained in this post

for some seven years, until 336 B.C., when Alexander himself became the king of Macedonia and began his conquest of the ancient world. In 334 B.C., at the age of 50, Aristotle returned to Athens to establish his own school, the Lyceum, in a grove in the north of Athens. The return to Athens marks the mature period of Aristotle's intellectual life, during which he composed most of his famous works. The Lyceum was a center of teaching, learning, and investigation. Aristotle gathered around him fellow students of nature, and coordinated a systematic investigation covering almost all areas of human knowledge, which continued after his death. Aristotle also collected hundreds of manuscripts, maps, and natural specimens, and the Lyceum became one of the first libraries and museums.

Although he was a prolific writer, only fragments of his published writings remain. However, his unpublished writings have survived in the form of lecture notes or texts used by his students. He produced groundbreaking texts not just in metaphysics and logic, but on virtually every subject: physics, astronomy, meteorology, taxonomy, psychology, biology, ethics, politics, and aesthetics. Given his incredible powers of observation, classification, and deduction, it is not surprising that later generations thought of him as a superman. When Alexander died in 323 B.C., Athens became a center of anti-Macedonian feelings, and Aristotle decided to leave the city. A year later, he died. He was 62.

Philosophical Overview

It is important to compare the thinking of Plato and Aristotle because the contrast between their works produces a fork in the development of philosophy. As a broad generalization, Plato was more analytic, humanistic, and religious, with an eye cast toward mathematics. Aristotle was more synthetic, scientific, and secular in his epistemology, with an eye directed toward logic. These very general differences of approach foreshadow the later splits between the humanities and the sciences, and also between rationalism and empiricism.

In brief, there are three major differences between the two great philosophers. First, Aristotle rejects the Platonic realm of Forms or Ideas. For Aristotle, the forms exist as the essence or properties of material things in the natural world. Aristotle replaced Plato's distinction between the eternal Forms and the transient world of appearances with his own form/matter distinction. According to Aristotle, the form and the matter of a natural object are simply two aspects of its existence.

Second, Aristotle developed a method of investigation very different from Plato's, for whom the world of sensory perception is ultimately an illusion and for whom true knowledge is confined to the Ideas or Forms and can only be attained by pure reason. Plato's work is often mystical and otherworldly; in contrast,

Aristotle displays detailed knowledge of animals, physics, and many other natural phenomena. Aristotle developed the idea of the systematic scientific investigation of nature. With others in the Lyceum, he carried out such research, but Aristotle also made this methodology part of his investigations. In other words, he practiced science, but he also developed a philosophy of science.

Much of Aristotle's scientific work is dedicated to biology, in which he employs the notions of essence, natural development, and natural purposes. The world primarily consists of natural things that belong to certain kinds, which define their essence. Biological classification must reflect these natural essences, thereby placing animals on a natural scale according to their development at birth, with humans at the top and bloodless molluscs near the bottom. Higher life forms are more perfect than the lower ones. Additionally, Aristotle looks for natural purposes to explain physiological processes and organs. For example, higher animals are naturally hotter. Because breathing cools, they need to breathe a lot, and for this reason, they have lungs.

Aristotle extends the biological notions of natural hierarchies and purposes or ends into physics. The universe consists of two realms. From the moon upward, there is the heavenly world, consisting of the stars and planets, which are in a constant circular motion but are otherwise unchanging. In contrast, below the moon, everything changes and decays and is composed of the four elements: earth, water, air, and fire. These last three lie in concentric layers around the stationary spherical earth, each according to its proper place or natural end. Without intervention, earth will fall downward, in a straight line toward the center of the universe. Likewise, fire will rise naturally upward, away from the center of the universe. Each element has its own natural end. Aristotelian physics did not have the modem notion of inanimate matter. Aristotle's cosmology was based on the (alleged) observation that the celestial bodies move in constant circles. But the four elements (earth, water, fire, and air) always move naturally in a straight line. Therefore, the stars cannot be made of the four elements.

Aristotle's scientific methodology is presented in six works, later compiled as the Organon, which together served as a definitive text until the sixteenth century. The Categories concerns the basic types of words, which are the parts of complete statements. On Interpretation is about these whole statements, which form part of syllogisms. The Prior Analytics is a work in the logic of syllogisms. The Posterior Analytics explains the use of these syllogisms in scientific investigation. Finally, the Topics and the Sophistical Refutations systematize the use of arguments in dialectics and identify some informal fallacies.

The third characteristic of Aristotle's work is his interest in classification, which extends from his work in biology to philosophy, language, and politics. For

example, he classifies different categories, logical inferences, types of explanation, and political systems. This is a more empirical approach than Plato's. Furthermore, Aristotle examines and classifies the way language is employed, such as the different uses of philosophically key terms such as 'being' and 'is,' and this forms the basis of his metaphysics.

Form and matter are not two independently existing things. They are two aspects of any substance or thing, which are separable only in thought. This distinction distances Aristotle from Plato, who conceived of the Forms as independently existing universals. Provisionally, we can conceive of Aristotelian form as the structure or organization of a natural thing. For example, the form of an animal is the way the matter of its body is organized such that it has the power to grow, perceive, and move in the way it does. This is the essence of the animal, and this nature defines its power of movement. The matter is the material out of which the substance or object in question is composed. Matter cannot exist without form, and form requires matter. They are two aspects of any particular thing. The form/matter distinction can be drawn at different levels. The body is the matter of a person. Flesh is the matter of the body. The matter of any compound will be one or more of the four elements – fire, air, earth, and water – and the form/matter distinction can be applied to the elements themselves.

The form/matter distinction allows Aristotle to advance a view that transcends the metaphysics of both the pre-Socratics and Plato. According to Aristotle, the pre-Socratics describe the matter, or the stuff of the universe, but not what reality consists in, that is, individual substances or particulars, such as plants and animals. Against the pre-Socratics, Aristotle argues that these substances are not reducible to the matter out of which they are composed. On the other hand, Plato claims that reality consists ultimately of eternal Ideas or Forms, such as Beauty, Justice, and Goodness. According to Aristotle, Plato's theory misunderstands form. It treats universals as if they were substances. This does not mean that Aristotle denies the existence of Forms. Rather, he denies that universals or forms are substances, or primary existents. According to Aristotle, they exist, but Plato is mistaken about the type of existence they have. Aristotle is able to transcend the pre-Socratics and Plato because he classifies types of existence. He recognizes that there are different ways in which things can be said to exist. This classification of 'exists' or 'be' is the ontological reflection of the categories.

Aristotle's influence is so pervasive, and he introduced so many new concepts into western thought, that we can only highlight a few central points. First, Aristotle observed nature in a systematic way and used these observations to classify natural things into different kinds. His insistence on the importance of

observation makes Aristotle the precursor of empiricism, even though it would be anachronistic and misleading to think of him as an empiricist.

Second, Aristotle's method that combines synthesis and analysis sets a new standard for philosophical reflection for future generations. Consider how he summarizes carefully the views of various pre-Socratic philosophers and tries to separate what can be learned from what should be rejected in their views. Consider, for instance, the debate between Parmenides' thesis that reality is unchanging and Heraclitus' assertion that reality is in constant flux. By analyzing different kinds of change and distinguishing form and matter, Aristotle argues that every event has both a permanent and a changing aspect. In this way, he is able to challenge the specifics of Parmenides' argument in a very direct way. Consider also how he analyzes different uses of crucial words such as 'to be' and 'cause,' and employs these analyses to define the basic categories of human thought and to construct a metaphysic. Aristotle's claim that things can be said to be in many ways provides one of the greatest insights in philosophy, showing how careful attention to language can help resolve philosophical problems.

Third, based on such analyses, Aristotle formulates a three-way distinction between substance, form, and matter, so as to transcend the debate between the pre-Socratics and Plato. Form and matter constitute two inseparable aspects of individual substances, such as a tree and an animal. Neither form nor matter has priority; both are necessary for a substance, and neither is itself a substance. Just as Plato is wrong to conceive form as a substance, so the pre-Socratics were mistaken to treat matter as substance. In this way, Aristotle revolutionized the conception of the soul, rejecting both the reductionism inherent in naturalistic early Milesian thought and the dualism of Plato. In these general terms, Aristotle's analysis is influential today.

Allied to this distinction between substance, form, and matter, Aristotle also distinguished different kinds of explanation or cause; this is the precursor to the contemporary debate concerning whether the types of causal explanations employed in the natural sciences are also appropriate for the social sciences.

Fourth, Aristotle formulated the ideas of metaphysical necessity and essence. Not all the properties of a substance are on the same footing. Some are accidental, and others constitute the essence of a substance. This idea had a tremendous impact on medieval philosophy and became a foundation stone of Scholasticism. In a very different vein, some contemporary thinkers claim that the universe contains natural kinds and individual substances that have a real essence. These are broadly Aristotelian views emanating from his view of essence.

Fifth, Aristotle invented many of the notions that form part of our modern conception of God. For instance, he argued for the necessity of a first cause or

unmoved mover. He also conceived of the divine as the end to which all things strive. As mentioned earlier, Aquinas tried to reconcile Christian doctrine with Aristotle's metaphysics, and in the process made much Christian thought Aristotelian. As a consequence, aspects of Aristotle's metaphysics are alive today as a part of the official doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church.

Finally, Aristotle introduced several key ideas into ethics, which several thinkers draw inspiration from today. In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in virtue theory as an alternative to Kantian and utilitarian action-based approaches to morality. Aristotle's Ethics is considered the primary text in this field, influencing recent writers such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Philippa Foot.

Answer the following questions:

1. Why is Aristotle considered to be the greatest philosopher?
2. Whose tutor was Aristotle?
3. What school did he establish?
4. What investigations did he coordinate?
5. Why did later generations think of Aristotle as a superman?
6. What are the differences in Plato's and Aristotle's thinking?
7. What are Aristotle's scientific works dedicated to?
8. How does Aristotle treat the universe?
9. How does Aristotle treat form and matter?
10. What is Aristotle's role in the development of thought?

Lecture 8. Medieval Philosophy. General Introduction. Early Medieval Philosophers. Plotinus.

Medieval Philosophy. General Introduction

The severe blow dealt to philosophy during the third and fourth centuries came as a great shock to many: books were burned, schools closed, and the Roman empire fell, destroyed not from without but from within. In Rome, the Hellenic philosophical genius and the distinctly antireligious sentiments of the Epicurean and Stoic philosophers, developed during the rise of the Roman Empire, gave way to a slew of cults and emerging religions vying for people's beliefs. With the fall of the Roman Empire, numerous Christian cults began to draw large numbers of followers and superstition was rampant. Even the Roman aristocracy began to worship its emperors as gods, while the common people divided themselves among various cults vying for power. Isis combined the worship of Greek and Egyptian gods, the Mithraic cult worshiped the sun, and the Phrygian cult worshiped the Mother of the Gods. Christian sects, no longer persecuted as they had been under Marcus Aurelius, began to win converts and eventually drew more than all the other cults combined.

Philosophy, however, not only recovered but also in fact continued to flourish, albeit in a very different manner. Philosophy during these tumultuous times came under the strict supervision and authority – some would say protection – of religious orthodoxy. The vast collaborative philosophical systems produced during the so-called Middle Ages, spanning the millennium from the ascendency of Christianity in the fourth century A.D. and the subsequent fall of the Roman Empire in the fifth century, to the Renaissance in the fifteenth century, can be divided into four distinct periods or movements: Early Medieval, Christian, Jewish and Islamic, and Late Medieval. Today, the profound philosophical works produced by medieval thinkers are essential reading for anyone seeking to understand philosophy's long and complex historical development. Not only do these works form a bridge between the ancient and modern worlds, but many of the concepts and categories forged therein have also become the standard tools and techniques of philosophy up to the present day.

Early Medieval Philosophers

The abrupt ending of Greek and Roman philosophy as it had evolved from the golden age of Greece heralded the inward turn of the Early Medieval Period.

Starting in the third century against the backdrop of the rapidly disintegrating Roman Empire, Early Medieval philosophy emerged as a unique blend of religious mysticism with esoteric logic. As Roman military campaigns took their economic toll on both citizens and cities, the great cultural centers of the empire began to unravel. The aristocracy fled to escape the huge taxes and worsening health conditions; nearly a third of the population was wiped out from either war or the plague. The Roman military gained power over the citizens, even over the emperors. People turned away from culture and education, seeking solace in otherworldly religions.

PLOTINUS (205-270 A. D.)

Biographical History

It is against this tumultuous sociopolitical backdrop that Plotinus, the last of the great ancient philosophers, tried to rekindle the flame of Greek thought. Born and raised in Egypt, he studied philosophy in Alexandria. In 243 he went east to study Indian and Persian philosophy; upon his return to Rome he devoted himself to teaching and writing philosophy that, because of his emphasis on the primacy of Plato, is known as neo-Platonism.

Plotinus' vast metaphysics inspired many devoted followers. He convinced Emperor Gallienus to build a second city near Rome, based on Plato's Republic, that was to be called Platonopolis, but the project was never completed. Plotinus' greatest work, posthumously edited by his student Porphyry into six books of nine sections (Enneads) each, is a vast metaphysical vision inspired by Parmenides, Pythagoras, and most of all Plato. Plotinus argues against the materialistic atomism of the Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics, whose materialistic philosophy he regarded as impotent for dealing with the growing superstitions of the time.

Philosophical Overview

Plotinus distinguishes three levels of reality that are but one ultimate reality, much in the way that Christian theologians viewed the Holy Trinity. The Parmenidean One, which he calls 'God,' transcends Being and is, in Plotinus' view, the same as Plato's concept of the supreme form of the good. Because the One, which precedes the good, is essentially indefinable, no predicates can be attributed to it. All we can say about it is that 'It is'. Everything that is, was, and will be exists as an emanation of the One, which is the ultimate and eternal source of all being. The next, second level, below the One, is its first emanation,

consisting in the image of the One, which he identifies with nous, a term that has variously been translated as ‘mind,’ ‘spirit,’ and ‘intellectual principle’. Nous exists as a result of the One trying to understand itself; nous gives to the One vision, the power of seeing, and it is the ‘light’ by which the One sees itself. The next emanation is the third, lowest level of reality, psyche, or the soul, which in turn is the creator not only of all living things but also of the sun, moon, and stars. The soul makes possible the visible world because it has two parts, the inner soul that faces the nous and the outer soul that faces the external world. These three metaphysical ‘levels’ – the One, the nous, and the soul – correspond, respectively, to three distinct levels of consciousness: mystical awareness, intuitive thought, and discursive thought.

Answer the following questions:

1. How can you characterize Early Medieval Philosophy?
2. Why did many cults and religious beliefs appear in the third century?
3. What did Plotinus devote himself to?
4. What did Plotinus argue against?
5. What three levels of reality did Plotinus distinguish?

Lecture 9. Christian Philosophers. Augustine. Thomas Aquinas.

Christian Philosophers.

With more than a little help, either directly or indirectly, from the works of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and the neo-Platonists, Christian philosophy dominated western thought for 1,000 years, from the fall of Rome until the Renaissance. Four of its main Latin Church founders – St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, St. Augustine, and Pope Gregory the Great – were all well versed in philosophical methods and techniques, especially Augustine (Aurelius Augustinus of Hippo), whose influence upon the Church and subsequent developments was deepest and most lasting.

Many have speculated as to why, after nearly 1,000 years of robust development from Thales and the other pre-Socratics, through Plato and Aristotle, culminating with the distinctly antireligious turn of the Epicureans, Stoics, and Skeptics, western civilization seemed suddenly to revert into rampant superstition, chaos, and religious fundamentalism. Plotinus, as we already pointed out, blamed the latter philosophers themselves. He was not alone. His solution – build an even better philosophy, founded on a logically grounded epistemology with an even more vast and all-encompassing, thoroughly cosmic metaphysics – inspired the next generation of philosophers who, regardless of how repressed they may have been by the orthodox church doctrines within which they had to live and work, were at the same time extraordinarily empowered by the sheer magnitude of protection and authority afforded to them by the emerging corporate system of knowledge acquisition. Among these newly hierarchical thinkers, Augustine was no doubt above and beyond the greatest.

AUGUSTINE (354-430)
Biographical History

Like Plotinus, who inspired and influenced him most deeply, Augustine was himself a bridge between ancient and medieval thought. He was born at Tagaste in North Africa (near present-day Tripoli) during the final years of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire. He studied and taught rhetoric – ‘the art of persuasion’ – in Carthage, Rome, and Milan, until he became a devout believer in Manicheism. This powerful Persian religion, the product of a strange mix of Christianity and Zoroastrianism by its Magian founder, Mani (Greek Manes, Latinized Manichaeus), teaches that the human struggle between good and evil is itself a cosmic manifestation of an eternal duel between angelic forces of light and demonic forces of darkness. Mani’s unique marriage of Zoroastrian ideas caught

young Augustine's fancy, especially the claim that Christ himself was an incarnation of the same immortal spirit as Buddha and Zarathustra. He believed that Christ was the original first soul of humanity created by the 'mother of light' as a guide in our cosmic ballet between light and darkness. No sooner did Augustine accept this teaching than he discovered the Skeptics and altogether dropped Manichaenism in favour of a new guiding light: doubt everything that can be doubted. But then he discovered Plotinus and became a devout neo-Platonist.

To Plotinus' religious interpretation of Plato he added Zoroastrian and Manichean themes: the struggle between good and evil, sin and salvation, a philosophical tension that remained the focal point of his thought even after his final conversion to Christianity.

You may think that with so many "conversions," Augustine was wishy-washy or a pushover. He wasn't. The fact is that the most highly esteemed Roman lawyers noted him as an intellectual wizard for his abilities to train young lawyers in rhetoric which he delighted in using to plead the most unimaginably unpopular cases. He became the leading professor of rhetoric at the University of Milan until the year 387, when he suddenly converted to Christianity, returned to his birthplace in Africa, and devoted himself to building monasteries and writing philosophy. He was ordained as a priest in 391 and five years later appointed bishop of Hippo, a city near Carthage, where he remained for the rest of his life.

Philosophical Overview

Plato did metaphysics and epistemology for their own sake. Not Augustine. He saw philosophy in a more Socratic light: the purpose is not knowledge or wisdom for their own sake but, rather, the moral development of individual souls. The goal is salvation, by which he means the ending of suffering and the attainment of happiness, both in this world and in the next. Augustine cleverly augments this ancient Socratic ideal with all the best arguments and tools developed by the Epicureans, Stoics, and Skeptics.

In the works of the neo-Platonists such as Plotinus, Augustine found "all things but one – the Logos made flesh." This problem he then himself solved by laying a firm philosophical foundation for Christianity using their views, especially those of Plotinus. Augustine's unorthodox Christian reinterpretation of neo-Platonism culminates in his view that only a select few individuals can obtain ultimate knowledge of reality via a mystical intuition of 'the supreme Form of the Good,' which is 'God'. His unique form of introspective empiricism begins with a study of the sensations of the external world and proceeds inward with a rigorous psychology of the self. His City of God, written shortly after the fall of the Roman

Empire in 410, provides the philosophical foundations for a new religious state modelled after and inspired by Plato's Republic. Augustine sees a major flaw in Plato's thought: to know the truth does not guarantee that you will do the truth. He finds a similar error in Aristotle: the essence of humanity is not rationality, as Aristotle thought, but will. Furthermore, it therefore follows, according to Augustine, that you cannot believe in God unless first you will yourself to believe. Logic, rationality, and argument are impotent against the will. Augustine's understanding of free will further complicates his astounding vision. The idea, basically, is that we are not free to believe in God or not. Only through Divine Grace can you or I come to believe that God exists. But it is not as simple as that, either. There are several crucially important things that we can and must do to prepare ourselves to receive God's grace. Interestingly enough, this religious preparation is thoroughly and deeply philosophical.

This point about the role of philosophy in Augustine's thought is easily, and often has been, missed by many religious as well as secular philosophers (but not, most notably, by Descartes or Kant). Philosophy in Augustine's conception is not opposed to but in fact essential to religion. This is because true reality can only be understood when we first understand the world of appearances to be false. And although through philosophy we can come to understand that appearances are deceiving, that for instance we do not directly perceive external reality, and so on, we cannot no matter what we do come in actuality to believe that this is so. This profound point – that, essentially, we cannot "believe" what philosophy teaches us, for instance, about perception and reality – has become a bone of contention or the foundation for deep insight for philosophy throughout the ages up to the present day; on the one hand, it provided the fodder for transcendental arguments and, on the other, the pragmatic turn in nineteenth- and twentieth-century thought. But as far as Augustine was concerned, this inner, transcendental revelation of the truth – whether it is about perception, psychological introspection, metaphysics, or God himself – Augustine calls faith. On no account can reason provide such faith. One must start, God willing, with philosophically inspired insights and only then reason to the truth, a method that would be further developed into a very potent philosophy by Descartes. In other words, one cannot reason to faith, one must reason from faith. Hence Augustine's famous dictum, "I believe in order to understand."

Here, then, are the truths that Augustine found by his revolutionary method of inquiry:

1. The mind cannot grasp the true nature of reality on its own.

2. Without special training into a state of illumination, we cannot ever know God.

3. God must illuminate the mind through inner revelation so that the true reality can be grasped.

4. Knowledge of God is predestined by God, and there is nothing any of us can do to attain such knowledge; no amount of study will help, no amount of learning, and not even prayer makes any difference.

Few, if any, professing Christians believe these doctrines today. According to most versions of contemporary Christianity, what you do can and does affect whether or not you attain knowledge of God, salvation, and so on. According to Augustine, however, such "illumination" either will or will not happen, independently of what you do. Even your salvation, or damnation, is preordained, in advance of anything you do, by God. God's grace cannot be earned but must be bequeathed to you directly by God, apparently for no rationally discoverable reason. Again, however, this vision is complicated by Augustine's insistence that although we cannot reach God by rational means, we are nevertheless obliged to seek the impossible, knowing fully well in advance that we cannot know whether we will ever succeed! We must seek truth and enlightenment even though we cannot ever know whether we are on the correct path. There is no 'correct path'. This sounds contradictory, but it is the seed of a very powerful idea that gripped and inspired minds of both religious and antireligious persuasions for generations to come.

Augustine provides an equally provocative answer to Plotinus' question as to why the mind is not fully aware of itself: because, to function properly, the mind must be seduced by its own images, to see its own mental representations of things not as images or representations but as things in themselves. Thus, it is only by properly deceiving itself that the mind can operate in and among the appearances, under a veiled, false, or hidden view of its own operations. To become fully illuminated to itself, to its own existence as such, the mind must detach itself in the manner of the Buddhist, Stoic, and Skeptic, from its own perceptions and the things to which it is attracted by desire. In other words, the mind must remove itself from the seduction of its own images. This view is no doubt reminiscent of the path of the philosopher who leaves the darkness of Plato's cave for the light of the sun. This state the mind can attain when it becomes aware of its three distinct faculties as separately functioning aspects of one entity. These three faculties – memory, understanding, and will – are, Augustine claims, the direct image within us of the Holy Trinity.

In the Confessions, Augustine describes his own final and most dramatic conversion to Christianity, inspired by nothing more and nothing less than the desire to be happy, to which the Aristotelian desire to know is itself subordinate. Even knowledge is a desire based on the desire to be happy (e.g., knowledge is

power and power makes me happy). Still under the influence both of the Manichaean doctrine that salvation comes from ascetic living and the philosophical minimalism of the Stoics and Skeptics, Augustine concludes that we can best achieve salvation by turning away from the world and its numerous pleasures, neither in the abstract and detached way of the Stoics nor in the belief-free disinterestedness of the Skeptics. Augustine's way is predicated on the mind's coming to understand, as in the philosophy of his Platonic predecessors, that what we call 'the world' is not the real world but only our idea, a representation. Likewise, what you call your 'self' is also but an idea, or representation, in your mind and not the real you. In this way Augustine argues that the Stoics were falsely caught up in reaction to what is not real and the Skeptics were caught up arguing against the reality of the appearances, and that both were blinded by their inability to see, beyond both the external and internal world of appearances, what he calls God.

Answer the following questions:

1. How long did Christian philosophy dominate western thought?
2. Who were the founders of Latin Church?
3. Who were the first Christian Philosophers?
4. What religion did young Augustine believe in?
5. What did Manicheism teach?
6. What ideas caught Augustine's fancy and brought him to Christianity?
7. What is the purpose of knowledge according to Augustine?
8. What ideas did he proclaim in his works?
9. What did Augustine call "faith"?
10. What truths did Augustine find?
11. What three faculties did Augustine claim the Holly Trinity?
12. What did Augustine write in his work "The Confessions"?

THOMAS AQUINAS (1225-1274)
Biographical History

Thomas Aquinas was born in Italy, in a small town between Rome and Naples, at the grand Roccasecca castle of his father, the rich and powerful count of Aquino. He was educated at the Benedictine abbey at Monte Cassino until the age of 14, when he went to the University of Naples. Like Anselm, he rejected his father's plans for the aristocratic life of a nobleman and instead, in 1244, to his father's horror, he joined the Dominican Order of mendicant friars whose ideal was complete poverty. He travelled through the countryside, begging for food and

money for the Dominicans, while spreading the Gospel of Jesus. His father was appalled. He in turn begged Thomas to join, instead, the Benedictines; if you're going to live the religious life, his father pleaded, and then do so not with the poor Dominican beggars but with the rich, powerful, and prestigious order of the Benedictines, backed by corporate wealth. When Thomas wouldn't listen, his father had him locked up in the family castle, where he offered him all sorts of bribes, including a very beautiful prostitute.

Thomas refused and instead, with her help, escaped to France. There he studied philosophy and theology with one of the greatest Scholastic thinkers, fellow Dominican Albertus Magnus (1200-1280), called 'Doctor Universalis,' and 'Albert the Great' because of his vast knowledge both of Greek and Islamic philosophy. Like his Islamic nemesis Averns, Aquinas spent his formative philosophical years primarily in the study and interpretation of the works of Aristotle, and writing scholarly commentaries on those works. In his later, more mature, philosophical works, he develops a full-blown metaphysics involving both a theory of being and of essence that incorporates Aristotelian principles of cause and change, arguing against the Averroist doctrine of the unity of all souls. Aquinas became regent master (full professor) at the University of Paris, and taught there and in Italy for the rest of his life.

Philosophical Overview

The Dominicans weren't just poor; many regarded them as dangerous philosophical and religious radicals. Their political troubles began when conservative university authorities in Paris accused the order of being Averroesists who believed that – quite contrary to received orthodox Christian doctrine – all souls are one. This idea, besides being antithetical to the political agenda of the time, which required un-crossable class borders between the haves and the have-nots, was originally a bone of contention between early Gnostic Christianity and its later, orthodox variant. Because history tends to be written by winners, that early radical aspect of Christian thought was repressed, especially during the top-down authoritarian times that so characterized the entire Middle Ages. Like the great neo-Platonist Plotinus before him, who interpreted Plato's teaching as leading to the summit that ultimately all souls are one, Averroes argued that your personality, defined in terms of the 'passive' aspect of the soul, is not immortal. It dies with the body. But the active part of your consciousness, the 'active intellect,' is not only immortal but also, according to Averroes – which he derived using the arguments of not Plato but Aristotle – is numerically identical in all sentient beings. You and I and everyone who has ever existed or will exist, including God, are one and the

same entity. This idea – which arguably can be derived from the teachings of the ancient Greeks, from Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle – was declared heresy by the church, punishable by death. (As late as the start of the seventeenth century, Renaissance philosopher Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake for professing it.)

Aquinas helped defend his fellow Dominicans against this heresy with help, ironically, from another one of Averroes' doctrines, namely, that there are two very different notions of truth:

1. 'Truth' as defined in logical terms by the use purely of human reason.
2. 'Truth' defined in terms of direct revelation from God.

The second does not necessarily contradict or destroy the former, but it does, as it were, trump it; if and when the two conflict, direct revelation is the 'real' truth. Aquinas then goes on to argue that, since Christian dogma derives from views fundamentally antithetical to Averroes' monopsychism (the idea that all souls are one), its revealed truth trumps the rational arguments for the unity of mankind as espoused by Averroes and the so-called integral Aristotelian school of philosophy.

It is perhaps even more deeply ironic that Aristotle, whose works had been lost to the non-Arabic world for centuries, was the main ancient influence both on Aquinas and Averroes. His return upon the scene from two opposing philosophical camps troubled many conservative Christian theologians, who feared that the Islamic philosophers had coloured them with their own spins and interpretations through their detailed and often deeply illuminating commentaries. They worried that ancient philosophy had been thus compromised, or tainted. Aquinas would have none of that. He quite openly agreed with his Islamic nemesis, Averroes, that Aristotle was without question the greatest philosopher ever. If Averroes could use Aristotle to justify Islam, Aquinas was ready and willing to use Aristotle to justify Christianity, to put the formerly faith-based doctrine on a new and philosophically secure intellectual foundation rooted in reason.

Answer the following questions:

1. When and where was Thomas Aquinas born?
2. How did he spend his youth?
3. Where did he study Philosophy?
4. How did Aquinas spend his formative philosophical years?
5. What was originally a bone of contention between early Gnostic Christianity and its orthodox variant?
6. What troubled many conservative Christian theologians?
7. What doctrine was Aquinas ready to justify?

Lecture 10. Islamic and Jewish Philosophers. Avicenna.

Islamic and Jewish Philosophers

Two centuries after the fall of the Roman Empire, in the early part of the sixth century, the philosophical schools founded 1,000 years earlier by Plato and Aristotle in Athens were closed. With Greek learning denounced by papal authorities as pagan heresies, philosophers were imprisoned or killed and the practice of what today we would call philosophy was outlawed in most of Europe. Some escaped with their banished classical and ancient Greek texts to Persia, where these works translated into Syrian and Arabic and began to influence Islamic and Jewish thinkers.

During the coming centuries, while orthodox Christendom ruled Europe with an iron fist, the philosophies of the ancients, but especially Plato and Aristotle, not only survived but also continued to evolve across the Mediterranean. New schools of philosophy arose in Alexandria, Syria, and Persia. Their libraries were filled with translations of all the major Greek texts forbidden in Europe. When the Arabs conquered Spain, they brought these works back into Europe and thereby, in an ironic twist, Islamic philosophers set within Europe the flame of the golden age of Greece. Two of the most important Islamic philosophers of the time. Avicenna (Ibn Sina) and Avenos (Ibn Rushid), were both thought to be followers mainly of Aristotle. In reality, their thought and writings were a mix of Platonic and Aristotelian ideas, which they learned from influential neo-Platonic works such as The Theology of Aristotle, which was itself based mainly on Plotinus' Enneads. At the same time, the great Jewish philosopher Maimonides – a contemporary of Averroes, born in Cordova, Spain – produced a synthesis of both systems in what generally is regarded as one of the greatest philosophical works of the Middle Ages.

Answer the following questions:

1. Whose teaching influenced Islamic and Jewish thinkers?
2. Where did new schools of philosophy arise?
3. Who were the most important Islamic philosophers of the time?
4. Whose followers were they?
5. What were their philosophical views?

AVICENNA (IBN SINA) (980-1037)

Biographical History

The great Persian (Iranian) philosopher Avicenna was born in Afshana, near Bocchara (Bukhara), in Turkistan. He studied the works of Porphyry, Euclid, Ptolemy, Plato, and Aristotle, along with the Koran, with a distinct eye for the art of healing; he practiced not as a theoretical philosopher but as a physician; his first works were his medical Canon and his Healing, the latter of which was an encyclopedic synthesis of logic, metaphysics, physics, philosophy, and medicine, which influenced scholars on both continents. He became a teacher and personal physician to Persian kings and princes, and his works were standard fare well into the seventeenth century.

Philosophical Overview

Avicenna led the first and arguably greatest revival of classical Greek thought in the Islamic world. His main influences were Plato, as interpreted by the neo-Platonists, and even more so Aristotle, whom he and his students regarded as the greatest philosopher of all time. His distinctly Aristotelian metaphysics had a tripartite division of universals, which exist in the mind of God, in rebus in individual particulars, and in the human mind. His interpretation of the logical and ontological forms of universals became the standard for medieval Aristotelians on both sides of the Mediterranean.

Avicenna, like Aristotle, views metaphysics as the science of being, based on an elaborate synthesis of the neo-Platonic theory of emanation and insights weaned from his own highly intuitive, introspective, empirical psychology.

The idea is based on a distinction between the Aristotelian division between possible being, which exists through, by, or in virtue of something else other than itself, and necessary being, which exists through, by, or in virtue of its own essence. Only in God are essence and existence identical. The human mind is capable of knowing this because being itself consists of a series of intelligences whose essence as such is understandable, knowable, meaningful, orderly, logical, and communicable essences by an immediate act of intuition. The intelligences structure the ultimate reality of both the internal and external worlds and are accessible to individual human intelligence through philosophical contemplation. The active intelligence that illuminates the human mind is one and the same in all of human beings. But, as in the view of Aquinas in contrast to Averroes, Avicenna argues that the ‘potential intellect’ in which the individual human psyche exists

also survives death as such, which is in line both with Mohammedan and Christian ethics.

Nearly all philosophers writing about God as conceived in the Judeo-Christian and Islamic traditions have had to grapple with the question of evil. How could God, the greatest and most perfect, all-knowing, all-good being, create a world with evil in it? Isn't evil a flaw in creation? How then can we conceive of the creator as perfect if the world thus created by God is imperfect? Would not a perfect being create a perfect world, a utopia? And so on. In this selection, Avicenna takes this issue head-on. First, after arguing that the soul, though immortal, is vulnerable to punishment and reward for its actions, he argues that the existence of evil in a world created by a perfect being is not only possible, but also necessary. He develops his view with emphasis on ideas derived from Plato and especially Aristotle, whom he calls, simply and reverently, 'the Sage'.

In many ways, Avicenna did for Islam what Aquinas did for Christianity (or, contra-positively, for philosophy), namely, made philosophy in the tradition of Plato and Aristotle compatible within the religion of the day. His distinction between existence and essence in individual creatures, and the unity of existence and essence in God, became an integral part of the medieval philosophical education that formed the basis, most notably, for Thomas Aquinas' philosophy. His theory of intelligences, derived from Aristotle, became the medieval religious doctrine of angels. The Dominican Albertus Magnus (1193-1280), who was mentor to Aquinas, incorporated many of Avicenna's principles and methods, which influenced him to formulate his notion of intention. In Islamic thought, Avicenna provided the basis for the work of Avem's, who also argued for the unity of the active intellect, albeit in a way that both Islamic and Christian religious philosophers rejected because it did not carry individual differences beyond the grave into a system of justified rewards and punishments in the next life.

Answer the following questions:

1. When and where did Avicenna live?
2. Whose works did he study?
3. What were his works about?
4. Whose teaching influenced Avicenna greatly?
5. How does Avicenna view metaphysics?
6. What is his metaphysics based on?
7. What did Avicenna argue about the existence of evil in a world?
8. What did Avicenna do for Islam and the medieval philosophical education?

Lecture 11. Modern Philosophy. General Introduction. The Birth of Science.

Modern Philosophy. General Introduction

One can view the modem period as an extraordinary drama, an intense struggle between two worldviews: medieval Scholastic thought and the emerging modern science. This struggle led eventually to the Enlightenment. Such a view simplifies the intellectual history of the medieval period by ignoring the wealth and diversity of its thought; nevertheless, the following sketch captures a relevant aspect of history.

During the medieval period, a tiny minority of people had access to learning, and almost exclusively through the Church, which controlled dogma. The general medieval picture of the universe, which had changed little in centuries, was inherited from the ancient philosophers. The earth was seen as the centre of the universe, around which there are seven spheres or domes. The universe was composed of the four elements: earth, water, air, and fire. Philosophical disputes were settled generally by appeal to two authorities: scripture and Aristotle. This simplified picture does not apply to the great philosophers of the medieval period such as Ockham and Aquinas.

In the thirteenth century, Aquinas tried to reconcile the revelations of Christianity with the earthly knowledge of Aristotle, and attempted to show that theological claims are consistent with the demands of reason. His Summa Theologica became the main textbook for instruction in theology. Thomas' version of Aristotle became Scholastic dogma. The Church, worried about any deviations from authorized belief, actively discouraged free learning. For example, as late as 1586, the Jesuits issued the following doctrine: 'In logic, natural philosophy, ethics and metaphysics, Aristotle's doctrine is to be followed'. The revolution that changed all this was both political and conceptual. There are some important landmarks in the political and social revolution. The first was the invention of the printing press in 1455. As more and cheaper books became available, more people outside church institutions became interested in learning, and there emerged a European community of free thinkers. The second landmark occurred in 1517, when Luther rebelled against the Catholic Church in Germany. Scandalized by the indulgences being sold by the Church, he campaigned publicly for its reform. Finally, Luther established a new church, which led to the proliferation of Protestant sects around Europe. The third milestone was the separation of the Church from the state, it was important landmarks in the political and social revolution, especially in northern Europe. During the medieval period, the Church was the most powerful and wealthy institution in Europe. The pope appointed and

dismissed kings and emperors, while the Church taxed nations for the Crusades and for its buildings and administration. After Luther, many northern European states became independent of the Roman Church, and the new Protestant churches were in a subordinate position to the state. For example, in 1531, Henry VIII established the Church of England. Just as Gutenberg's press made Luther possible, Luther made Henry VIII possible.

Throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, rational thought became gradually more independent of Christianity. Philosophy separated itself slowly from theology. As Europe became wealthier, a new middle class developed, which included professionals devoted to learning outside ecclesiastical institutions. Furthermore, the Renaissance in Italy caused a huge increase in translations of classical pagan works, including those of Plato and the atomist, Lucretius. The arts and humanism flourished. There was a fresh confidence in the air and a new desire for learning. By the end of the sixteenth century, the conditions were ripe for a revolutionary change. The modern era was about to be born. Modern science and philosophy began to replace Aristotelian Scholasticism. Probably the three people most important in causing these changes were Galileo, Francis Bacon, and Descartes.

Answer the following questions:

1. How can we view the modern period of Philosophy?
2. What important landmarks in the political and social revolution changed the world?
3. When did rational thought become gradually more independent of Christianity?
4. How did the Renaissance in Italy influence Modern science and philosophy?

The Birth of Science

Philosophically, the modern challenge to the Scholastic tradition was a dispute about the nature of evidence and explanation.

1. Evidence: Up to the late sixteenth century, investigation consisted in studying authoritative texts such as those of Aquinas and the Bible, and debate comprised citing and making deductions from them. However, the emerging new sciences, such as astronomy, had no place for arguments from authority. They relied on observation and reasoning. The English philosopher Francis Bacon strongly attacked authoritarian arguments on the grounds that the new sciences

required freedom from the old traditions to investigate the universe without prejudice and superstition.

2. Explanation: Traditionally, medieval thinkers tried to explain natural events, such as the motion of planets, in terms of natural and divine purposes. Viewed in this way, nature becomes the handiwork of God. Early modem philosophers, such as Descartes and Bacon, argued that final causes could not be used in the scientific study of matter. They replaced explanation by purposes with mechanistic explanation employing physical causal laws. Additionally, medieval tradition conceived the universe as a hierarchical whole, with different levels of being. Between the macrocosmic universe and the micro-cosmic man, there existed affinities, which were used in explanation.

In sharp contrast, according to Galileo and Descartes, the study of nature should concern itself only with the measurable properties of matter, such as size, shape, and motion. This puts all natural things on the same level, subject to the same mathematical physical laws, and it means that natural objects differ only in quantitative ways. This, in turn, implies the rejection of Aristotle's four elements, earth, water, air, and fire, and the denial of his distinction between the lower earthly and the higher celestial levels.

At stake in this conflict was the nature of the universe and of human life. According to the medieval Christian view, the universe was a quasi-organic piece of handiwork created by God, full of omens and signs. Modem science seemed to portray the universe as completely material, and all changes as mechanical, leaving no place for the soul or for God and, thus, threatening to make religion redundant. On the other hand, the optimism of the new science promised progress and freedom.

Descartes framed the fundamental questions of this age of transformation. How could the new sciences be reconciled with religion? Descartes pioneered this philosophical reflection. He saw the need to reevaluate the basis of knowledge in order to reconcile the new science with religion. He wrote, 'No more useful inquiry can be proposed than that which seeks to determine the nature and scope of human knowledge'.

The Rise and Conflicts of Modern Philosophy

The changes of the modern period occurred gradually. Furthermore, despite the radical break with the past, the science of Descartes' time was not like that of today. What we today call the scientific method was very much a work in progress. Therefore, the modern philosophers were struggling not only with the broad

philosophical implications of the new science, but also with its important details. As a result, the modern period contains an extraordinary burst of philosophical activity and a proliferation of different metaphysical views about the nature of the universe.

The development of science implicitly contained two models of knowledge. The first is typified by insistence on the importance of experimentation and sense experience, on the idea that hypotheses based on carefully made observations are less susceptible to error. The second model is based on the example of mathematics, on the idea that reasoning logically from self-evident truths yields error-free conclusions. Based on these two models, we can give a simplified portrait of modern philosophy by distinguishing two currents of thought about knowledge: Empiricism and Rationalism. Whereas Empiricists emphasize the empirical source of knowledge, the Rationalists stress its rational nature.

Furthermore, to extend this picture, although the early Empiricists stated the principles of Empiricism, they did not realize their full implications, and Berkeley and Hume progressively took these Empiricist principles to their logical conclusion. Similarly, although Descartes articulated the fundamental principles of Rationalism, he did not apply them consistently, and Spinoza and Leibniz took Rationalism to its logical conclusion.

Finally, Kant tried to transcend these two major currents of thought. He argued against the extreme positions of both Hume and Leibniz by giving a non-empiricist critique of Rationalism, and thereby forging a new vision of the world and humanity's place in it, which emphasized the importance of human freedom. In this way, Kant represents the final step in the huge change from the Scholastic medieval worldview to that of the Enlightenment.

Of course, this picture of the development of modern philosophy from Galileo to Kant is an oversimplification. The thinkers of the period did not see themselves as members of any philosophical school; the Empiricist/Rationalist distinction was invented after the fact. Furthermore, often the similarities between a so-called Empiricist and a so-called Rationalist are more striking than their differences. For instance, one could classify Hobbes as both and Pascal as neither. Also, the picture ignores many other important thinkers of the time, such as Pierre Gassendi, Nicolas Malebranche, Thomas Reid, Christian Wolff, and Mary Wollstonecraft. Nevertheless, this rough classification helps make initial sense of the modern era, and the great philosophers of that period.

Answer the following questions:

1. What was the modern challenge to the Scholastic tradition?

2. How did English philosopher Francis Bacon strongly attack authoritarian arguments?

3. How did modern science seem to portray the universe?

4. What models of knowledge did the development of science contain?

5. What two currents of thought can we distinguish in Modern Philosophy?

6. What great philosophers of that period do you know?

Lecture 12. The Enlightenment Philosophers. Rene Descartes. Spinoza.

The Enlightenment Philosophers

The modern period also saw a dramatic revolution in thinking about morality, politics, and human values. The medieval conception of values was based largely on the authority of God, both in politics and ethics. In contrast, Descartes, Bacon, and Hobbes optimistically stressed the practical potential of science to improve the material lives of people, and the dominant conception of morality became based increasingly on reason (or, in the case of Hume, human feeling), rather than God's commands. At the same time, the conception of the state altered. Hobbes and Locke tried to apply the principles of reason to political thought. They initiated a process that replaced the old concept of divinely appointed kings or rulers with the idea of a social contract that guaranteed certain freedoms and rights for the citizen. This new political philosophy went hand in glove with changes in the power structures governing society, especially in England, where the elected Parliament gradually gained ascendancy over the king.

In this, Locke was the pioneer. His philosophy was directed against authoritarianism, dogma, and the repression of individual free thought. He developed a conception of political power based not on command, but on consent. He advanced a view of knowledge founded on individual experience instead of dogma and authority, and an understanding of religion that embraced tolerance. This led the way to the French Enlightenment of Voltaire, to the French Revolution, and, finally, to the ideals enshrined in the Constitution of the United States of America.

RENE DESCARTES (1596-1650)
Biographical History

In 1616, after studying law at Poitiers in his native France, Rene Descartes began to travel, hoping to discover the knowledge contained 'in the great book of the world'. In Holland, he met Isaac Beckman, who stimulated Descartes' interests in mathematics and physics. Descartes then enlisted in the army. On November 10, 1619, stranded in a winter storm alone in a room, Descartes began to doubt all his beliefs. That night he had three dreams that he felt were divine indications of his philosophical mission to discover the unity of the sciences. During the 1620s, Descartes continued travelling in Germany, Holland, France, and Italy. In 1629, he

decided to settle in Holland, where he experimented in optics and physiology, and visited universities to talk to mathematicians and doctors. By 1633, he had completed a work called The World, which explained 'all of physics' and included topics such as heat, light, astronomy, and human physiology. Descartes withdrew the book when he heard of Galileo's condemnation by the Church. In 1637, he published the Discourse on the Method for Conducting One's Reason Rightly. Between 1638 and 1640, Descartes lived with his former servant, Helene, who had borne him a daughter, Francine. The child died suddenly in 1640. In 1641, his main work, the Meditations on First Philosophy, was published with six sets of objections and his replies. Two years later, he began his celebrated correspondence with Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia. In 1644, he dedicated the Principles of Philosophy to Princess Elizabeth, and his last work, The Passion of the Soul, was inspired by his discussions with her. In 1649, he left for Sweden to act as tutor to Queen Christina. A few months later, he caught pneumonia and died.

Philosophical Overview

The main aims of Descartes' Meditations are, first, to build a secure foundation for knowledge and in particular for his physics and, second, to show that this physics is compatible with the two main claims of religion, namely, the existence of God and the soul.

The Method of Doubt

In the First Meditation, Descartes outlines his Method of Doubt. He realizes that many of his beliefs are unreliable and that knowledge must be based on certainty, which we can gain only by rejecting the uncertain. The ultimate aim of the method is to discover a secure foundation for knowledge and, more specifically, for the new physics. In other words, Descartes raises the question of doubt only to show how it should be answered. This answer will reveal how his own scientific approach is preferable to Scholasticism, as well as how science and religion can be reconciled.

Doubt does not require thinking that one's beliefs are false; it means suspending judgment as to their truth. In effect, Descartes' Method of Doubt amounts to withholding the judgment that anything in the external world corresponds to our ideas in the mind. It consists of three progressively radical arguments, the conclusion of each of which is to show that doubt is reasonable.

In the third stage of doubt, Descartes claims that he has no evidence to refute the claim that there is a supremely powerful and intelligent spirit, which does its

utmost to deceive him. However, if there were a powerful deceiving demon, he (Descartes) would be mistaken even in thinking that his sense experiences correspond to external objects at all. The argument is as follows:

1. I have no evidence that there is no powerful spirit deceiving me.
2. If there were such a demon, then all my beliefs would be mistaken.
3. If I have no evidence against the claim that a belief is mistaken, then that belief is open to reasonable doubt.

The Cartesian Influence

Descartes set the agenda for much seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophy and science. As the leading pioneer in the fight to free philosophy and the fledgling sciences from the domination of medieval Scholasticism, he argued for the strategic importance of epistemology. This argument impressed later Empiricists, such as Locke, who also saw the definition of knowledge as vital to the progress of knowledge. At the same time, Descartes' project also required a metaphysical reconciliation of science and religion, and this aim influenced later Rationalists such as Spinoza and Leibniz.

Science and Mathematics

Descartes' geometrical and mechanical conception of physics reigned over Europe until it was eclipsed by Newton's more comprehensive system. Descartes' physics was so influential largely because it unified all the diverse scientific studies of the time, which had been perceived previously as disconnected investigations. The Cartesian ideal that the natural sciences should be a unity had an enduring influence even long after the specifics of Descartes' physics had been replaced. One might claim that Descartes was the first modem thinker to conceive of physics as a single body of knowledge. He was the first modern philosopher to suggest in some detail how areas as diverse as astronomy and physiology can be reduced to a few mechanical laws. Descartes' scientific vision was also so influential because it was mathematically based. He insisted that physics should be framed in terms of the clear and distinct ideas of mathematics. He also expounded the Euclidean ideal that mathematical theorems should be deductible from a few basic concepts and axioms, and embodied this ideal by formulating the principles of analytic geometry, which had an influence on Leibniz and nineteenth-century mathematicians such as Giuseppe Peano, George Boole, and John Venn.

In summary, Descartes' work defined the direction of much philosophy at least up to the time of Kant. It influenced directly Hobbes, Locke, Malebranche, and Spinoza and, from there, many other thinkers.

Answer the following questions:

1. What the medieval conception of values was based largely on?
2. Why did Descartes, Bacon, and Hobbes stress the practical potential of science?
3. What principles did Hobbes and Locke try to apply?
4. What Locke's philosophy was directed against?
5. When and where did Rene Descartes live?
6. How did he spend his youth?
7. What were his works about?
8. What are the main aims of Descartes' Meditations?
9. What does Descartes claim in his Method of Doubt?
10. Why was Descartes' physics so influential?
11. Why was Descartes' scientific vision so influential?

BARUCH DE SPINOZA (1632-1677)

Biographical History

Baruch de Spinoza was born in the Jewish community of Amsterdam. His early education was almost entirely religious, but his later teachers included Manasseh ben Israel, a major figure in seventeenth-century Judaism who introduced Spinoza to non-Jewish philosophy, languages, mathematics, and physics. In 1656, Spinoza was excommunicated from the synagogue, and he began using the Latin version of his name, Benedict. His family disowned him, and he chose the trade of making and polishing lenses for spectacles, microscopes, and telescopes. From 1660 to 1663, Spinoza lived near Leiden, and he joined the study groups of the Collegiant sect, who were opposed to rigid orthodoxy. Spinoza worked on his major book, The Ethics, intermittently from 1662 to 1675. In the meantime, in 1663, he published the Principles of the Philosophy of Rene Descartes. In 1670, he moved to The Hague, where he spent the rest of his life. During his last years, Spinoza wrote a Hebrew grammar, a scientific treatise on the rainbow, and the Tractatus Politicus.

Philosophical Overview

Spinoza's aim in The Ethics is to present a new vision of ethics founded on metaphysics. He rejects Descartes' mind/body dualism, as well as a universe/God dualism. Instead, he argues that there is only one substance, Nature or God, and claims that the understanding of this oneness is the highest possible good.

Substance

The main point of Part I of The Ethics is that there can be only one substance, called 'God' or 'Nature'. God is not an entity distinct from the universe, and mind and matter are just two of the infinite attributes of the one substance. Substance exists in itself, independent of anything else, and 'is conceived through itself'. The only thing that qualifies as being conceived through itself is something that does not depend on any external causes, and that is Nature as a whole. Since everything must have a cause, substance must be its own cause, and, therefore, it must exist. However, only something infinite can be its own cause, and there can only be one infinite substance.

Spinoza tries to prove that God with infinite attributes necessarily exists and that there can be only one such substance. To prove that there is only one substance, Spinoza argues that

a) substance must exist, or there exists at least one substance; and b) there can be only one substance because substance must be infinite.

To prove that substance must exist, Spinoza demonstrates that it cannot be caused by anything but itself. This is true, he argues, because there cannot be two substances of the same kind and that substances of different kinds cannot cause each other. To prove that only one substance can exist, Spinoza argues that substance has all infinite attributes, and there cannot be two substances with the same attribute. In conclusion, the only substance is Nature as a whole. The substance must be infinite and it necessarily exists, so it can be identified with God.

In effect, Spinoza shows how a rationalistic view of explanation and the standard definition of 'substance' imply that there is only one substance. He defines substance as an independent existent, and his Rationalism interprets the word 'independent' so strictly that nothing but Nature as a whole counts as independent. Because he assimilates causation to logical implication, Spinoza assumes that the conception of any thing must include its explanation, which implies that no substance can be conceived in isolation. Descartes' philosophy is inconsistent because it involves the traditional definition of substance and the Rationalist view of causation, and yet it maintains that God is not the only substance. Descartes refers to minds and bodies as 'created substances,' which according to Spinoza is a contradiction in terms.

Spinoza's Influence

Spinoza's main metaphysical conclusion is that there is only one substance. This rejection of a God/universe dualism makes Spinoza part of a long tradition of pantheism and deism that includes Schelling, Hegel, and other nineteenth-century idealists who tend to regard God as the Absolute or the all-encompassing infinite totality. Hegel claimed that to be a philosopher, one must first be a Spinozist. Just as he repudiates a God/universe separation, Spinoza also rejects Descartes' mind/body distinction. Mind and body are two aspects of persons. This type of view has seemed attractive to many philosophers who are unwilling to accept either strict materialism or dualism. For example, the twentieth-century Oxford philosopher Peter Strawson argues in his book Individuals (1959) that 'person' is a basic or primitive concept and not a compound of mind and body. Mental and bodily predicates pick out two aspects of persons rather than two substances.

Perhaps the most persistently influential aspect of Spinoza's work is his ethical theory. This persistence is due to at least three factors:

1. First, Spinoza defines ethics in terms of personal development rather than moral requirements imposed by the needs of society. Ethics is a personal question of combating negative and dehabilitating passions, such as hatred, fear, jealousy, and anger, within oneself and of cultivating an understanding that naturally breeds love. It is not merely a question of complying with social moral rules. This aspect of Spinoza's work has inspired recent writers such as Michel Foucault to distinguish ethics and morality.

2. Second, Spinoza's ethical theory is based on a metaphysical and spiritual vision of the universe, but it is not tied explicitly to a specific religious tradition. It has the majesty of a religious metaphysics but apparently without being doctrinaire. This has made it appealing to pantheists and deists. Spinoza sees the divine in nature rather than outside it; God is immanent rather than transcendental. In other words, nature has divine qualities, and our ethical lives should be a response to this facet of nature. This aspect of Spinoza's thinking appealed greatly to the Romantics of the nineteenth century. The first romantic champion of Spinoza's Ethics was Friedrich Jacobi, around 1785, who made the work famous. From then on, it influenced many Romantic German thinkers such as Schelling (1775-1854) and especially the great German philosopher poet Johann Goethe (1749-1832), who said that he was 'converted' to the Ethics on first reading. From there, Spinoza's influence spread to Britain when the English poets Samuel Taylor Coleridge and William Wordsworth visited Germany in 1798 and passed the Romantic spirit in Spinoza onto Percy Bysshe Shelley and John Keats.

3. Recent ecological thinkers have drawn inspiration from a third aspect of Spinoza's ethics: the holism. For instance, 'deep ecology,' which was developed by Arne Naess in the 1970s, opposes so-called shallow approaches that characterize our environmental problems merely as the prevalence of pollution and the depletion of resources. Such views are superficial because they fail to identify our ecological predicament as constituted by an unhealthy way of life and unsustainable modes of thinking. Some deep ecologists argue that the conception of an individual as an entity separate from its environment is a mistaken metaphysical notion. The universe consists of parts within wholes, and the only genuine whole is the universe itself. Like Spinoza, some deep ecologists see the process of acquiring ecological awareness as a process of spiritual transformation through which one transcends the limited individualistic conception of the self.

In his own time, Spinoza's work had little immediate effect. It was considered atheistic. For instance, in 1732, Berkeley called him the 'great leader of our modern infidels,' and even Hume refers to the 'hideous hypothesis'of 'the famous atheist'. The main exception was Leibniz, who was influenced strongly by Spinoza, whom he visited in October 1676.

Answer the following questions:

1. When and where did Spinoza live?
2. Who influenced his views?
3. What is his main work?
4. In what terms does Spinoza define ethics?
5. What is Spinoza's ethical theory based on?
6. What is the third aspect of Spinoza's ethics?
7. Why have recent ecological thinkers drawn inspiration from a third aspect of Spinoza's ethics?

Lecture 13. The Empiricists. Francis Bacon.

The Empiricists

The development of science in seventeenth century Europe depended on both mathematical reasoning and observation. Whereas the Rationalists stressed the importance of the former, the Empiricists emphasized the latter. Empiricism is the view that all knowledge and concepts originate from experience. Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume are called Empiricists because they share common concerns and assumptions, but not because they follow a specific school of thought. The central claims of Empiricism are as follows:

1. All ideas are derived from experience.

All complex ideas are built from the simple ideas we receive from experience. Consequently, there are no innate ideas or concepts. This view involves an atomistic conception of experience. All ideas are either complex or simple. Any complex idea is composed of simple ideas; and by definition, these simples cannot be broken down any further. If there were an idea that could not be derived from experience, then we would not be justified in using it to make judgments about experience. For example, Hume argues that, as traditionally conceived, the ideas of cause, substance, and self cannot be derived from experience, and he concludes that beliefs based on such ideas are not justified.

2. We can perceive directly only our own ideas.

We are immediately aware only of our own ideas, as a given in experience. Consequently, we are not immediately aware of external objects.

3. Reason is not a source of knowledge about the world.

We can have no a priori knowledge of the world. Hume, in particular, makes this thesis explicit by distinguishing between relations of ideas and matters of fact. A priori reasoning is possible only concerning the relations between concepts, and such reasoning does not give us knowledge of matters of fact or of the world. In other words, we cannot have knowledge of the world through a priori reasoning alone. To have knowledge of facts, we must resort to experience. Hume's distinction undermines Rationalism.

4. All meaningful words stand for ideas.

In the Enquiry, Hume says, 'When we entertain any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea, we need but inquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived?' In other words, words stand for ideas, which are derived from sense experience.

The preceding four claims articulate the basic pillars of modern Empiricism. However, this does not mean that each Empiricist philosopher endorses all of

them. These broad similarities do not indicate any uniformity in the views of the Empiricists. Sometimes, the similarities between an Empiricist and a Rationalist are just as important as the similarities between two Rationalists.

Answer the following questions:

1. What did the development of science in seventeenth century Europe depend on?
2. What are the central claims of Empiricism?
3. Does each Empiricist philosopher endorse all of them?

FRANCIS BACON (1561-1626)

Biographical History

At age 23, Bacon became a member of the English Parliament. However, it was not until after the death of Queen Elizabeth in 1603 that he was appointed Attorney General and, in 1618, Lord Chancellor of England. Three years later, he was found guilty of accepting bribes, and he lost all political power; he was banished from the court and was forced to sell his London mansion. The Essays appeared in 1597, and his first book, The Advancement of Learning, was published in 1605. In 1610, he wrote New Atlantis, concerning the cooperative nature of scientific research. Novum Organum was published in 1620. After his impeachment, Bacon wrote two works on natural history: Historia Ventorum, 1622; and Historia Vitae et Mortis, 1623. Bacon died in 1626, after catching a cold whilst experimenting on stuffing a dead chicken with snow.

Philosophical Overview

Bacon envisioned scientific knowledge as a new world or continent which he would provide the map. According to Bacon's vision, knowledge should be used to control nature for the benefit and liberation of humanity. This was humanity's new mission, the worldly counterpart of spiritual salvation. Bacon saw himself as articulating the principles for the dawn of a new era, and sweeping aside the stagnant Scholastic view of knowledge that dominated Europe. However, Bacon's work does not argue for a systematic metaphysical theory to replace Scholasticism. Rather, it consists in voicing this vision and finding the means to bring it about.

As such, Bacon had three philosophical ambitions. First, he tried to classify all kinds of knowledge. Second, he wanted to undermine the popular

misconceptions of learning. Third, he presented a new method for the systematic advancement of scientific knowledge.

The Criticism of False Learning

Bacon's aim in the first part of The Advancement of Learning is to remove obstacles to the methodological progress of science; for this purpose, he criticizes three misleading schools of learning.

1. Dominant at the time was Aristotelian Scholasticism, which Bacon calls the 'disputatious' style of learning, which fruitlessly speculates about theology. Also, Bacon criticizes the Scholastics for overemphasis on deduction, which cannot yield new knowledge, and for too little emphasis on observation, which can. Most Scholastic philosophers try to preserve tradition rather than seek new knowledge.

2. He also criticizes the humanism of his time, which he calls the 'delicate style of learning'. He accuses it of indifference to the serious business of science, and for preoccupation with vacuous eloquence and polite morality.

3. The third problematic style of learning is that of the occultists. Despite their desire to master nature, the occultists uncritically accept myths and fables. In contrast, scientific knowledge should be based on rational procedure and observation that anyone could critically accept.

The New Method of Induction

Bacon claims that science should be based on his new method of eliminative induction, which he contrasts with simple enumerative induction. In enumerative induction, one derives an unrestricted general conclusion from an observed finite set of singular cases. From the fact that one has seen a few white swans, one concludes rashly that all swans are white. In contrast, the scientist should seek counter-instances in order to try to falsify a hypothesis, which can be eliminated. The scientific method should be eliminative and not enumerative.

Bacon's example of his method at work is the discovery of the nature of heat. First, draw up three lists: a list of hot things that are otherwise unalike; a list of cold things, which are otherwise like the hot things; and, finally, a list of things of varying degrees of heat. By carefully comparing these tables, one can reject some suggestions as to the nature of heat, and make a first affirmation as to its nature. Second, from a number of such affirmations of the lowest degree of generality, one can suggest laws that are slightly more general, and so on. Third, any proposed law or hypothesis should be tested in new circumstances. One must try to falsify it, and if one cannot, the hypothesis is to that extent confirmed. In particular, one should

look for experiments that hasten the process of induction by allowing one to reject quickly false hypotheses. For example, Bacon mentioned ‘prerogative instances,’ which separate the characteristics found both in hot and cold bodies. By applying this method consistently one may conclude that heat is the rapid irregular motion of the small parts of bodies.

Bacon contrasts his method with that of the Scholastics. On the one hand, his method begins from the observation of particulars and, by eliminative induction, builds systematically toward more general conclusions. On the other hand, the Scholastic method, which involves reasoning deductively from the general to the particular, is weak because it assumes general knowledge of nature that, in fact, must be acquired through elimination.

The Theory of Forms

According to Bacon, science is the investigation of ‘the form of a simple nature’. For instance, the form of heat is both a necessary and sufficient condition of heat. The form of heat is always present in hot things, is always absent in cold things, and varies with the degree of heat. These forms are arrangements of matter. Bacon thinks we should explain observable properties in terms of the fine structure of matter. The form of gold is that configuration of matter that constitutes gold. This revolutionary idea was adopted and developed by Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke.

Bacon’s Influence

Bacon’s influence was immense, but it was largely specific to the period shortly after he wrote. He accomplished three goals. He gave a trenchant critique of Scholastic study; he called for others to join in the construction of the new sciences for the future of humanity; and he began the project of building those sciences by reclassifying knowledge and outlining some of the principles of the new scientific method. Bacon’s call to action was answered. One might regard the philosophies of Descartes and Hobbes (who worked as Bacon’s secretary for a while) as attempts to complete the huge project that Bacon envisaged and initiated: that of constructing a new unified vision of science and giving it a metaphysical foundation. Bacon saw the way forward for the philosophy of the time.

For these reasons, the work of Bacon was later acknowledged as a decisive turning point in philosophy. For example, Leibniz called him the regenerator of philosophy. One of the great works of the French Enlightenment was the Encyclopedia, edited by Denis Diderot and Jean d’Alembert, the complete first

edition of which consisted of 35 volumes, which appeared between 1751 and 1780. This work was dedicated to Francis Bacon, who, as Diderot says, ‘proposed the plan of a universal dictionary of sciences and arts at a time when, so to speak’ neither existed.

Answer the following questions:

1. What are the main Bacon’s works?
2. What three philosophical ambitions did Bacon have?
3. How does Bacon call Aristotelian Scholasticism?
4. How does Bacon criticize the humanism of his time?
5. Describe Bacon’s discovery of the nature of heat.
6. What is science, according to Bacon?
7. Why was Bacon’s work later acknowledged as a decisive turning point in philosophy?

Lecture 14. The Enlightenment Philosophy. J.-J. Rousseau. I. Kant.

The Enlightenment Philosophy

The Enlightenment of the late eighteenth century developed, primarily in France, from the attempt to extend the philosophical and scientific principles of the modem period to human social, political, and moral life. It derives its inspiration mostly from Locke and Newton. It is marked mainly by a belief in the ideals of progress, such as liberty of thought, social reform, and material betterment. These ideals fuelled an interest in history as a story of cultural progress. The Enlightenment is also characterized by a rejection of superstition and authority, especially that of the Church, and by an attempt to understand human values in non-theological terms.

These ideas inspired a generation of prolific French writers. For example, Baron Montesquieu (1689-1755) studied different forms of government and legal systems, and argued that political liberty requires the separation of legislative, judicial, and executive powers. Condillac (1715-1780) adapted the Empiricist ideas of Locke to argue against the metaphysical systems of Spinoza and Leibniz. In Man, a Machine, La Mettrie (1709-1751) argued for a materialist view of the mind. One of the greatest works of the period was the Encyclopaedia, edited by Diderot and d'Alembert, which appeared between 1751 and 1780. The complete first edition of which consisted of 35 volumes. As well as a functioning modern encyclopaedia, the work contained social commentaries opposing the Church and the French establishment. However, the most eloquent and vociferous voice of the French Enlightenment was Voltaire, whose witty works defend the ideal of political liberty and advocate the idea of intellectual, scientific, and economic progress. Around 1751, after the suppression of the Encyclopaedia, Voltaire began to attack the Catholic Church as an institution.

In contrast, the thought of Rousseau points beyond the Enlightenment toward the Romanticism of the nineteenth century. Like Hume, Rousseau stresses the feeling side of human nature and, unlike Voltaire, he sees civilization as the source of degeneration. Rousseau praised nature and upheld a natural religion, even though he criticized religious dogmatism. His main work, The Social Contract, inspired the French Revolution.

In some ways, the work of Kant can be considered as the pinnacle of the modem period. In the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Kant tries to identify and diagnose the conflicts between Rationalism and Empiricism, and produces a non-Empiricist critique of Rationalism. By defining the limits of theoretical reason, he opens the way for a moral and political theory based on the freedom of the will. He

defines ‘enlightenment’ as ‘man’s release from his self-imposed tutelage. Tutelage is man’s inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another’.

By this time, the long dramatic battle, pioneered by Galileo, Descartes, and Bacon, between modern science and medieval Scholastic philosophy was over. The Industrial age was beginning, and Kant’s grand synthesis was itself to come under critical scrutiny.

Answer the following questions:

1. From what attempts did the Enlightenment of the late eighteenth century develop?
2. By what belief is it marked?
3. What features is the Enlightenment also characterized by?
4. How did the ideas of the Enlightenment inspire a generation of prolific French writers?
5. Why is the Encyclopaedia marked as the greatest work of the Enlightenment?
6. What greatest philosophers and writers of the Enlightenment do you know?

JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU (1712-1778)
Biographical History

Jean-Jacques Rousseau was born in Geneva; his mother died a week later. In his early youth, he wandered around Europe, almost destitute. In 1742, he moved to Paris, where he became friends with the young Diderot. In 1749, his essay, the Discourse on the Arts and Science, an attack on the corrupting effects of civilization, won a literary prize. Rousseau composed music, and one of his operettas won acclaim. Tired of Paris, in 1754, he returned to Geneva and to the Protestant Church, having briefly been a Catholic. In his Discourse on the Inequality Among Men (1755), he argues that humans are naturally good, and that injustice is caused by civil society. In 1755, Rousseau and his common-law wife, Therese, moved to a cottage on the edge of the forest of Montmorency, where he wrote his popular and romantic novel La Nouvelle Helois (1761). In 1762, he published two of his best-known books, The Social Contract and Emile, his work on education. These works made Rousseau an outcast; his revolutionary works were banned, and he faced imprisonment for heresy. Furthermore, his Romantic naturalism and sensitive temperament brought him into conflict with the philosophers of the time, most notably Voltaire and his old friend, Diderot.

Whereas Voltaire argued in favour of reason and progress, Rousseau praised spontaneous feeling and nature. For a while, the naturalist philosopher David Hume befriended Rousseau. However, they quarrelled and, in 1767, after a 16-month stay in England, Rousseau and Therese returned illicitly to France, from which he was officially banned.

His frank autobiography, the Confessions, was published posthumously in 1782.

Philosophical Overview

Much of Rousseau's philosophy is contained in a contrast between an optimistic view of human nature and a pessimistic view of social history. On the one hand, like Voltaire and other French Enlightenment philosophers, Rousseau rejects much of the teaching of the Church and especially the concept of original sin, claiming that humans are by nature fundamentally good. On the other hand, Rousseau subscribes to a pessimistic view of human social history, according to which human civilization has caused us to degenerate. He denies the standard Enlightenment view advanced by Voltaire that more civilization and learning bring progress to humankind. This contrast highlights how Rousseau's thought conflicted with both the conservative and the radical thinking of his day.

This very sharp contrast between nature and society also helps us to understand the central features of Rousseau's philosophy. Much of Rousseau's work praises nature and ways of life that are naturally simple. He idealizes the noble savage, who naturally loves the good and who lives freely. In contrast, Rousseau's writings condemn cosmopolitan civilization and corrupt commercial culture. We can find this contrast in Rousseau's views on education: children have a natural ability to learn and develop, but normally educational institutions thwart these natural tendencies by imposing adult expectations on children. We also find this general contrast in Rousseau's views on religion. Natural religion consists in a spontaneous love of the good. In contrast, the revealed religion of Scripture and the Church ends up being superstitious, dogmatic, and authoritarian.

This general contrast between nature and society defines the main problem of Rousseau's political theory. If humans are naturally good and free, then why are societies unjust, tyrannical, and corrupt? If a society were built on the right principles, then it ought to be possible for free persons to construct a social order in which they retain their freedom and natural goodness. What are the political principles that would govern such a society? The work The Social Contract (1762) attempts to answer this question.

The Social Contract

Rousseau's political theory is best understood as a contrast between three conditions of life: (1) the original state of nature, (2) society as it ought to be according to the social contract, and (3) society as it actually is. In their natural state, humans are different from the other animals not so much for their reasoning capacity, but rather for the soul's feeling of free will, which defies mechanical explanation. Humans are naturally free. In their natural state, they have self-love and natural compassion, but not egoism. There is no original sin. With this portrayal of human nature, Rousseau rejects rationalism, mechanistic philosophy, Hobbes, and the teaching of the Church.

For the sake of self-preservation, humans entered into a social contract, but, in order for this act of association to be justifiable, it must not diminish our natural freedom. Consequently, the social contract must consist in the formation of a collective body, or general will, which allows individual citizens to share power. Through this contract, a social morality of justice, rights, and duties replaces actions freely motivated by instinct, and, because of this, the individual citizen must be willing to follow the general will. However, this need not diminish freedom; the capacity to obey the law makes a person master of his or her own appetites, and thus freedom finds full expression in a civil society governed by the social contract. Rousseau wrote, 'Obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty'.

In sharp contrast to both of these states, actual society corrupts natural human goodness and destroys freedom. Thus, Rousseau's famous opening sentence of The Social Contract, 'Man is born free and everywhere he is in chains,' defines the problem of politics, which is the contrast between our fundamental nature and society as it actually is. The solution lies in the nature of the social contract, which defines how society should be.

Rousseau's Influence

The popularity of Rousseau's political philosophy first expressed itself in the French support for the American Revolution. Thomas Jefferson, who was the U.S. ambassador to France from 1785 to 1789, was influenced by Rousseau's views. Rousseau's doctrine of the sovereignty of the people became very popular in pre-Revolution France. For example, when Jean-Paul read parts of The Social Contract in the street, he was met with enthusiastic applause. Rousseau's work gave tremendous impetus to the Revolution. According to the conservative English

political thinker Edmund Burke, the French Revolutionary Constituent Assembly (1789-1791) almost worshiped Rousseau's thought.

When the revolution began, it was decidedly atheistic because of the influence of Voltaire and other Rationalist and antireligious Enlightenment thinkers. However, Robespierre was convinced by Rousseau's writings to support religious belief, and by 1793, as he rose to power, he persuaded the National Convention to adopt an article of faith based on Rousseau. Napoleon Bonaparte also agreed with Rousseau on the importance of religion. Ironically, the survival of the Church depended on Rousseau, who had been banished for heresy during his lifetime.

The German philosopher Kant was inspired by Rousseau's emphasis on human free will. Sometimes, Rousseau characterized liberty as obedience to a self-prescribed law, and Kant took this suggestion to heart by arguing that free will consists in the ability to follow the moral law. Furthermore, like Rousseau, Kant claims that, because the ability to obey the moral law requires that a person can master his or her own desires, freedom finds full expression only in a civil society where people are regarded equally as ends.

In a way, Rousseau was part of the French Enlightenment, but he was also very critical of its assumptions. He rejected its emphasis on rationality, scorned the assumption that civilization meant progress, and praised human life in the state of nature. These aspects of Rousseau's philosophy made him the darling of the Romantic Movement that flourished in the nineteenth century. Moreover, his autobiography, the Confessions, became recognized almost as the founding document of the Romantic Movement not only because it praised feeling and sentiments, but also because, apparently, it offered a way of understanding the human psyche that did not reduce a person to a machine.

Through the Romantic Movement, Rousseau exercised an extraordinary influence on nineteenth century literature and thinking. In Germany, he inspired the poet Goethe and the philosopher Friedrich Schiller, in England the poets Wordsworth, Coleridge, Lord Byron, Shelly, and Keats; and in Russia Alexander Pushkin and Leo Tolstoy. Rousseau-inspired Romanticism also shaped art and popular tastes. There was a shift toward simpler clothing, love of the countryside, and the expression of romantic love.

In 1762, in Emile, Rousseau wrote, 'Nature provides for the child's growth in her own fashion, and this should never be thwarted'. According to this view, the development of a child occurs naturally, and the main job of a teacher is to facilitate this process and not to impede it by imposing rules and the preconception that children should know various facts.

Answer the following questions:

1. When and where was Jean-Jacques Rousseau born?
2. How did he spend his youth?
3. What are his best-known books on education?
4. What ideas does much of Rousseau's philosophy contain?
5. Why did Rousseau's doctrine of the sovereignty of the people become very popular in pre-Revolution France?
6. How was Rousseau part of the French Enlightenment?
7. What great people did Rousseau inspire?

IMMANUEL KANT (1724-1804)

Biographical History

At the age of 31, Kant became a university instructor, lecturing on a wide variety of subjects, including logic, geography, natural history, anthropology, mathematics, and physics. His first published works were mainly scientific and his early philosophy was Rationalist, influenced by Leibniz. However, around 1770, his reading of Hume interrupted his 'dogmatic slumbers,' which led to his writing the Critique of Pure Reason and to a period of intense creativity. After 12 years' labour, the Critique was published in 1781, when Kant was 57. It is one of the greatest and most difficult works in philosophy. To explain his ideas more fully, Kant published the Prolegomena (1783) and a revised second edition of the Critique (1787). After 1781, Kant wrote several works that explain the implications of the Critique for ethics, science, religion, politics, and aesthetics: the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 1785; the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, 1786; the Critique of Practical Reason, 1788; and the Critique of Judgment, 1790. In 1793, he published Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, which earned censure from the king's minister and forced Kant to promise to refrain from publicly discussing religion.

Philosophical Overview

Kant rejects both the Rationalist and Empiricist traditions because they share certain fundamental assumptions. First, they assume that there is only one source of knowledge: either sense experience or reason. In contrast, Kant argues that sensation (or sensible intuition) and the understanding (or concepts) are both necessary for experience.

Second, they fail to separate the two distinctions, analytic/synthetic and a priori/empirical. Kant argues that not all a priori truths are analytic. Synthetic a priori truths are necessary truths that it would not be a contradiction to deny. Examples include 'every event must have a cause,' 'The three angles of a triangle equal 180 degrees,' and '7 + 5 = 12'. Such claims are necessary truths, but, because they are not analytic, they can give us knowledge of the world, and they form the basic principles of mathematics and science.

One major objective of the Critique and the Prolegomena is to explain how such truths are possible. In doing so, Kant develops a non-Empiricist theory of experience (in the Aesthetic and Analytic), which he employs to criticize rationalist metaphysics (in the Dialectic). Kant argues, against Rationalism, that reason cannot yield theoretical knowledge that goes beyond what we could experience. Kant develops a non-Empiricist theory of experience to show how synthetic a priori truths about the world are possible. What makes such truths possible is precisely what makes Rationalist metaphysics impossible. Kant's explanation of synthetic a priori truths about the world has two elements.

1. First, he argues that experience has certain structural necessary conditions, which he calls the a priori forms of experience. These consist in space and time and 12 categories.

2. Second, he argues that the world itself must conform to these a priori forms. This involves giving up the assumption that the world is totally independent of the character of experience. Transcendental idealism is the claim that the world of spatio-temporal objects is transcendentally ideal and empirically real. The world is empirically real because such objects are real in that they exist independently of us. The world is transcendentally ideal because such objects are, and must be, relative to the a priori forms of experience. In other words, although such objects are real, they are phenomena (relative to the a priori forms of experience) and not nominal (or things as they are absolutely in themselves). Transcendental idealism implies that spatiotemporal objects necessarily conform to the a priori conditions of experience and, thereby, explains how synthetic a priori truths about the world are possible.

In brief, that experience has a necessary or a priori structure refutes Empiricism, and that the world is transcendentally ideal shows that Rationalism is false. Both elements are needed to explain how the synthetic a priori claims of science and mathematics are possible.

Space and Time

Kant's main point is that space and time are necessary conditions of experience. One of his arguments for this claim is that it is required in order to explain how the synthetic a priori truths of geometry and arithmetic are possible.

Answer the following questions:

1. What subjects did Kant teach at the university?
2. Who influenced his first scientific works?
3. What are Kant's greatest works?
4. Why does Kant reject both the Rationalist and Empiricist traditions?
5. What is the major objective of the Critique and the Prolegomena?
6. What two elements does Kant's explanation of synthetic a priori truths about the world have?
7. What are necessary conditions of experience, according to Kant?

Lecture 15. The Nineteenth-Century Philosophy. Introduction. The German Idealists. G. Hegel. A. Schopenhauer.

The Nineteenth-Century Philosophy. General Introduction

There are two commonly accepted philosophical views, shared by most ordinary individuals:

1. A mind-independent real world
2. A mind-independent real world, directly experienced

These two beliefs tended to persist among the general public in spite of the various challenges posed to such 'naive realism' by the New Scientists and the advent of modem philosophy and Kant, who even explained (with his notion of the transcendental illusion) why this should be so. But in the nineteenth century, the wider public began to be affected by the various views in profound new ways, first mostly among the educated classes, but this would soon filter down to ordinary citizens through the impact of a new breed of socially minded philosophers with an eye for revolution.

While many philosophers took different stands, pro and con, with regard to (1), hardly any philosopher accepted (2) at face value. Thus for instance idealists, such as most notably Berkeley, deny wholeheartedly the existence of any such mind-independent world; representationalists, such as most notably Kant, do not deny (1) but (2), arguing that there is a real world, in part created by mind – the phenomenal world – and created in part by things in themselves as they exist independently of the mind – the nominal world. What all these views have in common is that any two-way relation between things in themselves and the mind must be explained in terms of individual minds affecting one and the same public reality. In other words, the underlying presupposition is that there exists one world, and that we all exist as different individuals in that one common world. The one real world is thus, ultimately, objective.

Several extraordinary philosophers will now challenge this presupposition in a number of different ways, starting with Hegel and Schopenhauer, followed by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. By arguing that the thing in itself is the will, that the body itself is an expression of the will, Schopenhauer will make the case that subjectivity itself can be transcended in the social arena. Reality is an agreement among minds. But more than that: following Kant, these philosophers go on to inspire Marx, Mill, and others to argue that the ego can create reality first by convincing other minds to think as you do and, even more importantly, by creating the right sort of social institutions. The process of building a new sort of individual not just through new and improved epistemologies and metaphysics but also

through the design of social institutions becomes the sort of rallying cry heard around the world, as for instance Marx would now insist: The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways: the point however is to change it'. Thus the shift: in Marx's view it is not individual consciousness that makes reality but, rather, social reality that makes individual consciousness.

The impact of philosophical systems thus helped herald the new Industrial Revolution. The traditional end goal of philosophy until this time was thought, ideas, or the attainment of certain special sorts of cognitive or emotive states. The nineteenth-century shift into the social arena is thus brought about in part by a philosophical sea change concerning the question of what reality itself is. Instead of manipulating thoughts, propositions, opinions, and so on, the task of philosophy becomes constructing the lived reality. Thus, Marx's dialectical materialism "turns Hegel upside down." Philosophy becomes less the realm of introspective analysis and more the realm of social, political, and economic activity.

The German Idealists

The remarkable blooming of philosophy in Germany at the turn of the nineteenth century – especially the four decades from 1780 to 1820: – has been rightly compared to the golden age of philosophy in Greece, from Socrates to Aristotle. This happened in tandem with new and profound developments in literature and art nurtured by geniuses among whom Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Goethe, Schiller, and Ludwig von Beethoven were only the most illustrious.

The advent of Kantian philosophy rooted in the previous century provided much of the impetus, even and especially among those who reacted against it. Indeed, it was the sudden departure from one central tenet of Kant's system that characterized the first aspect of the sudden new revolution in thought and led to a resurgence of grand new systems of idealism. This was the abandonment of the concept of the thing-in-itself that began with Johann Fichte (1762-1814), who Kant himself recognized as a great new thinker and whose career Kant helped launch. Fichte's fruitful advance from the Kantian philosophy paved the way for three important subsequent developments: absolute idealism, phenomenology, and existentialism. What enabled him to do this was his brilliant analysis of the reality and primary function of the ego as a self-affirming primitive act of consciousness that constructs the objective world, not in accordance with or based as a reaction to things-in-themselves, but purely from its own appearances. In this way, Fichte paved the way for Schelling and Hegel. Friedrich Schelling (1775-1854) formed on the basis of such thinking his system of objective idealism, which so influenced his

colleague and younger friend Hegel, and the romanticism that inspired so much of subsequent thought, even and especially in the development of literature and the arts. His System of Transcendental Idealism lays out his "philosophy of identity," in which the objective and subjective are unified under one systematic philosophy of nature, epistemology, and ethics.

Answer the following questions:

1. What are two commonly accepted philosophical views, shared by ordinary individuals?
2. What becomes the sort of rallying cry heard around the world in the 19th century?
3. What is the main task of philosophy in the 19th century?
4. Who are the greatest philosophers of the 19th century?
5. Whom did Kant recognize as a great new thinker? Why?

G. W. R HEGEL (1770-1831)

Biographical History

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was born and raised in Stuttgart, Germany. After graduating from the University of Tubingen, he joined one of the most illustrious philosophy departments of the time, at the University of Jena, Germany, which included, besides Fichte and Schelling, the great writer, philosopher, and critic Friedrich von Schlegel (1772-1829), who helped originate the German Romantic movement, and one of the leading playwrights of the time, idealist philosopher Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805).

During the French occupation by Napoleon, Hegel was removed from his position as professor and moved to Bamberg, where he worked as a newspaper editor and then a school principal in Nuremberg. Eventually, in 1816, he returned to being a professor of philosophy, in Heidelberg; two years later he transferred to the university in Berlin and remained there for the rest of his life.

Philosophical Overview

The denial of Kant's distinction between phenomena, the known world of appearances, and the unknowable, nominal world of things in themselves, was the starting point of Hegel's thought. Since in Kant's view the phenomenal world is not an illusion but empirically real, and the nominal world is in what ultimate reality consists, there are therefore necessarily two real worlds. In Hegel's view, as

in those of his fellow idealists Fichte and Schelling, there is but one real world. Objects according to Hegel are created completely by the mind, just as in idealism. But whereas Berkeley's denial of matter and any mind-independent realm matter makes room for (indeed, requires) God, according to Hegel the mind's own faculties are self-created, through its own historical evolution, itself resulting from an eternal opposition of itself against itself. Thus, in Hegel's metaphysical system, the mind generates, structures, and regulates the whole of reality, up to and including, most especially; itself.

By 'the Absolute,' Hegel means reality as it exists in itself; but it is not nominal.

The absolute is, itself, mind or what the German word he uses explicitly implies, 'spirit'. It should be kept in mind(!) that in German and Slavic languages there is no word for mind as such, and that the word Hegel and other German writers of the time use, geist, has as its root the meaning of 'ghost' or 'spirit'. Reality itself, all aspect of the world, is the result of a self-thinking thought. All existence in time is a teleological, goal-directed, evolutionary process in which being slowly becomes aware of itself, 'the Absolute realizing itself,' as Hegel calls it.

Unlike in Kant's transcendental idealism and Berkeley's subjective idealism, both of which are pluralistic, Hegel's notion of the Absolute is in the ancient and medieval monistic tradition according to which the whole of existence is one substance. This one substance is spirit, or mind. What is new and different, albeit with an aspect of an Aristotelian nod to teleological forces, is that what drives evolution are not past or present events; rather, the still uncreated future draws us into itself as a way of the Absolute coming to realize itself. In that sense, the Kantian notion of a nominal reality beyond the phenomenal world of appearances becomes in Hegel's view the real but as-yet-un-present domain of future possibility, toward which everything must evolve as a manifest expression of the absolute trying to 'realize' itself. Philosophy itself, and its history, debates, problems, and resolutions, are all part of this grand cosmic evolution. Thus, as Hegel sees it, history is neither a succession of material objects rearranged into different geometrical positions nor a succession of ideas that turn out to be false when new and better ideas replace them. Philosophical developments through history are themselves changes in the absolute, a gradual process in which the great cosmic mind comes to realize itself, that is, becomes conscious.

Metaphysics and Epistemology

Hegel claims that Kant's notion of mind-independent reality, the 'thing-in-itself,' is ultimately unknowable and therefore immediately unintelligible. He starts with an analysis of Kant's notion of necessary truths that are not logically necessary, the synthetic a priori. This is the aspect of Kant's view that posits mind as existing not passively in relation to its objects but as an active force in object construction. It is a two-way process, according to Kant: objects in the world, which are but representations of mind-independent things-in-themselves, contribute something to the mind as mind contributes something to them. The phenomenal world itself exists as a sort of superposition of the effects of objects as things-in-themselves and the effects of the faculties of the mind. Hegel then goes beyond Kant by putting an emphasis on necessary truths that are not necessary in the logical sense but come from within the mind itself. The laws of history as such express these necessities.

Theory of Truth: Not Correspondence but Coherence

Because the laws of history, according to Hegel, follow a necessary process, they structure consciousness. For Hegel, as for Kant, necessary truths are mind-dependent and not logically necessary. The difference is that, for Hegel, these truths do not depend in any way on any sort of substance or reality beyond the reach of our minds. Truth is not a correspondence between some nominal, mind-independent reality and the phenomenal representations in the mind. Truth, as conceived by Hegel, is understood as coherence within a complete system of thought: 'The true is the whole'. What Hegel means by 'complete system' is not something that in any way corresponds to some sort of objective, mind-independent reality but is, itself, objective reality. This Hegelian whole is not static. It evolves. Therefore, truth evolves. Nor is truth something beyond, or transcendental to, experience and the world. It is immanent. Like the world itself, truth is an evolutionary, developing process.

The Philosophy of History and the History of Philosophy

In Hegel's view, the evolutionary changes in philosophy are not merely conceived as the abstract work of human philosophers trying to understand themselves and the world. Rather, philosophy, like history itself, is but the world (the Absolute) trying to understand itself. Because this process cannot be

understood without thorough knowledge of all these developing stages of thought as represented by the history of philosophy, trying to understand philosophy without understanding the history of philosophy is impossible. The history of philosophy has been an important facet of philosophy ever since. The idea that in reading the history of philosophy we are not merely viewing the struggles of individuals to understand themselves and the world but also witnessing the evolution of the world's understanding of itself, can be thoroughly inspiring.

Dialectic

Hegel's theory of dialectic is an important and widely influential system of philosophizing in its own right. Dialectic begins with some proposition, the 'thesis,' that subsequent analysis will reveal to be false. This results in a contradictory proposition, the 'antithesis'.

This too will turn out to be false. This, however, does not end in paradox or skepticism but leads to a synthesis of the two initially contradictory propositions. This Hegel calls 'sublatiori'. The process then continues, leading to a new thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.

Neither is this process static. The dialectic leads to higher levels of discursive thought and enlightened consciousness, until distinctions derived from the false dichotomy between Empiricist and Rationalist systems of thought dissolve.

Answer the following questions:

1. When and where was Hegel born?
2. Where did he work?
3. What was the starting point of Hegel's thought?
4. What role does the mind play in Hegel's metaphysical system?
5. What does Hegel mean by 'the Absolute?
6. How does Hegel see history and philosophical developments through history?
7. What does Hegel claim about Kant's notion of mind-independent reality?
8. Interpret Kant's Theory of Truth.
9. Is the dialectic static? Where does the dialectic lead to?

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER (1788-1860)
Biographical History

Arthur Schopenhauer was born to a prominent German family in the free city of Danzig, in a Baltic province (consisting of East Prussia and Pomerania, which after World War II became Gdansk in Poland). Schopenhauer was only 17 when his father, a wealthy travelling merchant, was found drowned in the river, probably a suicide. From early on he had a broad education; his mother, a writer in her own right, had a salon – a private meeting place popular among writers, artists, and intellectuals during the nineteenth century – frequented by the likes of Goethe, Schubert, Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, and other prominent figures of the time. After studying history, mathematics, Greek, and Latin at the Gymnasium in Gotha, Schopenhauer went in 1809 to the University of Gottingen, where he studied physics, astronomy, meteorology, medicine, botany, law, and philosophy. For his graduate work he went to the University of Berlin to study with Fichte, and completed his doctorate at Jena.

Schopenhauer was only 30 years old when he published his most important work. The World as Will and Idea, he did not receive the attention he deserved until much later in life. It took nearly three decades before anyone took serious notice of his work. Like Hume, who had lamented that his own work had 'fallen stillborn from the press,' Schopenhauer was deeply hurt that his masterpiece was ignored. It did, however, help him to get a teaching position at the University of Berlin in the same department as Hegel, the most famous and talked-about philosopher of the time, whom Schopenhauer both envied and despised.

How much of Schopenhauer's distaste of Hegel was the result merely of envy and jealousy, and how much from his substantive criticisms of Hegel's views, is a matter of controversy. However, he did write, "The minds of the present generation of scholars are disorganized by Hegelian nonsense, incapable of thinking, coarse and stupefied, they become prey to the shallow materialism that has crept out of the basilisk's egg." Schopenhauer tried in vain to compete with his departmental colleague Hegel by scheduling his own lectures at the same time as Hegel's; as a result, hardly anyone attended Schopenhauer's classes, whereas Hegel's were packed, standing room only. Meanwhile, Hegel's philosophy grew ever more popular throughout Germany, dominating European thought. Schopenhauer was outraged: "Hegel, installed from above by the powers that be as the certified Great Philosopher, was a flat-headed, insipid, nauseating, illiterate charlatan, who reached the pinnacle of audacity in scribbling together and dishing up the craziest mystifying nonsense."

In 1844, at the age of 56, Schopenhauer published an expanded revision of The World as Will and Idea. Much to his surprise, this time it drew great attention. Already by then in his sixties, suddenly he found himself at the centre of a rapidly growing international following of devoted philosophers, psychologists, writers, and musicians who found him deeply inspirational and profound. His reputation quickly spread by word of mouth. Some of his most famous and devoted adherents included Friedrich Nietzsche, Richard Wagner, Leo Tolstoy, Joseph Conrad, Marcel Proust, Thomas Mann, and Sigmund Freud.

Philosophical Overview

The biggest influences on Schopenhauer were Plato and Kant, the latter whom he regarded as the greatest philosopher of all time. Following Kant, Schopenhauer developed his own unique brand of idealism in marked contrast to Hegel. Schopenhauer's unique blend of Kantian and Platonic metaphysics and epistemology, Indian mysticism, and Goethe's Romanticism was tempered by a deep respect for Descartes, Locke, and Hume. Hegel, as already mentioned, was widely influential throughout the nineteenth century and beyond in both a positive and negative sense. The most substantive similarity and difference, put most simply, is that although Hegel's and Schopenhauer's philosophies had much in common, having both developed from within a Kantian framework, Schopenhauer vehemently and openly opposed Hegel's emphasis on reason, which in Schopenhauer's view stemmed from a deeply profound neglect of the underlying concept of will, the basic force of our existence.

Answer the following questions:

1. What family was Arthur Schopenhauer born to?
2. When and where did he live?
3. What education did Arthur Schopenhauer receive?
4. When did he publish his most important work 'The World as Will and Idea'?
5. How was his work accepted?
6. Who were his most famous and devoted adherents?
7. What is Schopenhauer's philosophical overview?

Lecture 16. The Existentialists. F. Nietzsche.

The Existentialists

Although Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies evolved along different, sometimes opposing, paths, both accepted – either overtly or covertly – as fundamental an absolute presupposition that we can state as follows: 'Essence precedes existence'. Plato's ideas, found nowhere among the appearances, are eternal and abstract, beyond space and time, and are ultimate essences that precede the existence of objects in the world. The triangle you draw is a copy, or representation, of the eternal idea, or form, of the ideal triangle that existed before you drew it. Nothing can exist in the world of appearances without its ideal form preceding its arrival, as it were, on the scene. Similarly, for Aristotle, everything that exists does so with a purpose for which it was by nature designed to strive. In existentialist philosophies, this fundamental proposition is turned on its head. Rather, as the great twentieth- century French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre would eventually put it, 'Existence precedes essence'.

The roots of this philosophically revolutionary idea can be found in Schopenhauer, who replaced the notion of reason with purposeless will But existentialism, as a philosophy, would not be named as such for decades to come. In the works of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, the existentialist ideal found its first, original, and some would argue primordial force.

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE (1844-1900)
Biographical History

Friedrich Nietzsche, the son and grandson of devout Lutheran ministers, was born in Rocken, Prussia. His father died when Nietzsche was 4, and his mother, grandmother, and aunts raised him. At school he excelled in all disciplines, but most of all loved classic literature and philosophy, especially Plato. He was admitted to the University of Bonn but found both the students and professors too superficial for his liking, and he transferred to Leipzig. There he encountered his two greatest inspirations: the philosophy of Schopenhauer and the music of Richard Wagner. After publishing a few highly regarded articles, he finished his doctorate at Leipzig, and then accepted a professorship at the University of Basel, Switzerland. He was still only 24.

Nietzsche became one of Richard Wagner's closest friends and confidants. With the success and acclaim of his books, he resigned from the university and

became a full-time writer, producing over a dozen brilliant works, such as Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883-1885), Beyond Good and Evil (1886), The Genealogy of Morals (1887), The Antichrist (1895), and The Will to Power (1901).

Philosophical Overview

Nietzsche's philosophy, like that of Schopenhauer and other nineteenth-century thinkers who reacted against Hegel, springs from the idea that there are no things in themselves, no nominal realm. But in Nietzsche's view, neither is there any phenomenal reality. Like Kierkegaard, he discards completely as myth the notion of Platonic ideas. Nothing exists but a Heraclitan flux, an underlying and ceaselessly turbulent, ever-changing chaos upon which our will acts. And the will, as in Schopenhauer, is not bound by reason; the Logos, too, is an ancient unreality. Epistemology is dead. Even God is dead, by which Nietzsche means that the idea of God has ceased to perform any positive function. Nietzsche thus seeks a return of philosophy to its Sophist form. In a way reminiscent of Thrasymachus, he argues that might is right: the powerful must impose their will upon the weak.

Avowals of knowledge are pure invention; the only authentic way to be, then, is to lie with a purpose. That purpose is power. Nietzsche is opposed, however, to traditional forms of the lie, which he identifies as the chief function and domain of all religious, political, and educational institutions. Such lies are but elaborate forms of self-deception. Rather, Nietzsche espouses an authentic form of lying, which is fundamentally creative, and the purpose of which is to subjugate the will of others to one's own. This is what he calls 'the will to power'. This molding can only be done by the brave and powerful who have survived the educational system of lies imposed through institutions that in his view are but the dead remnants of previous acts of will to power. Such institutions are the corruptive means for what he calls the 'trans-valuation of values,' where what is truly good is made to appear bad, and what is truly bad is made to appear good.

A New Philosophy of Language

Language, in Nietzsche's view, is also a mask, imposed from without upon the individual as a 'condition of life'. However, because language is, necessarily, a type of deception or lie, it is also the source of our freedom to create. For the will, language becomes a 'mobile army of metaphors, metonyms and anthropomorphisms'. Metaphors are figures of speech wherein terms are transposed from their original meaning to a new meaning. This creates a false likeness, or analogy, that does not exist in reality but only in our description.

Metonyms, on the other hand, are figures of speech by which names are used as substitutes for something that the name is associated with. Such associations, in Nietzsche's view, are merely linguistic; they have no reality beyond the language.

According to Nietzsche, the metaphoric, metonymic, and anthropomorphic nature of language gives a primal power to poetry as expression of truth. He does not accept the standard sort of distinction between 'literal' or 'scientific' language and 'metaphoric' or 'figurative' language. Both are essentially poetic. The division between the two forms is not only false and artificial but also the source of confusion among philosophers. Nietzsche wants to return to philosophy the function of language as poetry; his own major philosophical works he called 'poems'. They are his poetical interpretations of being and, as such, expressions of the artistic force of his own acts of self-creation.

Nietzsche's Influence

Nietzsche inspired many subsequent philosophers, writers, and literary theorists from existentialists to deconstructions such as Jacques Derrida. His perspectival theory of truth and instrumentalist theory of knowledge influenced a wide range of philosophers, including philosophers of science like Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend who, like Nietzsche, argue that facts cannot be separated from values, that even the most rigorous scientific method involves interpretation, and that even the most precise observation is theory-laden.

Nietzsche's books continue to inspire a broad and influential following of admirers across the disciplines. George Bernard Shaw, Thomas Mann, and Hermann Hesse are among the writers who drew great inspiration from his works. Among philosophers, Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, and Jean-Paul Sartre were all influenced by him, as were Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault. Sigmund Freud also found in Nietzsche great insights into the nature of human psychology and the forces of the will that structure it.

Answer the following questions:

1. How can we state an absolute presupposition?
2. What is the main idea of existentialists?
3. When and where was Friedrich Nietzsche born?
4. What education did he receive?
5. Where did Friedrich Nietzsche work?
6. What are his fundamental works?
7. From what idea does Nietzsche's philosophy spring?
8. How does he identify the lie?

9. What does he call ‘the will to power’?
10. What is language, in Nietzsche’s view?
11. What function does Nietzsche want to return to philosophy?
12. Who drew great inspiration from his works?

Lecture 17. The Utilitarians and Marxists. K. Marx. The American Pragmatists. C. Peirce.

The Utilitarians and Marxists

The term ‘the Industrial Revolution,’ coined by the English economic historian Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975) to describe Europe’s economic development from 1760 to 1840, is the backdrop for a philosophical shift in thought from epistemology and metaphysics toward social engineering that occurred during this time. Traditionally, the ‘product’ of philosophy, its ‘end goal,’ so to speak, was thought, in the following sense. The philosophical enlightenment process takes you from one set of thoughts to another, from the false to the true. This of course has some obvious exceptions, such as during the Epicurean and Stoic periods, when the emphasis was not on the having of correct or sound judgments but, rather, the attainment of certain sorts of emotional states and the promotion of psychological well-being. Such a shift of philosophy into the social arena during the latter part of the nineteenth century is evident in the shift in Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Marx from the search for new and better epistemologies and metaphysical systems to building, instead, a new kind of human individual. The shift is achieved not with new critiques of reason but, rather, especially in the works of Nietzsche and Marx, with critiques of social institutions. This is nowhere more apparent than in Marx’s famous call to arms: ‘The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways: the point however is to change it’. The essential paradigm shift that became the essence of communism is that instead of individual consciousness making reality, social reality makes individual consciousness.

On the other hand, no less influential were the utilitarians, starting with one of the leading radical reformers of the nineteenth century, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). A child prodigy, his main philosophical influences were Locke and Hume. In his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), which made him an influential international figure, he lays the groundwork for utilitarianism that, as developed by Mill, became one of the leading moral theories in the world. Bentham defines his ‘principle of utility’ as that property in any object whereby it tends to produce pleasure, good or happiness, or to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered.

This principle, according to Bentham, explains the two main motives for all human action: pain and pleasure. Social, political, and legal institutions should follow the Greatest Happiness Principle: Choose that course of action that leads to the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. In this way utilitarianism

was supposed to free people from oppressive laws, make governing bodies moral, and provide a solid foundation for democracy. Leaders no less so than individuals in a utilitarian society are morally bound to follow the same universal principle, readily accessible to everyone; everyone knows what pain and pleasure are. This cannot be manipulated. Moreover, we are each our own best judge as to how best to live and attain happiness. Utilitarianism was thus designed to break the repressive structure of laws imposed by leaders, under the false banner of morality, on their people. As Bentham put it, 'All government is in itself one vast evil'. The only justification for putting such evil into place would be to prevent some greater evil; governments should therefore never stray from the principle of utility – the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Among Bentham's many disciples, the most famous is John Stuart Mill, who further developed utilitarianism along rather different lines.

Answer the following questions:

1. Who coined the term 'the Industrial Revolution'?
2. What does this term describe?
3. What is Marx's famous call to arms?
4. Who were the leading radical reformers of the 19th century?
5. How does Bentham define his 'principle of utility'?
6. How should social, political, and legal institutions follow the Greatest Happiness Principle?
7. In what way was utilitarianism supposed to free people?

KARL MARX (1818-1883)
Biographical History

Karl Marx was born in the town of Treves, Prussia (now Trier, Germany). He attended the universities of Berlin and Bonn, where he studied history and philosophy, and earned his doctorate in philosophy at the University of Jena. In his doctoral dissertation, he contrasted the Greek atomist views of Democritus and Epicurus.

After receiving his doctorate, he could not find a teaching position due to his radical leftist views. He got a job as a newspaper editor at the Rheinische Zeitung in Cologne, and as a foreign correspondent in London for the New York Tribune. He lost his job at the Rheinische Zeitung after writing an inflammatory article deeply critical of poverty and the government's repression of workers. He moved to Paris, where he got a job as co-editor of a journal in Paris, and married his

college sweetheart, Jenny von Westphalen. But the journal went bankrupt and Marx was again unemployed, as he remained for most of his life.

He was so poor that several of their children died of malnutrition. His friend and collaborator, economist Friedrich Engels, the son of a wealthy industrialist, supported him for many years, and together they wrote the Communist Manifesto (1848), one of the most influential books of all time.

In 1845, having been expelled from France for his involvement with the newly formed communist party, he moved to Brussels, where he wrote The German Ideology (1846) and The Poverty of Philosophy (1847). After attending the Communist League in London that same year, he went to Cologne and tried to start up a communist newspaper but was expelled by the government. He moved to London, where he became a foreign correspondent for the New York Tribune. He remained in London, studying in the reading room of the British Museum, where he wrote his Critique of Political Economy (1859) and Das Kapital (1867), his most important work, for which he is generally regarded as the most important figure in the history of socialist thought.

Philosophical Overview

Philosophy during Marx's university days in Germany was dominated entirely by Hegel and his works. Philosophers divided themselves into two camps. The Hegelian right consisted of older, conservative professors. They tended to give orthodox interpretations of Hegel's views of religion and morality. The Hegelian left consisted of younger, radical philosophers. As a member of the 'Young Hegelians,' Marx belonged to the latter. The Young Hegelians regarded Hegel's views on social and political issues as false but pregnant with deep, hidden insights that revealed, under closer scrutiny, the very opposite of Hegel's philosophy. Thus, Marx in the end claimed that his own philosophy of dialectic materialism was an upside-down, inside-out version of Hegel's dialectic idealism.

Most of the Young Hegelians who rejected Hegel's system did so in philosophical rebellion against transcended entities like Hegel's concept of the Absolute world-mind. The biggest early influence on the young Marx was Ludwig Feuerbach's Essence of Christianity, in which Feuerbach argues that the human mind is corrupted by its idealized images of universal values that, in reality, cannot be attained. Seduced by its own idealizations into craving what it cannot have, consciousness is thus alienated, not just from the world but even more so from itself. Its desires are transferred onto a surrogate ideal and purely imaginary being, God. In so doing, consciousness denies itself the possibility of its own ascension to the ideal. Instead, consciousness imprisons itself in the false ideal. In this way,

Feuerbach argued, and Marx followed suit, that all religious imagery should be erased from the human psyche. Like the Stoics and Epicurians, the Young Hegelians, inspired by Feuerbach and led by Marx, argued that peace and happiness cannot be achieved unless first we do away with religion. Marx did not merely repeat Feuerbach's arguments but also improved and strengthened them. His Theses on Feuerbach (1886) is a brilliant criticism of Feuerbach's notion that change can be brought about simply by changing or manipulating ideas and images. Thus, in marked contrast to Feuerbach's 'speculative' materialism, the purpose of Marx's 'practical materialism' is to force a change in the actual material relationships in which human social, political, and psychological structures consist.

Thus, in his own way, Marx not only turned Hegel upside down and inside out, but also reversed Descartes' apocryphal statement from Meditations. According to Descartes, the purpose of philosophy is not to change the world but to change yourself. According to Marx, because consciousness is itself a by-product of society and the world, the purpose of philosophy is to change the world: 'The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways, the point however is to change it'.

Marx's Influence

There are few names in philosophy with which as many people have claimed association as with that of Karl Marx. Even that is an understatement; entire countries, comprising hundreds of millions of people, have identified themselves as Marxist. This holds, for instance, for the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, the former Yugoslavia, and present-day China. That the predicate 'former' applies to so many of these countries suggests that Marx's influence is over; but many so-called Marxist forms of government, synonymous with the communism that seems to have collapsed under its own weight in so many places around the globe, comprised systems containing elements that Marx would never have accepted. Many have argued that communism as practiced in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries, for example, was a distortion of his actual philosophy. In any case, the influence of Marx on the political scene in the twentieth century, however one wants to interpret it, is gargantuan, to say the least.

More recently, there has been a great resurgence of Marx scholarship, due in part perhaps to the demise of communism, which may have had a liberating effect on the actual philosophy that bears his name. For instance, there are various movements in the United States and Europe under the rubric of Marxist feminism, Marxist ecology, and so on. Many see a new relevance of Marx to contemporary

problems in the economic, political, ethical, and social arenas, where political power struggles wax and wane between collectives and individuals, conservatives and liberals. Eco-feminist philosophers such as Carolyn Merchant, for instance, claim that dialectical materialism is the philosophy of choice on questions of the environment. Perhaps because feminists today see women as an oppressed class, the significance of Marx for philosophers such as Gwyn Kirk, Chris Cuomo, and others is that he provides the means by which an oppressed class can not only express its concerns but also change the environment and end the oppression.

Answer the following questions:

1. When and where was K. Marx born?
2. What education did he receive?
3. Why couldn't he find a teaching position?
4. Why did he lose his job at the Rheinische Zeitung?
5. When was the Communist Manifesto written?
6. Why is it one of the most influential books of all time?
7. Why is K. Marx regarded as the most important figure in the history of socialist thought?
8. What were the Old Hegelians views?
9. How did the Young Hegelians regard Hegel's views on social and political issues?
10. What did the Young Hegelians, inspired by Feuerbach and led by Marx, argue?
11. What role did Marxist philosophy play in the history of the world?
12. Prove the fact that there has been a great resurgence of Marx scholarship.

The American Pragmatists

That there was virtually no philosophy to speak of in the United States prior to Charles Peirce (1839-1914), his pupil William James (1842-1910), John Dewey (1859-1952), and Josiah Royce (1855-1916) is all the more remarkable, given its sudden and extraordinary proliferation throughout American colleges and universities ever since. It is now called 'the golden age of American philosophy,' and rightfully so, which is all the more remarkable given that in the United States there was neither a bronze nor stone age. As one observer of the early American philosophy scene, Andrew Reck, put it; 'A sprawling company of farmers, engineers, politicians and businessmen, Americans on the whole have entrusted the care of their spiritual life to preachers, lawyers, and soldiers. The very term

“culture” arouses mental associations with ladies’ clubs, in isolation from the masculine world where work gets done’. If part of the explanation of the previous paucity of philosophy in the United States does indeed lie in the dominant role played at the time by pious, faith-based theology, certainly part of the explanation of its subsequent renaissance is the simultaneous arrival on the scene of these four brilliant, original thinkers, any one of whom would have been sufficient to galvanize the process.

To get a philosophical, education at the time, one had to go to Europe, and it is no surprise that all four of these great minds had strong associations, either directly or indirectly, with philosophy as it was flourishing at the time in Germany. Kant, after all, was the first philosopher to use the word ‘pragmatishe’ in the sense employed by Peirce, James, and Dewey. The strong influence of Kant and neo-Kantian German thought on Peirce, James, Dewey, and Royce is evident not only in their formative years but also throughout their work. James spent a year studying in Germany, Peirce studied Kant and Hegel, and Dewey, who were inspired by the ‘German rational idealism’ of Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel, and who considered himself a Hegelian, wrote his doctoral dissertation on Leibniz. Josiah Royce went from the newly formed University of California to study philosophy at Leipzig and Gottingen, where he became a Hegelian idealist. And yet, the philosophy produced by these four thinkers in their own right is anything but derivative. It is profoundly new and original, and today continues to influence philosophers not just in the United States and Europe but also throughout the world.

Answer the following questions:

1. Who were the first American philosophers?
2. Why was there the golden age of American philosophy,’ but there was neither a bronze nor stone age?
3. What philosophers influenced greatly American thinkers and why?

CHARLES PEIRCE (1839-1914)
Biographical History

Charles Sanders Peirce was born in Cambridge, Massachusetts. His father was a mathematician and professor of mathematics at Harvard. Peirce went to Harvard and graduated at the bottom of his class. In 1870 he formed a discussion group, called the ‘Metaphysical Club,’ in Cambridge, Massachusetts, which included students such as his student William James and Oliver Wendell Holmes. Except for

teaching logic at Johns Hopkins University as an adjunct from 1879 to 1884, and some lectures that he gave at Harvard and the Lowell Institute in Boston, he could not find a permanent teaching position. So he joined the U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey.

Philosophical Overview

Peirce's philosophy developed from a close study of Kant and Hegel, infused with the then-new and extremely radical evolutionary theory of Charles Darwin (1809-1882). He is generally credited as being the founder of American pragmatism. Starting with insights weaned from his reading of Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel, Peirce develops a new concept of truth based on the practical significance of propositions from the standpoint of personal experience. It involves the clarification of thought using his 'pragmatic principle':

Consider what effects, that conceivably might have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.

Beliefs, in Peirce's view, are habits predisposing us to behave in certain ways, depending on the situation, by causing either a physical movement in our bodies or a psychological expectation in our minds. But not all beliefs are created equal. The most common and worst way is the method of tenacity: you hold firm to whatever you think or feel is true, and simply ignore any evidence or argument to the contrary. The second, slightly less bad but still philosophically impoverished way is through conditioning by authority. This is the oldest and most traditional way of getting people to accept received, 'official' theological and political opinions as their own; it results from our governmental, church, and military institutions conditioning us to be obedient to authority. The third, a priori method is the one accepted by rationalists such as, most notably, Plato and Descartes. It is preferable to the first two but ultimately is no better. The reason why reason fails, in Peirce's view, is that it is but an elaborate form of rationalization. Thus the best way, and the only truly reliable method, is what he calls 'scientific' method, which is necessarily self-correcting. The key is that we must not be biased or prejudicial in any way, which amounts to not knowing in advance what it is that we are looking for or where we are going. This, after all, is how evolution works. Nature is not teleological, and neither should be our quest for certainty.

Peirce put high value, therefore, on spontaneity. Instead of starting with universal doubt, as Descartes did, we start by learning everything we can; our beliefs then occur in response to something independent of ourselves. In this way, the proper method for acquiring beliefs is independent of personal prejudices. It

does not require any sort of unique experiences had by the special few who then become the philosophical authorities, the epistemological masters. The process is democratic and brutally egalitarian, and leads to a pragmatic sort of truth. Ideally, we should all be affected, or effectible, in the same way as a result of applying his method.

Peirce is not denying the reality of the world as something independent of thought, belief, or will. Nor is he denying that we can form correct beliefs. On the contrary; the aim of his philosophical method is to make us see that our beliefs are 'not a momentary code of consciousness'. Rather, for S to believe that A behaviourally predisposes S to act as if A were true. By thus providing S with psychological confidence, it allows S to behave in and interact with the world in certain ways rather than others. For S to truly doubt A, on the other hand, means that S is in a psychologically uncertain state with regard to A. S then does not know what to do when some situation involving A requires S to reach a decision. Peirce's brilliant insight here is that it is for this reason that we are predisposed by nature to avoid doubt at all costs: doubt is psychologically painful, it is an anxious state, and it makes us unfit to interact well with our environment. The process of philosophical inquiry is therefore essential if we are to escape doubt. Inquiry according to Peirce requires (1) a stimulus, in the form of the psychological experience of doubt, described above; (2) an end, which means that an opinion is settled and there is some closure; and (3) a method, by which he means the scientific, 'self-correcting' method. The key to this whole process, which became a sort of philosophical foundation for all the pragmatists, is that inquiry is not some purely intellectual activity of thought but must occur in the form of a problem felt directly in experience. If S feels there is no problem, which means that S is not genuinely concerned, puzzled, or irritated, S is not capable of true inquiry. Intellectual doubt is not sufficient; the doubt must be experientially felt. Without real doubt, the mind is closed to inquiry.

Answer the following questions:

1. When and where was Charles Sanders Peirce born?
2. Where did he receive his education?
3. What was Peirce's philosophy developed from?
4. What is Peirce's new concept of truth based on?
5. What are beliefs, in Peirce's view?
6. What is the key to Peirce's 'scientific' method?
7. What is the aim of his philosophical method?
8. Describe Peirce's words: "Without real doubt, the mind is closed to inquiry".

Lecture 18. The Twentieth-Century Philosophy. General Introduction. Frege. Husserl.

The Twentieth-Century Philosophy
General Introduction

During the twentieth century, there were many rapid worldwide social, political, and cultural changes. The century saw two world wars, the rise and fall of fascism and communism, and cultural and economic globalization, as well as the beginning of the end of colonialism. It was a time of tremendous technological advances, population growth, and many new social problems. Similarly, during this period, humanity's understanding of itself and the world went through some dramatic developments. This was the century of quantum physics, relativity, molecular biology, chaos theory, and computer science. In the human sciences, the twentieth century saw Sigmund Freud, Jean Piaget, Noam Chomsky, behaviourism, structuralism and cognitive science. In similar ways, philosophy changed dramatically in the last century.

The story of twentieth-century philosophy is in part a tale of the development of two apparently conflicting types of philosophy, the analytic and the continental traditions. In the analytic tradition, there are thinkers such as Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, the logical positivists, and W. V. O. Quine, who have focused on language. In the continental tradition, there are thinkers such as Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Jiirgen Habermas, and Michel Foucault, who have studied questions related to the human condition and politics. There are many differences of substance, style, and emphasis between the two traditions.

However, toward the end of the century, the distinction between the two traditions became blurred to some extent. Analytic philosophers became more interested in social issues and in existential questions. Continental philosophers became more explicitly interested in language and interpretation. Furthermore, there was much more cross-fertilization between the two traditions. So, the twentieth century is in part a story of divergence and, later, convergence.

In the later part of the twentieth century, philosophy broadened its scope. For example, in analytic philosophy, there are thinkers working in diverse areas such as the philosophy of biology, of physics, of law, of economics, and of cognitive science. Analytic philosophy deals with more than just the traditional ethical, metaphysical, and epistemological problems that were its main concerns in previous centuries.

In addition, philosophers from both traditions have opened their doors to other disciplines and to socio-political problems. As a consequence, there are more thinkers working outside and against what might have earlier been considered 'mainstream' philosophy. For example, there are many kinds of feminist philosophers constructing new feminist approaches to all areas of knowledge and society. There are thinkers inspired by an ecological vision of humanity and the world. There are also more philosophers concerned with cross-cultural approaches to philosophy and the philosophies of the different parts of the world, rather than being limited to only western thought. For these reasons, we can no longer contrast analytic and continental philosophy as if this were a mutually exclusive and exhaustive categorization. As a result, philosophy is no longer a single discipline in the way that it was at the beginning of the twentieth century.

General labels, such as 'postmodernism' and 'ordinary language philosophy,' are powerful simplifying tools, useful for a book such as this. They can help us see quickly some similarities between philosophers. At the same time, however, they can mask other similarities and differences. They can prevent us also from approaching the work of each thinker individually and with a fresh outlook. Having said that, we now need to give the briefest and most general review possible of twentieth-century philosophy.

Frege and Husserl

Both continental and analytic philosophy had their sources in the Germany of 1900. Gottlob Frege was a major inspiration of much of the analytic tradition, and Husserl of the continental tradition. Frege was interested in the philosophy of logic, mathematics, and language and his work inspired a broadly scientific approach to language and mental states. In contrast, Husserl developed phenomenology; an approach to experience that opposed the encroachment of the natural sciences in the understanding of consciousness. Despite the differences between them, Frege and Husserl, who corresponded with each other, have some views in common. For example, both insist on a distinction between the content of thought and the psychological process of thinking. They separate what thought is about, namely, its reference, and its content, or sense.

Frege's Legacy

Frege's distinction between sense and reference is important for much analytic philosophy of the twentieth century because it seems that reference is a

more straightforward notion than sense or meaning. Sense seems to involve the existence of nonphysical entities, such as meanings, that do not have clear boundaries of identity and that do not fit well into a scientific conception of reality. In contrast, reference seems clear cut and undemanding. The reference of a noun or a name is simply the object or person that it refers to. The reference of 'is red' is simply the set of all things that are red. Furthermore, such notions of reference comply with the law of substitution in logic: words with the same reference can be substituted for each other in a sentence (without changing whether the sentence as a whole is true). For example, in 'Venus has no water,' we can substitute for 'water' the term 'H20' and for 'Venus' 'the hottest planet in the solar system'. Notions of sense do not comply with the law of substitution.

For these reasons, Frege's distinction raises some fundamental issues. For example, some analytic philosophers argue that the language of science can be defined using only clear notions like reference, avoiding unclear ones like sense. This is an important aspect of logical positivism. Others have argued that language more generally can be characterized adequately in terms of notions like reference. This claim is important in logical atomism and in the works of Quine.

Furthermore, notions such as the content of a mental state and the significance of a social practice pertain to sense or meaning broadly conceived. In contrast, the concepts of physics pertain to reference only; physical states as such do not have a sense or meaning. Now consider the question 'Can the meaning-related concepts of the humanities, psychology, and sociology be reduced to the reference-based notions required for physics?' This kind of question strikes close to the heart of many debates, such as the relation between mental states and the brain, the nature of perception and of understanding, and the status of scientific knowledge claims. These disputes are central to many thinkers of the twentieth century.

Husserl's Legacy

Here is a very brief preview of twentieth-century continental philosophy; a more detailed explanation of each thinker can be found in the philosophical overviews. At the beginning of the century, Husserl rejected any attempt to reduce the intentionality or subjectivity of consciousness to the concepts of natural science. To oppose such a reduction, he tries to define and practice phenomenology, a new method of describing experience and consciousness without making any assumptions regarding what exists. In this method, one describes how something is understood and how it appears to the persons concerned. One characterizes its meaning. Husserl's pupil Heidegger, in Being and Time (1927), altered and extended this new method to disclose and describe the

meaning of our mode of being. In this process of interpretation, he tried to show how our cares and concerns constitute the world we live in, and how the scientific world model is an abstraction from this lived-in world. In this process of disclosing meaning, Heidegger attempted to show how we can live either authentically or inauthentically, depending on whether we are aware of the temporal meaning of our way of being or not. An inauthentic way of living involves using superficial interpersonal relationships to escape from facing the meaning of one's being and death.

The French philosopher and writer Jean-Paul Sartre can be seen as extending the work of Heidegger. In Being and Nothingness (1943), Sartre argued that human existence is defined by free choice rather than a God-given human nature. We live in bad faith when we try to hide this existential free choice from ourselves, for example by pretending that we are determined by some human essence. Simone de Beauvoir, Sartre's companion, extended the existentialist analysis to the subjugation of women in her classic feminist work, The Second Sex (1949). De Beauvoir argues that there are no essential differences between the sexes because even biological differences have a social meaning. She introduces into existentialism the claim that moral choices may depend on social conditions.

Habermas is a more recent German philosopher. Much of his work can be seen as an attempt to provide a basis for and extend the critical theory movement. The critical theorists, such as Max Horkheimer and Theodore Adorno in the Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947), attempt to renew a Marxist-inspired critique of capitalist society and consumer culture by criticizing the Enlightenment notion of reason. Habermas argues that this kind of critique needs to be based on the nature of communication, and by examining the conditions of communicative acts he develops a discourse ethic in works such as Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (1983).

To understand the recent French poststructuralist thinkers, we need to step back. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Hegel claimed that all understanding must be historically situated. Most of the continental philosophers mentioned so far take this claim very much to heart. However, structuralism, which became a popular movement in France in the 1960s, emphasizes a non-historical and more holistic approach to language by understanding it as a system of signs. The poststructuralist French philosophers Derrida, Foucault, and Irigaray have worked both within and against a structuralist framework to undermine, in various ways, the Enlightenment conceptions of reason and truth. For example, in various books written from 1961 to 1984, Foucault shows how the exercise of power relations determines the nature of all knowledge claims. He develops a historical analysis of the changing roles of various social institutions, such as the prison and

the clinic, and shows how these act as instruments of power. His analyses are always tied to the specific conditions of the time, thereby avoiding generalized historical narratives such as those of Marxism.

His contemporary, Derrida, is well known for deconstructing the official readings of texts, an idea that has influenced some contemporary literary criticism. Deconstruction involves showing how a text contains elements that contradict its standard interpretation. For Derrida, this process has a philosophical point; he wants to undermine the assumption that there are fixed determinate givens, such as meaning, God, self, truth, and the world, which transcend the changing interplay between signs.

Some Conclusions

Looking back over twentieth-century philosophy, we can see some interesting broad patterns. First, compared to earlier periods, there has been a more direct focus on the nature of language and understanding. This was a prime concern of much analytic philosophy. But it has been also of central importance to Husserl, Heidegger, and, more recently, to Derrida and Foucault. One reason why philosophers have focused explicitly on language, meaning, and interpretation is that by comprehending understanding itself, we may hope to gain comprehension of many other issues. Language has been seen as pivotal.

Second, the relationship between the natural sciences and the study of human beings has been a continuing central concern. Are the concepts and methods of the natural sciences adequate or applicable to the study of human life? During the birth of science and the modem period (1600-1800), this question was loaded explicitly with theological connotations. In contrast, in the twentieth century, the question was understood in terms of the nature of understanding itself. For this reason, parts of this volume introduce the debate between, on the one hand, scientific naturalistic approaches to language and, on the other, broadly phenomenological and interpretive approaches.

A third pattern of the twentieth century is that the nature of skepticism has altered. After 1600, much skepticism was concerned with the nature of perception: how can we claim to know the external world when our knowledge is based on the internal perception of ideas? This question still plagued Bertrand Russell and the early logical positivists. However, Heidegger and the later Wittgenstein attempted to show how this question is itself based on false assumptions, and, as a result, there is much more widespread recognition of the public and social nature of knowledge. This in turn has given rise to a new breed of skepticism concerning the nature of concepts and interpretation, which seem to be radically underdetermined.

This skeptical thesis can be seen in the work of the later Wittgenstein, Quine, Thomas Kuhn, and post-structuralism, all of which are contained in this book.

Fourthly, there has been the opening up of philosophy, as described earlier, which has resulted in so many '-isms,' or schools of thought.

Answer the following questions:

1. What worldwide social, political, and cultural changes were there during the twentieth century?
2. What is the distinction between the analytic and the continental traditions?
3. How did philosophy broaden its scope in the later part of the twentieth century?
4. What was philosopher Frege interested in?
5. What does phenomenology, an approach developed by Husserl, mean?
6. What views in common do Frege and Husserl have?
7. Why is Frege's distinction between sense and reference so important for much analytic philosophy of the twentieth century?
8. Interpret philosophical overviews of the twentieth-century philosophers.
9. What interesting broad patterns can we see in the twentieth-century philosophy?

Lecture 19. The Logical Atomists. B. Russell. Wittgenstein. Part I.

The Logical Atomists. Part I

At the beginning of the twentieth century the British philosophy was greatly influenced by ideas of idealism. It was largely a form of idealism inspired by the work of Hegel and Bradley. However, the two young Cambridge students, G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, rebelled against idealism and argued in favour of a commonsense philosophy. For instance, Moore argued against the idealist claim that to be is to be perceived, and in favour of the commonsense thesis that we can know that propositions such as 'the earth exists' are true. Meanwhile, Russell became deeply interested in the philosophical foundations of mathematics. He studied the work of the German philosopher Frege (1848-1925), who had made the most significant advances in logic since the time of Aristotle. Frege, who had devised a new logical notation, had undertaken the project of showing rigorously how arithmetic was reducible to logic, a task that Russell was later to try to complete. Frege's mathematical project required him to develop new concepts in the philosophy of language, which we need to review briefly to understand logical atomism.

Regarding language, Frege introduced four important basic concepts. First, he argued for the distinction between sense and reference. This distinction is best explained in terms of 'subject terms,' which refer to particular things. Subject terms include ordinary proper names such as 'John,' referring phrases such as 'the number nine,' and definite descriptions such as 'the only son of Marina'. Frege argued that knowing the reference of a subject term is not the same as knowing its sense. We can know to whom the name 'John' refers, without knowing that the phrase 'the only son of Marina' refers to the same person. Furthermore, we can understand the sense or meaning of these terms without knowing that they have the same reference. Hence, sense and reference are distinct. According to Frege, the sense of a subject term is what we grasp when we understand it, and it determines what the reference is. For this reason, two names or subject terms with the same sense must have the same reference, even though two names with the same reference need not have the same sense.

Second, Frege argued that the true unit of meaning is the sentence. A word on its own asserts nothing. Only sentences affirm something and express thoughts. This implies that individual words do not have a sense or meaning except in the context of a sentence. They have meaning only in so far as they contribute to the sense of whole sentences. Moreover, the meaning of a sentence is determined by

the contribution made by each of the words in the sentence. Its sense is determined by its composition, by the meaning of its parts.

Third, he introduced the idea of concepts or predicates as functions. In so doing, Frege showed us how to think about sentence structure, and how sentences are built up from their parts. Consider a simple subject-predicate sentence, such as 'John is bald'. This sentence consists of two parts: (1) the subject term 'John,' which, in the context of a sentence, refers to an individual, and (2) the predicate term 'is bald'. This predicate term does not refer to any object, but serves as a function, telling us that the object is of a certain kind or giving us a principle for grouping things into kinds. In mathematics, a function effects a systematic transformation from one number to another. For example, the function л/ transforms any number to its square root. According to Frege, a predicate term serves as a function because it transforms the sense of the subject term into the sense of a subject-predicate sentence, and the reference of a subject term into the truth-value of a sentence.

Fourth, Frege introduced the idea of the existential and universal quantifiers. He recognized that not all sentences have a subject-predicate form. For example, 'John exists' and 'Everything is blue' do not. Such sentences must be explained in terms of the quantifiers that bind variables, such as 'x'. The sentence 'John exists' involves the existential quantifier. It has the logical form: 'There is an x, and x is identical to John,' or in logical notation, '3x (x = John)'. The sentence 'Everything is blue' involves the universal quantifier. It has the logical form: 'For all x, x is blue' or, in logical notation, (x) (Bx). This logical notation allows us to analyze sentences in which the quantifiers have an ambiguous scope, such as 'Everyone loves someone,' and to show how they are composed of their parts.

But what are senses? Frege firmly rejects the claim that they are purely subjective or private psychological ideas, for this would make communication impossible. They are objective features of words and sentences. Frege's distinction between sense and reference seemed to require a Platonic realm of abstract objects, in addition to the existence of material things. Later philosophers, such as Russell and Wittgenstein, were unhappy with Frege's conception of sense because it seemed to require the existence of strange and unclear entities, such as senses, propositions, or meanings. It is quite different from the much clearer notion of reference. Part of Frege's legacy was that he left philosophical logic with this fundamental problem. Incidentally, Frege also made the suggestion that the sense of a sentence can be understood in terms of its truth-conditions, which became the basis of proposed solutions to the problem.

Briefly, logical atomism can be understood as an attempt to continue with Frege's project of formalizing language, but without the need for Platonic senses.

The goal is to explain the meaning of every expression in a language in terms of two concepts. First, the language contains simple or primitive expressions that have a reference. Second, it contains certain logical rules that specify how the references of complex expressions are determined by their structure and the reference of their constituent expressions.

Russell was mentor to one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century, Ludwig Wittgenstein, who developed the basic ideas of logical atomism in a direction that is rather different from Russell's. However, both reject Frege's idea that language requires the postulation of abstract entities, senses. They share the idea that language can be formalized and the conviction that traditional philosophical problems can be resolved in the process.

Answer the following questions:

1. What ideas inspired English philosophers at the beginning of the 20th century?
2. What did G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell argue?
3. What four important basic concepts regarding language, did Frege introduce?
4. How can logical atomism be understood?
5. What Frege's idea did Russell and Wittgenstein reject?

BERTRAND RUSSELL (1872-1970)
Biographical History

Bertrand Russell had a long, active, and interesting life. His parents died while he was still a child, and he was raised by his grandfather, Lord John Russell. Russell's first important philosophical works were in the philosophy of logic and mathematics. The groundbreaking The Principles of Mathematics was published in 1903. He and the mathematician Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) collaborated on the three-volume work, Principia Mathematica (1910-1913). Their project was to prove that mathematics can be reduced to pure logic, thereby obviating the need for Platonic mathematical objects. Starting with logically primitive concepts stated as axioms, they try to derive rigorously the whole of mathematics. As with Frege, each step in the derivation would be proved logically, with no vague appeal to intuition. Indeed, it is possible to view the entire three volumes as an attempt to write a program – a set of algorithmic procedures – for deductive mathematics.

After the publication of Principia Mathematica, Russell's philosophical interests broadened and became less technical. Furthermore, his views on many central philosophical issues changed during his long academic life.

He was a devout atheist and a lifelong opponent of religion. He was also an adamant critic of traditional morality and education, and an outspoken pacifist, which got him fired from his teaching post in England during World War I. He was jailed many times in his life. At the age of 89, he was arrested for protesting against nuclear arms. In 1940, he was prevented from accepting a teaching position at the College of the City of New York because of his liberal views on sex. A prolific writer and a household figure, Russell published over 70 books and hundreds of articles, as well as essays on virtually every topic. He was awarded the Order of Merit in 1949, and in 1950, he won the Nobel Prize for Literature.

Philosophical Overview

Russell's theory of descriptions is famous for solving an old philosophical problem, which is 'How can a meaningful name fail to refer to something?' For example, the name 'Pegasus' refers to a mythical flying horse, but no such horse ever existed. In reply to this question, the philosopher Alexius Meinong postulates non-existing objects. Russell rejects this idea of non-existing actual objects, citing Ockham's razor, the principle that one should not postulate entities beyond what is strictly necessary. Instead, Russell tries to solve the problem by revealing the logical structure of sentences, such as 'The present king of France is bald'. This sentence is really a conjunction of three distinct sentences: (1) There is a thing that is the present king of France; (2) There is only one of them; and (3) That thing is bald. Understood in this way, the problem is solved because statement (1) is just false. In other words, what superficially appears to be a proper name becomes on analysis a definite description?

Russell's theory of descriptions is important for three reasons.

1. First, it provides a solution to the ancient philosophical problem of non-referring expressions, which had plagued philosophy since the time of Parmenides.

2. Second, the theory of descriptions is the basis of Russell's theory of knowledge. How can we think about things with which we are not directly acquainted? To answer this question, Russell distinguishes between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. He claims that we are only ever directly acquainted with particular sense data and universals. He argues that every proposition that we can understand must be composed of primitive expressions that refer to particulars and universals that we are directly acquainted with. However,

knowledge of things that we are not directly acquainted with is possible because we can have knowledge of complex facts described with definite descriptions.

3. Third, the theory of descriptions is a central part of the program of logical atomism, according to which the world must consist of logical atoms. According to Russell, these logical atoms include particular sense data, which are referred to or denoted by logically proper names or primitive referring expressions. These primitive expressions alone are guaranteed to refer to some existent particular. In contrast, complex expressions, such as definite descriptions, can fail to refer. In this way alone, we can explain how false propositions are possible, for if a proposition were regarded as a simple name of some fact, then false propositions would be impossible. A proposition can be false because it is a complex.

In brief, the following picture of language and the world emerges. The only particular things are sense data, and we can refer to them with primitive or logically proper names. These sense data have properties and stand in relation to each other, and the corresponding expressions in language are simple concept terms, described as functions by Frege. All other referring expressions that might look like names are really complex definite descriptions, which can fail to refer. This means that all the words that we use to refer to physical objects are complex expressions constructed from simple names that refer to sense data. In a similar way, the mind itself is a construction from sense data, and Russell's logical atomism points toward the kind of radical empiricism found in Hume. It also indicates a way to analyze linguistic meaning formally in terms of simple names and the logical rules that allow us to construct complex expressions and propositions from such elements.

Russell's Influence

Russell was an extremely prolific writer whose work touched many areas of philosophy during a long period. His most influential compositions were Principia Mathematica, which he co-authored with Whitehead in 1910-1913, and his own The Principles of Mathematics and Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy. These books were groundbreaking in the newly emerging field of mathematical logic. For example, Russell discovered the logical paradox named after him, and put forward the theory of types as a solution. In brief, Russell's work gave a tremendous impetus to mathematical logic and thus to later computational theory.

Russell's pioneering writing in the field of logic set the tone and the direction of much twentieth-century analytical philosophy of language, such as the logical positivists' program. His work was one of the first steps toward a purely formal analysis of language and a syntactical theory of thought. Formal and syntactical

theories are those that avoid the concept of meaning and that aim to translate language and reasoning into a purely formal machine language. These were the first steps on the long road to artificial intelligence much later in the century.

Russell's theory of definite descriptions is important as a model of how we can solve philosophical problems by uncovering the logical structure of language. In particular, it shows that the superficial grammatical form of a sentence can be quite different from the logical structure of the proposition it expresses. According to Russell, this indicates that philosophical analysis can reveal the logical structure of propositions and can lead to the construction of a logically perfect language. It presents the hope that other philosophical problems can be solved in a similar way. For this reason, it became a model for many analytic philosophers.

The theory of descriptions became an integral part of Russell's Empiricist program of showing how the concepts of objects and of the self are logical constructions out of sense data. This idea had considerable influence on the early logical positivists. For example, in his work The Logical Construction of the World (1928), Carnap tries to carry out in detail a program that is akin to Russell's. He tries to show how all scientific and psychological concepts can be constructed from immediate sense experience. In a similar way, Russell had a substantial influence over other British empiricists of the twentieth century, such as A. J. Ayer, who thought that all of our concepts had to be derived from our immediate experience of sense data.

Finally, logical atomism was a view shaped jointly by Russell and Wittgenstein. It is difficult to know who influenced whom.

Answer the following questions:

1. What were Russell's first important philosophical works?
2. What ideas did Russell proclaim?
3. What is Russell's theory of descriptions famous for?
4. Why is Russell's theory of descriptions so important?
5. Why are Russell's 'the Principles of Mathematics' and 'Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy' well known?
6. What role did Russell's pioneering writing in the field of logic play?

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN (1889-1951)

Biographical History

Ludwig Wittgenstein was born in Vienna to a prominent Jewish family that had converted to Roman Catholicism. After receiving a degree in engineering in

Berlin, he moved to England with the idea of going to the University of Manchester to study aeronautical engineering. However, his growing interest in the foundations of mathematics prevailed and, instead, following Frege's advice, he went to Cambridge University to study with Russell.

World War I interrupted Wittgenstein's studies, and he left England to serve as an officer in the Austrian army. In the trenches, he began writing what would become his doctoral dissertation, which he completed in an Italian prison camp: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922). It created a revolution in philosophy.

Wittgenstein was convinced that he had successfully answered all of philosophy's main questions, and he abandoned the profession in favour of teaching elementary school in the Austrian Alps. Shunning what he considered the trappings of wealth, Wittgenstein had by then given away his share of the family fortune. When he grew disillusioned with teaching elementary school, he worked as a gardener in a nearby monastery, taking time off to design a house for one of his sisters. Seven years later, in 1929, Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge as a research fellow, where he was awarded a doctorate in philosophy on the basis of the Tractatus. However, by this time, he had begun to develop a new vision of philosophy, culminating in his work Philosophical Investigations, which was to cause a second revolution in philosophy.

Philosophical Overview

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein tries to show how logic and language are possible. Linguistic propositions represent how things are in the world. Like thoughts, they picture facts. Wittgenstein's analysis consists of three layers. At each level, language and the world reflect each other: logic is the structure of language and of the world.

1. First, there are names, which are simple signs that, in the context of a sentence, refer to logically simple objects. Names have no sense; they only denote the simple objects that they stand for. These simple objects cannot be identified with everyday objects, which are themselves complex. This is because the assertion that something does not exist must involve a complex definite description rather than a simple name. The theory of descriptions shows us that it cannot make sense to say of a simple object that it does not exist. As a result, any simple object must exist in all possible worlds. Simple names and their corresponding objects are necessary to explain how language hooks onto the world. Without simple names and the objects they denote, sentences could not have a determinate meaning and analysis could proceed indefinitely. However, just as a name by itself asserts nothing and is only meaningful in the context of a proposition, so too objects must

exist as elements of possible facts. It is essential that objects can exist in different configurations as possible states of affairs. They cannot be thought of as isolated, but rather they must be conceived as the constituents of possible states of affairs. They essentially have a form. In this way, we come to the second level of Wittgensteins analysis.

2. Second, language consists of elementary propositions and the world consists of the totality of atomic facts. An elementary proposition consists only of simple names in a certain structure. Similarly, an atomic fact consists only of simple objects in a structure. When an elementary proposition is true, there is corresponding atomic fact. True elementary propositions are pictures of the atomic facts they depict, in virtue of what Wittgenstein calls their 'logical form'. Propositions are pictures of facts because pictures are themselves facts and both have the same logical form. A true elementary proposition and the atomic fact it depicts have their corresponding simple elements in the same logical structure. This point is necessary to account for the fact that false propositions are possible. A proposition cannot name a fact, for otherwise false propositions would be impossible. The sense of an elementary proposition consists in its truth conditions, that is, the possible state of affairs or combination of objects that would make the proposition true, but whether a proposition is true or not (i.e., its truth-value) depends on the facts or which state of affairs holds. It is only in this way that a false proposition can have sense. What makes a proposition elementary is that its truth or falsity does not depend on the truth or falsity of any other proposition. Similarly, an atomic fact is independent of all other atomic facts. This point brings us to the third level of Wittgenstein's analysis.

3. Third, all complex sentences are truth-functional combinations of elementary sentences. Sentences can be combined to form more complex sentences through the logical connectives, such as 'not/ 'and/ 'or/ and 'if... then'. These connectives define how the truth-value of the whole sentence is a determinate function of the truth-value of the component sentences, and the connectives can be defined in terms of various truth tables. Wittgenstein notes that all the other connectives can be defined in terms of joint denial. He conceives of joint denial as an operation that can be performed successively on any sentence or set of sentences. He uses the sign 'N' for this operation. So, for example, 'N(is equivalent to 'not} and 'NN(p)} is equivalent to 'not not p' or 'p/ 'N(pq)} is equivalent to 'neither p nor q.} Wittgenstein claims that every complex sentence is a result of successive applications of the operation 'N} to sets of elementary sentences.

In short, Wittgenstein's view is that any language must consist only of truth-functional combinations of elementary sentences, which consist of logically proper

names in a logical structure; otherwise, the sense of a sentence would not be determinate. Only in this way can propositions picture facts. Literally, nothing else can be said. He notes that much of our language does not appear to be a truth-functional combination of elementary sentences. For instance, psychological statements, such as ‘A believes that P,’ do not appear to be so. Yet, they are, and must be, because nothing else can be said. Much of the rest of the Tractatus consists in revealing the surprising implications of his austere view of language for metaphysics and philosophy.

Answer the following questions:

1. What education did Ludwig Wittgenstein receive?
2. What Wittgenstein’s work created a revolution in philosophy?
3. At what three levels do the language and the world reflect each other? Interpret each of them.
4. According to Wittgenstein’s view, what must any language consist of?

Lecture 20. The Logical Positivists. Rudolf Carnap.

The Logical Positivists

When Moritz Schlick was appointed to the chair of philosophy in Vienna in 1922, he gathered around him a group of like-minded thinkers who were named the Vienna Circle and, later, the logical positivists. Among those present at their Thursday evening meetings were Schlick, Friedrich Waismann, Herbert Feigl, as well as the mathematicians Hans Hahn and Kurt Godel and the economist Otto Neurath. The young German philosopher Rudolf Carnap joined the group in 1926. Hans Reichenbach formed a similar group in Berlin, which included Carl Hempel.

For three years from 1926, the Vienna Circle met to study Wittgenstein's Tractatus. In 1928, Carnap published his work, The Logical Structure of the World. In this work, he audaciously tries to carry out the philosophical program, proposed originally by Russell, of showing how our concepts of the world and the mind are logical constructions out of sense data. Carnap saw his philosophical program as part of a larger battle for scientific clarity, according to which the contemporary world needs to combat the irrationalist philosophies, such as Heidegger's.

This view influenced the group, which in 1929 issued its pamphlet, The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle. In this philosophical manifesto, they advocate the principle of verification according to which, to be meaningful, any statement must be verifiable in principle. They welcomed the implication that this rendered all metaphysics meaningless nonsense. Philosophy needed a new and more scientific start, and to put behind it its metaphysical past.

Afterward, logical positivism went through two fundamental changes. First, in 1932, Neurath urged a reformulation of the positivist view. He contended that the sciences rest on physical objects that exist independently of our perceptions rather than being based on sense data. In other words, he objected to the phenomenalism of Carnap's early work, which conceives of objects as constructions out of sense data.

Second, the positivists revised the verification principle to meet objections to its early formulations. For example, statements about other galaxies and the distant past cannot be verified for physical reasons. Furthermore, 'All humans are mortal does not seem to follow from a finite number of observations, and the same point applies to physical laws. For these reasons, the verification principle needed revision.

Meanwhile, two figures entered the scene: Karl Popper (1902-1994) and A. J. Ayer (1910-1989). Popper, who was friends with the members of the Vienna

Circle, was not a logical positivist. He argued that universal physical laws could never be derived from a finite set of observational statements. In contrast to the principle of verification, he advocated a principle of falsifiability, according to which scientific claims must be falsifiable to be meaningful. Furthermore, he was skeptical of Carnap's project of constructing a logical syntax to unify the sciences.

In 1932, Ayer was sent by his Oxford teacher, Gilbert Ryle, to Vienna to study logical positivism. During the months that Ayer attended the meetings of the Vienna Circle, the American philosopher Quine was also present. When Ayer returned to Oxford full of enthusiasm, he wrote Language, Truth and Logic (1936), which was the first book-length exposition of logical positivism to appear in English.

Meanwhile, the political landscape of Austria was changing: fascism was on the rise.

Many members of the Vienna Circle were left-wing atheists, and others were Jewish. After Schlick was assassinated in 1936, members of the circle immigrated to the United States and England. The circle was broken and dispersed, but logical positivism continued to exercise an important influence on analytic philosophy until well after the end of World War II.

Answer the following questions:

1. Who entered the Vienna Circle?
2. What philosophical program did Carnap carry out in his work 'The Logical Structure of the World'?
3. What principle did the Vienna Circle advocate in their philosophical manifesto?
4. What two fundamental changes did logical positivism go through?
5. What did Karl Popper argue?
6. Why is the work Language, Truth and Logic by Ayer so important?

RUDOLF CARNAP (1891-1970)
Biographical History

In 1910, Rudolf Carnap went to the University of Jena to study philosophy with Frege.

However, in 1917, he was called up to fight for the German army on the Russian front in World War I, after which he returned to his studies, gaining his doctorate in 1919 for a dissertation on the nature of space. Afterwards, he was appointed professor at the University of Vienna and became one of the leading

spokespersons for the logical positivists. In 1930, he and Reichenbach launched the journal Erkenntnis. In 1936, he moved to Chicago.

Toward the end of his life, Carnap worked on probability theory.

Philosophical Overview

Roughly speaking, Carnap's thought can be divided into three phases:

1. During the first phase, just prior to joining the Vienna Circle, Carnap composed The Logical Structure of the World (1928). In this work, he tries to show how our concepts of the world and the mind are logical constructions out of sense data.

In 1932, Neurath criticized Carnap's program on two grounds. First, in contrast to Carnap's phenomenalism, Neurath claimed that science is based on the existence of physical objects and not sense data. Therefore, he rejected Carnap's protocol sentences. Protocol sentences are immediately verifiable, logically independent, and incorrigible sentences about sense data. They were supposed to be the foundations of science. Second, Neurath argued that protocol statements could not be compared with reality, but only with other statements. Thus, truth does not consist in the correspondence of statements to reality, but in their internal coherence as a group. This implied a certain conventionalism. In other words, when two sets of internally coherent sentences are incompatible, which one is accepted is purely a matter of convention.

2. In part, as a consequence of Neurath's criticisms, Carnap wrote The Logical Syntax of Language (1934). Carnap argues that philosophy is the discipline that analyzes the language of science. To defend this view, he has to show that philosophy is not itself nonsense. In other words, he has to solve the problem of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, according to which the Tractatus implies that it itself is meaningless. So, in his own work, Carnap tries to show that a language that is rich enough to include arithmetic can also describe its own logical syntax. For this reason, he aims to reconstruct the syntax of scientific language through a program of formalization. To carry out this task, he distinguishes the material and formal modes of speech. In the material mode, we refer to and describe objects with sentences such as 'There are five apples on the table'. In the formal mode, we describe the syntax of a language with sentences such as '"Five" is a number word'. Carnap uses this distinction to criticize traditional philosophy, which confuses the material and formal modes of speech by producing pseudo propositions, such as 'Five is a number'.

In line with Neurath's critique of his previous work, Carnap abandons his earlier notion of protocol sentences. He argues that the language of science can be

completely characterized in terms of its formation and transformation rules, which show under what conditions sentences are derivable from each other. Carnap now thought that meaning rules, linking some expressions to observations, were dispensable. This position has the logical consequence that such formation rules could generate many incompatible, but internally coherent, systems of sentences. Carnap accepted the indeterminism and conventionalism implicit in this position, arguing that the system accepted by the scientific community would be considered true. This point is important for understanding the work of his American pupil, Quine.

This second program was itself put into doubt by the work of the logician Alfred Tarski, who had argued that the project of formalizing artificial languages could not be applied to natural language. This was because the definition of truth for a formal language has to be stated in terms of a meta-language, which to be formalized would require a meta-meta-language and so on. In contrast, a natural language, such as German, is its own meta-language. As a result of Tarski's work, Carnap abandoned the purely syntactical view of language of his 1934 book. He concluded that some semantic concepts were necessary, and that an analysis of language had to rely on some intensional notions. This led to the publication of the main works of his third period, Introduction to Semantics (1942) and Meaning and Necessity (1946). These works rely on the claim that every linguistic designation refers to both an extension and an intension. Extensional entities are individuals, sets, and truth-values. In contrast, intensional entities are concepts, properties, and propositions. These are referred to respectively by names, predicates, and declarative sentences. Carnap's later view has many similarities to Frege's distinction between sense and reference. In particular, it does not solve the problem that Russell and Wittgenstein had seen with Frege's work, namely, 'What are senses?' The problem now emerging from Carnap's work is 'What are intensional items?' Quine felt that Carnap had gone too far in abandoning the principle of extensionality and postulating the existence of intensional entities.

Answer the following questions:

1. What three phases can Carnap's thought be divided into?
2. How did Neurath criticize Carnap's program?
3. What ideas did Carnap proclaim in his work 'The Logical Syntax of Language'?
4. What ideas did his works of the third period 'Introduction to Semantics' and 'Meaning and Necessity' proclaim?

Lecture 21. Ordinary Language Philosophy. Wittgenstein. Part II.

Ordinary Language Philosophy. Part II

In 1929, when Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge, he was already unhappy with his work Tractatus. He also repudiated logical positivism, the movement that his own work had helped encourage. He began to examine the way that language is actually used in ordinary everyday contexts and how philosophical problems and puzzles are created by the misuse of these ordinary words. His book, Philosophical Investigations, published in 1953, changed the face of much philosophical thought.

Meanwhile, Gilbert Ryle, in Oxford, who was influenced by Wittgenstein, began thinking in a similar direction. Ryle and his former students, J. L. Austin and R E Strawson, developed what is called 'ordinary language philosophy'. Apart from the work of Wittgenstein, the three most influential books of ordinary language philosophy are Ryle's Concept of Mind (1949) and the two posthumous works by J. L. Austin (1911-1960), Sense and Sensibilia and How to Do Things with Words, both published in 1962.

In this book Concept of Mind (1949), Ryle tries to undermine Descartes' dualism and the Empiricist assumption that our mental lives consist in the having of private ideas. He compares this myth of 'the ghost in the machine' to the claim that a university is some entity over and above a set of buildings. Both are category mistakes. It is a mistake to affirm that mental processes are entities distinct from bodily behaviour. Ryle analyzes mentalistic terms, such as 'think,' 'imagine,' and 'to have in mind,' in order to show how these words mislead us systematically into conceiving the mind as a Cartesian 'ghost in a machine'. For example, Ryle argues that it is a mistake to apply verbs such as 'see' and 'perceive' to sensations. Consequently, the concept of sense data and the early Empiricist notion of ideas as objects of perception are both mistaken.

In Sense and Sensibilia, Austin attacks the two central theses of classical Empiricism, namely, that we can only directly perceive our own sense data and that propositions about sense data from the incorrigible foundation of our claims to know objects. In How to Do Things with Words, Austin presents a speech-act theory of language, which is fundamentally opposed to logical atomism. In effect, Austin invented a new approach to the nature of language, with the intension of shifting the focus of philosophical analysis away from abstract propositions toward contextualized utterances. Finally, Austin has been influential because of his way of practicing philosophy, which he called 'linguistic phenomenology,' an examination of 'what we should say when'. He employed a meticulous

examination of how words are used in their various ordinary everyday contexts to criticize philosophical positions and to gain philosophical insights.

Answer the following questions:

1. What philosophers developed the idea of 'ordinary language philosophy'?
2. What two central theses of classical Empiricism does Austin attack in his work 'Sense and Sensibilia'?
3. How did Austin call practicing philosophy?

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN

Biographical History

In 1929, Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge as a research fellow at Trinity College, after many years away from academia. In 1939, he was appointed to the chair of philosophy at Cambridge. During this period, he filled many notebooks with philosophical reflections, some of which he circulated among his students, but he did not allow any of his works to be published during his lifetime. At the beginning of World War II, he volunteered as a hospital orderly in London. After the war, he returned to Cambridge again but, after two years, he resigned his position and went to live in seclusion in Ireland, where he continued to write and where he completed the manuscript, Philosophical Investigations, which was published posthumously in 1953. Subsequently, many of Wittgenstein's notebooks were edited and published. The most important of these include The Blue and Brown Books (1958), Zettel (1967), On Certainty (1969), Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (1978), and Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (1980).

Philosophical Overview

One of the revolutionary aspects of Wittgenstein's later work is his new conception of philosophy, which is roughly as follows. In general, Wittgenstein conceives the aim of philosophy not in terms of providing theories but rather as trying to dissolve philosophical problems, which arise because of 'the bewitchment of our intelligence' by language. Philosophy unties knots in our understanding, and is like the treatment of an illness. This treatment consists in passing from a disguised to a patent piece of nonsense by showing how the words used in philosophy, such as 'private,' 'external,' and 'real,' have a rule-guided ordinary usage. The claims of standard philosophical theories are senseless, and they arise

because language has ‘gone on holiday’. In other words, philosophical theories use ordinary words in a way that disregards the grammatical rules and criteria inherent in their ordinary use. In contrast to these theories, the practice of philosophy is a therapy that makes this misuse plain. In his later works, such as Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein practices philosophy in this manner.

The Influence of the Later Wittgenstein

While many philosophers were following the agenda established by logical positivism, Wittgenstein was brewing a view of understanding that would transform philosophy. There was a whole generation of philosophers affected directly by his later work, such as F. Waismann, Elizabeth Anscombe, Georg Von Wright, Anthony Kenny, John Wisdom, Peter Hacker, Peter Winch, and O. K. Bousma, to name only a few.

There are four primary ways in which the later Wittgenstein’s work has been very influential on the course of philosophy. First, he developed a new style of thinking that tries to dissolve philosophical problems rather than creating theories that answer or solve them. It regards philosophy as conceptual therapy. The therapist’s cure is to help the patient to examine how the relevant parts of language function ordinarily in a variety of specific contexts. The aim is to enable him or her to see that the problem or puzzle, like the theories that try to solve it, involves a misuse of language.

Second, in the philosophy of the language, Wittgenstein tries to undermine the assumption that words derive their meaning by referring independently of context and practice, whether this reference is to private ideas, essences, or Platonic Forms. In contrast, he emphasizes how words are used in a variety of ways in different contexts and language games, and in so doing he stresses the social nature of language.

Third, in the philosophy of mind, Wittgenstein’s influence primarily has been to remove some of the motivation that had held thinkers in the grasp of Descartes’ introspectivism, that is, the view that mental states are defined in essentially private terms by how they feel to the person having them. In contrast, Wittgenstein insists on the need for outer, behavioural criteria, and he challenges the assumption that there are private mental entities such as ideas, sensations, and beliefs.

Fourth, in epistemology, Wittgenstein challenges the assumption that knowledge requires certainty, and, in the process, he tries to undermine the tendency toward solipsism and skepticism. As with the philosophy of mind, he confronts the assumption that we know the contents of our own minds better than we know external objects. He questions the whole basis of such an inner versus

external distinction. Partly as a result of Wittgenstein's work, the idealism of earlier years and the sense data-based theories of perception that tended to dominate philosophy are rarely discussed as live issues today.

One overall effect of Wittgenstein's impact on philosophy has been to put more distance between contemporary thought, which stresses the public and social nature of understanding, and that of Descartes and Locke, which stresses the private.

Answer the following questions:

1. What new revolutionary conception of philosophy does Wittgenstein's later work proclaim?
2. In what four primary ways has the later Wittgenstein's work been very influential on the course of philosophy?
3. What philosophers affected directly by his later work?

Lecture 22. The Analytic Philosophers. W. Quine. T. Kuhn.

The Analytic Philosophers

Around the 1950s, much analytic philosophy in the United States and England was in part motivated by the desire to rethink logical positivism, and more generally Empiricism, but within the analytic tradition as defined by the works of Frege, Russell, and Carnap. Frege suggested that one understands the meaning of a sentence when one knows its truth-conditions, and, in rather different ways, both Wittgenstein in his Tractatus and the logical positivists exploited this suggestion to construct theories of meaning. This broad program received three major shocks.

First, in Two Dogmas of Empiricism' (1953), Quine argues against logical positivism, while retaining the extensional view of language inherent in logical atomism. He contends that logical positivists exploited this suggestion to construct theories of meaning ends that the reductionist program of the early logical positivists fails because theories are underdetermined radically by sensory data. No single theory can be derived from the sense data we perceive. Because the reduction fails, Quine constructs a theory of language that eschews all intensional notions, such as senses, meanings, and propositions. Such notions cannot be reduced; therefore, they must be eliminated. For this reason, the analytic-synthetic distinction is flawed. In this way, Quine tries to turn the two pillars of positivism into dogmas.

Second, Thomas Kuhn presents another radical critique of logical positivism. In his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), Kuhn provides a historical account of science that opposes both the idea of uniform scientific progress and a nonhistorical Empiricist methodology of science. Moreover, his work apparently challenges the concept of objectivity. A scientific revolution occurs when one scientific paradigm replaces another, and when this happens, the relevant scientific concepts change their meaning. Because there are no theory-neutral observations, this results in incommensurate paradigms. They are incommensurate because there can be no neutral set of observations against which to compare them.

The third shock was the ordinary language philosophy of the later Wittgenstein as well as that of G. Ryle and J. Austin. Partly as a result of these shocks, contemporary analytical philosophy changed in tone and direction. Especially since the 1970s, it has broadened its scope considerably. There are an increasing number of works in other areas such as applied ethics, aesthetics, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of the social sciences. One of the great classics of the later part of the century is John Rawls' Theory of Justice (1971), which has stimulated a rich debate in political theory and the philosophy of law.

Answer the following questions:

1. What was much analytic philosophy in the United States and England motivated by?
2. How did logical positivists try to construct theories of meaning?
3. What does Quine contend in his work 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'?
4. How does Thomas Kuhn criticize logical positivism in his book 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'?
5. What philosophical problems were discussed by philosophers in the later part of the century?

W. V. O. QUINE (1908-2000)

Biographical History

Willard Van Orman Quine, who was born in Akron, Ohio, studied mathematics and philosophy at Oberlin College. In 1930, he went to graduate school at Harvard, where he wrote a dissertation on the mathematical logic of Principia Mathematica, which was subsequently published as A System of Logic. He received his doctorate in philosophy after only two years.

Afterward, Quine was awarded a traveling scholarship and he studied in Vienna, where he met Moritz Schlick, Hans Reichenbach, and Rudolf Carnap. He also studied logic with the great Polish logicians, Tarski and Jan Lukasiewicz. In 1936, Quine returned to the United States and became an instructor at Harvard. When the United States entered World War II, he joined the navy and ended up working for radio intelligence in Washington. After the war, Quine returned to Harvard, where he became a full professor in 1948 until his retirement 30 years later. During his academic career, Quine has written many books and articles. His books include From A Logical Point of View (1953), Word and Object (1960), Ways of Paradox (1966), The Roots of Reference (1967), and Ontological Relativity (1969).

Philosophical Overview

Quine's main philosophical aim is to explain naturalistically, or factually in scientific terms, how our theories of the world arise from sense perception. This constitutes a revised and radical form of Empiricism, which substitutes Carnap's early notion of reduction with one of naturalististic explanation, inspired by Dewey

and Hume. To provide background to Quine's thought, let us briefly review four aspects of his philosophy.

Stimulus Meaning

All theories are based on sensory input. This input should be conceived of in strictly behaviourist terms in the following way. The stimulus meaning of a sentence for a speaker at a particular time can be defined behaviourally in terms of the sensory stimuli a person would need in order to agree with or assent to the sentence. If a person assents to sentence 'S' given stimulus 'A', then 'A' is part of the stimulus meaning of 'S' for that speaker at that time. Thus, in the case of observation statements, meaning and evidence are identical. According to Quine, observation statements form the basis of all scientific theories. By explaining these observation statements in the way he does, Quine is advocating behaviourism, according to which all intensional language, such as 'believes' and 'desires,' should be eliminated from psychology and science

Holism and the Indeterminacy of Meaning

Holism means that single theoretical sentences do not have evidential support on their own in relation to observations, but only together as a theory. Since the meaning of a statement solely depends on what would count as evidence for its truth, Quine also accepts a holistic conception of meaning. However, theories are underdetermined by sensory inputs. In other words, the same sensory inputs could generate many different incompatible theories. Thus, meaning is underdetermined too. This, in turn, implies the indeterminacy of translation: one could have two incompatible translation manuals for a given language, both of which are compatible with the speech dispositions of a linguistic community. Because of holism and indeterminacy, the notion of the meaning of a sentence is mistaken.

Ontological Relativity

Every theory has an ontological commitment, a claim about what there is or what kinds of things exist. As a consequence of the indeterminacy of evidence and meaning, Quine argues that opposing ontological stances, such as phenomenalism and physicalism, can be underdetermined. He calls this view 'ontological relativity'. What can be said to exist is always relative to a theory, and there can be competing alternative ontological theories, encased in conflicting conceptual schemes, which are observationally underdetermined.

Extensionality

According to Quine, the language in which scientific theories are constructed should be purely extensional. The structure of this language is defined solely in terms of the quantifiers and truth functions basic to Frege's logic. This is called the thesis of extensionality.

An extensional sentence permits substitution of terms with identical reference. Because he endorses the thesis of extensionality, Quine tries to explain stimulus meaning in strictly behaviorist terms, as mentioned above. The thesis also commits Quine to the program of showing how intensional (or non-extensional) phrases can be eliminated from language. This is called the regimentation of language into the canonical idiom. According to Quine, this program has three advantages. First, the theory of language itself will appeal purely to clear extensional notions, such as 'reference' and 'truth conditions,' and not to unclear intensional notions, such as 'meaning,' 'analytic,' and 'sense'. This point feeds back into the claim that meaning is indeterminate. Second, the corresponding ontology will not require so-called intensional entities, such as propositions, meanings, concepts, and propositional attitudes such as beliefs and desires. To support this point, Quine argues that such proposed 'intensional entities' do not have acceptable principles of identity or individuation. They cannot be identified and individuated. This point also shows why Quine is opposed to traditional Empiricism, which is idea based. As traditionally conceived, ideas are intensional items. Third, in this way, Quine argues for the unity of science, the claim that the psychological and social sciences are unified with the physical sciences.

Quine's Influence

Quine's 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' is one of the most discussed pieces of twentieth-century philosophy. In general, Quine's work introduces several new themes into philosophy. For instance, holistic conceptions of science and language were relatively new at the time he first expounded them. They subsequently became popular. Quine also introduced the problems related to radical interpretation and the resulting ideas of the indeterminacy of translation and ontological relativity.

Quine's work gave new impetus to the idea of the under-determination of theory by data. According to this idea, it is possible to have two theories that explain all empirical data equally well. In such a case, the two theories are underdetermined. Quine embraces this possibility and extends it from evidence to

semantics. Meaning or translation is also radically underdetermined. Philosophers have found this an intriguing and significant point, which has generated much debate.

These comparatively new ideas eroded the optimistic assumption of the logical positivists that the reductions that their program needed could be carried out successfully. What makes Quine's position novel and influential is that he tries to show how the thesis of extensionality can be maintained even when reductionism cannot. Quine does this in two ways. First, he argues for an eliminativist position, that is, that all intensional notions, such as meaning and belief, would be eliminated from a description of the world in order to keep that description properly scientific and extensional. Second, he draws on pragmatist conceptions and naturalistic explanations of aspects of our discourse that do not fit into the extensionalist model. Both aspects of Quine's overall strategy have been very influential.

Answer the following questions:

1. When and where was Willard Van Orman Quine born?
2. What education did he receive?
3. What books did he publish?
4. What is Quine's main philosophical aim?
5. What does the first aspect of his philosophy 'Stimulus Meaning' proclaim?
6. What does the second aspect of his philosophy 'Holism and the Indeterminacy of Meaning' state?
7. What does the third aspect of his philosophy 'Ontological Relativity' say?
8. What does the fourth aspect of his philosophy 'Extensionality' state?
9. What new ideas did Quine introduce into twentieth-century philosophy?

THOMAS KUHN (1922-1996)

Biographical History

Thomas Kuhn, who was born in Cincinnati, Ohio, studied physics at Harvard University, where he received his Ph.D. in 1949. By this time, he had grown interested in the history and philosophy of science, which he subsequently taught at Berkeley, Princeton. In 1962, he published The Structure of Scientific Revolutions; his other works include The Copemican Revolution (1957) and The Essential Tension (1977).

Philosophical Overview

Kuhn argues systematically for a historical conception of science that opposes the idea of uniform scientific progress advocated by the logical positivists. The argument consists in a contrast between normal science and scientific revolutions. According to Kuhn, normally scientists work within a paradigm, which is a set of theoretical assumptions, concepts, and commitments that define the problems, methods, and solutions of scientific investigation. Normal science consists in puzzle solving, or in showing how experimental results and theoretical work fit into the accepted paradigm. In normal science, the paradigm is beyond challenge, and the scientific community's research program consists in interpreting results in terms of it. It defines a worldview.

A paradigm breaks down when the anomalies between it and specific scientific results are too significant for the scientific community to reconcile the two. There occurs a scientific revolution, which consists in the old paradigm being replaced by a new one that is able to explain the new evidence. For example, Einstein's theories of relativity replaced Newton's paradigm. Such paradigm shifts do not consist in new facts coming to light; rather, they consist in a dramatic conceptual change, during which the methods, problems, and language of science alter. After a transitional period, the new paradigm becomes accepted and scientific practices revert back to the stage of normal science.

According to Kuhn, the old and new paradigms are incommensurable for two reasons. First, all paradigms leave some problems unresolved. However, two paradigms will leave different problems unsolved. Therefore, any debate between two paradigms must involve answering the question 'Which of the problems are the most significant?' and any answer to this question involves appeal to the relevant paradigm. Second, observation and theory cannot be sharply distinguished; observations of the facts are always theoretically laden because the only access to facts is through concepts. In this sense, Kuhn challenges the concepts of a theory-neutral world and data. Conflicts between scientific paradigms cannot be settled by appeal to such neutral evidence. This does not necessarily mean that science is irrational and purely subjective. In effect, Kuhn argues for a third alternative, namely, that conflicts between paradigms must be resolved by the informed judgments and the commitments of the scientific community.

Kuhn's Influence

Kuhn's work unsettled the assumption that physics is straightforwardly objective. Because physics had been taken as the model of objective knowledge by

many thinkers since the days of Newton, Kuhn's arguments struck a deep nerve. In the short term, they derailed the logical positivist program. In the longer term, Kuhn's arguments have led philosophers to question more deeply what 'the objectivity of science' really means and what the authority of science consists in. Also, Kuhn's arguments have opened the way for more radical postmodern and feminist critiques of scientism and of traditional views of scientific methodology.

The centre of the stage is held by Kuhn's claim that rival scientific paradigms are incommensurable. By this he apparently means that rival paradigms cannot be assessed comparatively in terms of a neutral set of facts. Whether one can derive a stronger notion of incommensurability from Kuhn's arguments is contested. In any case, incommensurability in the natural sciences would seem to imply incommensurability in all other areas of knowledge. For this reason, there is much at stake in discussions on this aspect of Kuhn's work.

Kuhn's thesis concerning incommensurability is premised on the failure of the observation-theory distinction. This distinction fails because of the Kantian point that any perception requires concepts. Any observation will presuppose a theory, and, consequently, there are no theory-neutral observations to which one can appeal to settle scientific disputes.

These two central theses of Kuhn's work have challenged many aspects of traditional views of science. For example, Carnap, Popper, and Reinchenbach were all scientific realists who claimed that science aims at true descriptions of the real world. Incommensurability threatens realism. The lack of a clear observation-theory distinction also pressurizes foundationalism, the view that scientific theories can be justified in terms of some observational foundations. It also begs for a new definition of scientific progress.

Debate about Kuhn's thesis dominated the philosophy of science from the 1960s to the 1980s. Kuhn's work transformed the field. Earlier purely theoretical discussions of the ideal scientific methodology seemed too removed from historical and actual practice to yield any understanding. Kuhn's work was also very influential outside of the philosophy of the natural sciences. It transformed the discussion of the methodology of social sciences and injected new energy into the sociology of science. Kuhn's phrase 'paradigm shift' became popular outside of philosophy and outside of academia.

Answer the following questions:

1. When and where was Thomas Kuhn born?
2. What books did he publish?
3. How must normally scientists work, according to Kuhn?

4. For what two reasons, according to Kuhn, are the old and new paradigms incommensurable?
5. How did Kuhn's work derail the logical positivist program?
6. Why have two central theses of Kuhn's work challenged many aspects of traditional views of science?

Lecture 23. The Phenomenologists and Existentialists. Heidegger

The Phenomenologists and Existentialists

The twentieth-century continental philosophy begins with Husserl, who was the founder of phenomenology. Husserl's thought influenced Heidegger, who can be regarded as the originator of existentialism.

The term 'phenomenology' comes from the Greek word *phainomenon*, meaning appearance. Phenomenology is the study of experience as experience. The phenomenological method consists in a careful description of the essential natures of specific psychological phenomena. Husserl argued that experience has a certain structure, which permits it to have content, and, in so doing, he developed the phenomenological method as an alternative to the natural sciences. Toward the end of his life, Husserl applied the phenomenological method to the sciences themselves.

Phenomenology has had an important impact on continental philosophy. This is first because it constitutes a radical departure from the Cartesian and Empiricist view of experience as consisting of a collection of passively received ideas. Secondly, phenomenology is fundamentally opposed to the use of the methods of the natural sciences in the study of our experiential life. We should not impose scientific concepts on our experiential world. Thirdly, Husserl claims that consciousness has an inherent a priori structure. He employs a rich Kantian-like notion of the a priori and rejects the Empiricist tradition that claims that all judgments are either analytic tautologies or else empirical and based on observation. In these three ways, phenomenology opposes logical positivism, which was a dominant trend in analytic philosophy up until the 1950s.

In his later work, The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936), Husserl develops the idea of a historical life-world (Lehenswelt). The crisis arises because the modern natural sciences were founded on a quantitative view of nature that conceals the priority of perception and that results in a loss of meaning. Naturalism forgets the intentionality of consciousness. The aim of philosophy should be to restore the mean' ingfulness of the lived and historical life-world.

Answer the following questions:

1. What does the term 'phenomenology' mean?
2. What important impact has Phenomenology had on continental philosophy?
3. What ideas does Hussell develop in his later work 'The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology'?

HEIDEGGER

One of the more immediate impacts of phenomenology was its influence on Heidegger and existentialism. To answer the question ‘What is Being?’ Heidegger, in Being and Time (1927), developed the idea of fundamental ontology, which involves uncovering the mode of being that persons exhibit, called ‘Dasein’. This mode of being consists in certain a priori existentials, among which the primary one is care. Care reveals itself both in Dassin’s inauthentic and authentic modes of being. In-authenticity is marked by Dasein’s taking flight from its own being, or from the possibility to be itself and, in particular, from its own death. The structure of care also reveals the temporality of Dasein. It defines the very nature of past, present, and future.

Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology contradicts much traditional metaphysics, which attempts to define the nature of existence independently of human concerns. For Heidegger, the world must be characterized in terms of the existential that comprise Dasein’s being. Reality does not consist of the neutral objects as depicted by the sciences, which are only an abstraction from the character of everyday life.

After 1936, the emphasis of Heidegger’s thought changed. Rather than trying to characterize Being through an existential analysis of Dasein’s modes of being, he tries to depict Being itself directly. In various essays, he criticizes the representational, subject-object concept of knowledge, and the calculating nature of Enlightenment rationality, which have characterized western philosophy since the time of Plato. He also condemns Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power as part of this tradition. Drawing inspiration from the pre-Socratics, Heidegger contrasts the tradition of western metaphysics with poetic thinking and truth as ‘letting be’.

Heidegger refused to be called an existentialist. In part, this was to distinguish his own work from that of the French existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre, which he inspired. In his Letter on Humanism (1947), Heidegger criticizes humanism and human-centered subjectivism on the basis that the idea of the subject, and its correlate the object, belong specifically to the modern period of philosophy. He tries to overcome this idea by showing how the history of philosophy is a manifestation and concealment of Being itself, rather than a result of the thought of particular philosophers about Being. The idea of the subject and humanism are part of the post-Platonic metaphysical tradition that conceals Being.

Answer the following questions:

1. What ideas does Heidegger develop in his work ‘Being and Time’?

2. How does Heidegger's project of fundamental ontology contradict traditional metaphysics?
3. How does Heidegger's thought change after 1936?
4. On what basis does Heidegger criticize humanism and human-centered subjectivism in his 'Letter on Humanism'?

Lecture 24. The Hermeneutics and the Postmodernists.

The Hermeneutics and the Postmodernists

After World War II, continental philosophy is principally marked by four factors. First, there is the emergence of hermeneutics as a continuation and extension of the phenomenon logical tradition. Second, there is also a renewed interest in Marx, and the work of critical theory. Third, there is the advent of structuralism as an intellectual force, especially in France in the 1950s and 1960s. Finally, there is a renewed interest in Nietzsche, again appeared in France after 1960. To put it in simple terms, the first two factors led to the work of Habermas, and the second two led to the development of the poststructuralist and post-modern thought of Foucault and Derrida. However, as we shall see, this is a simplistic classification because there are considerable interaction and interplay between these four factors.

Hermeneutics

Hermeneutics is the part of philosophy concerned with the nature of interpretation. It is a relatively new discipline, which arose in part because literary theorists, art critics, legal thinkers, social scientists, and historical scholars saw that their work had much in common. Hermeneutics has its roots in the works of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) and phenomenology, as well as that of Heidegger, who characterized his work as hermeneutical phenomenology. The main proponent of hermeneutics is Gadamer (1900-2002), who studied with Heidegger. Gadamer's major work is Truth and Method (1960) in which he argues that interpretation is a process of making latent meanings explicit. This process must be constrained by truth but without adhering to a rigid method. He argues that the cultural presuppositions one brings to an interpretation cannot be regarded as an obstacle to understanding. They are a necessary part of the process. Interpretation cannot be prejudice free. Because of this, interpretation is a dialectical process; one must be willing to have one's initial assumptions negated by the meaning of a text. As a result, interpretation must be both open and critical in order for it to be self-reflective, and it is akin to entering into a dialogue with a text. Another important recent exponent of hermeneutics is Paul Ricoeur. Habermas also works with a broadly hermeneutical approach.

Hermeneutics can be contrasted with the structuralist movement, which attempts to understand texts and systems of signs without any reference to the

subjectivity of the author and reader, and which tends to portray language non-historically, without essential reference to tradition.

Critical Theory and Habermas

Marx's complete works were published only after the end of World War II. They contain his early writings, which were generally unknown beforehand and which are more philosophical than the economic materialism and determinism of his later works. This led to a renewed interest in Marx as a philosopher. It also led to the revitalization of the Critical Theory movement or the Frankfurt School. The movement emerged originally in Germany in the 1930s as a new interdisciplinary approach to the social sciences, which was opposed to the scientism of logical positivism. The Frankfurt School claimed that the social sciences should not limit themselves to merely describing and understanding social phenomena but should also provide a critical evaluation of social ideology. Marx claims that capitalism treats work as merely a means to production and, thereby, leads to alienation. Critical Theory extends this critique. It contends that capitalism also threatens democratic values and that it uses popular consumer mass culture to stimulate false needs. The central figures of the Frankfurt School were Max Horkheimer, Theodore Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Erich Fromm.

However, from the outset, Critical Theory was dogged by a methodological problem: how can an evaluative critique be valid? This problem was especially acute for the Critical Theorists because, drawing inspiration from Nietzsche, they had criticized the Enlightenment notion of reason. They claimed that instrumental rationality is a basic cause of capitalism's ills, and, therefore, they faced the thorny problem of how a critique of rationality could be rationally based. Marcuse tried to solve this problem through a Freudian view of human nature, and Adorno tried by appealing to our aesthetic sensibility.

The philosophy of Habermas can be seen as an attempt to rethink this whole problem and provide a philosophical foundation for the Frankfurt School tradition, thereby rescuing it from later postmodernism. He tries to rescue Critical Theory by shifting the focus from the subject to communication. In brief, Habermas argues that certain values are inherent within and presupposed by the very act of communication. He develops his insight into a theory called 'Discourse Ethics'. Analysis of communication leads Habermas toward a new participatory view of democracy but, at the same time, it allows for an immanent critique of capitalist ideology.

Structuralism and Beyond

In 1916, the theoretical work of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, was published posthumously. Saussure invented semiology, the general science of signs, according to which all signs consist of both a signifier and the signified. For example, the signifier would be the word 'tree,' and the signified would be the concept 'tree'. A sign is determined by the differences between it and all the other signs in a whole language or system of signs. Furthermore, this system of signs is both social and structured.

Saussure's work inspired the anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss to found structuralism, a new approach to the social sciences, which consists in applying Saussure's linguistics to the study of societies. Levi-Strauss argues that the social sciences should follow the successful example of linguistics by seeking rules that exhibit meaningful order and syntactical structure in social practices, which are to be viewed as a system of signs. Anthropology should be looking for structural features that are common to all societies. Both in anthropology and linguistics, we need structural abstract models that make observed facts intelligible.

Levi-Strauss' approach to the social sciences has two general theoretical features. First, it tries to explain social phenomena in a way that transcends the characterizations a society would give of itself. He argues that this is required for the social sciences to become more scientific. Second, Levi-Strauss explicitly rejects individualistic psychological explanations of social phenomena. He claims to dissolve the self because the concept of the self is part of the social system of signs. In this way, structuralism opposes a strict division between the natural and the social sciences as well as historical relativism, but without being positivistic.

Structuralism has important philosophical implications. The claim that language is a structured holistic system of social signs denies the alternative view that language is a transparent representation of an objective reality. It also rejects the idea of the knowing subject that is inherent in phenomenology. The notion of the self is a social construct, and therefore the meaning of signs does not depend on the subject.

During the 1960s and 1970s, structuralism became a very popular intellectual movement in France. It inspired Jacques Lacan to employ a similar approach to the unconscious and its manifestations, and thereby to invent structural psychoanalysis. To some extent, we can understand the work of recent French philosophers, such as Jean-Fransois Lyotard, Foucault, and Derrida, as an extension of, and a reaction to, some elements of structuralism, and for this reason they are often called poststructuralists. The poststructuralist movement has also included radical feminist thinkers such as Irigaray and Julia Kristeva. For example, Irigaray employs a deconstructivist reading of classic philosophical texts to reveal

how philosophical conceptions of the subject have been male dominated, thereby excluding the identity and experiences of women.

Answer the following questions:

1. By what four factors is continental philosophy principally marked after World War II?
2. What is Hermeneutics as the part of philosophy concerned with?
3. Who is the main proponent of hermeneutics?
4. What are his main works?
5. What does Gadamer proclaim in his works?
6. What led to a renewed interest in Marx as a philosopher?
7. What did the Critical Theory movement proclaim?
8. What philosophers represent this movement?
9. What does semiology invented by Saussure argue?
10. What does anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss say in his works?
11. Who invented structural psychoanalysis?

Lecture 25. The Revival of Nietzsche. Michel Foucault.

The Revival of Nietzsche

This reaction against structuralism was caused in part by a renewed interest in Nietzsche. Recent French thinkers, such as Foucault, embrace the historicism inherent in Nietszche's concept of genealogy. In other words, they accept the claim that no philosophical position can be understood independently of its historical context, and, thus, they reject the non-historical aspects of structuralism. They also tend to follow the perspectivism and antirationalism of Nietzsche. Because of this Nietzschian influence, recent French thinkers such as Foucault reject Hegel and Marx's idea of a single grand narrative that can make sense of history. Similarly, they also criticize the Enlightenment and Kantian idea of the interpretation of history as the progress of reason. Like the Frankfurt School, these later French thinkers are critical of the modern and Enlightenment notion of reason. However, unlike Habermas, they do not try to reconstruct a more pragmatic and social conception of rationality, and, because of this, they are sometimes called postmodern thinkers.

MICHEL FOUCAULT (1926-1984)
Biographical History

Born in Poitiers, France, Michel Foucault studied philosophy and psychology at the Ecole Normale Superieure, working for a time with Merleau-Ponty. Around 1948, he formed a friendship with the Marxist Louis Althusser, but one of his main sources of philosophical inspiration was Nietzsche. He wrote his master's thesis on Hegel, and completed his doctoral dissertation on madness in the classical period in 1960. Foucault was influenced by historians of culture and science, who stress that no idea can be understood outside of its historical context. When, in 1969, he was elected chair at the College de France, he chose the title 'Professor of the History of Systems of Thought'. During the 1970s, he was very active politically, helping to form a group to support prisoners and participating in protests on behalf of marginalized groups. In 1983, he took a post at the University of California, Berkeley, but died the following year of AIDS.

Philosophical Overview

One of the unifying themes of Foucault's diverse corpus is the aim of showing how concepts and practices that might be taken as necessities are in fact historically contingent.

No idea can be understood outside of its historical context. Foucault applies this claim to the concept of human nature, which arose out of the historical conditions of the Enlightenment. This is why he says, 'Man is an invention of recent date. And perhaps one nearing its end'. The work of Foucault eschews universal generalizations, but rather seeks to study specific discourses and their limitations in their historical context. Indeed, he argues, through his historical studies, that there are no universals to human experience.

Foucault's early works included Madness and Civilization (1961), which was his doctoral dissertation, and The Birth of a Clinic (1963). In these influential works, Foucault documents the history of the way madness has been perceived in western culture. For example, madness was treated as an illness requiring confinement only after the creation of a centralizing state. In earlier periods, mad people were permitted to roam freely, and madness was not hidden; there was no real distinction between reason and unreason, as there is today. Foucault's study is a critical history of the origins of psychiatry and an account of the political circumstances that led to changes in our perception of madness.

One of the main philosophical ambitions of these early works is to reveal how the concept of madness, like claims to knowledge in general, are a function of political practices and concerns, within a established network of power, which is historically situated. Thereby, Foucault aims to undermine the rationalist and positivist idea of inquiry as a politically neutral search for universal truth and, at the same time, to uncover the power structures of society. However, this project does not constitute a rejection of the notion of truth. Rather, what passes as truth, and the relevant criteria for establishing truth, are never independent of both political forces and historical context.

In The Order of Things (1966) and The Archeology of Knowledge (1969), Foucault turns to the history of epistemology. In the first of these works, he studies the modem period, from roughly 1600 to 1800, with the aim of showing how discontinuities in the development of thought are caused when the structural episteme of a period is eclipsed and new ways of describing emerge suddenly. For example, at the end of the eighteenth century, in medicine, the language of anatomy replaced that of humors. An episteme is roughly the common and structural knowledge assumptions of a historical period. For example, the concept of the individual ('man') emerges in the Enlightenment, which makes possible the human sciences of the nineteenth century. These epistemes are to be revealed by a process that Foucault calls archeology. The idea of archeology, which requires

digging out the unconscious rules that govern the knowledge claims of a period, should be contrasted with the phenomenological method, which requires returning to the non-structural notion of the subject.

In The Archeology of Knowledge, Foucault aims to advance the idea of archeology by contrasting it with other approaches to the history of ideas. He does so with the notion of a discourse or discourse practice. Discourses are formed by the regularities within systems of speech and between such systems as well as historical practices, all of which are governed by certain formation rules that may be transformed historically. Examples of discourses are the religious discourse regarding sexual behaviour that involves confession, the mercantile discourse on wealth, and the clinical language of modem psychiatry.

Middle Period: Genealogy

During the 1970's, Foucault employs the wider Nietzschean concept of genealogy, rather than the less politically oriented notion of archeology. Genealogy involves revealing historically how knowledge claims are linked to centralizing power structures in a society. According to Foucault, this wider concept explains how the unconscious rules that govern a discourse come to be accepted. It makes the exercise of power more explicitly central to the historical study of systems of thought. The relationship between the exercise of power and knowledge becomes internal; Foucault argues that 'all knowledge claims presuppose and constitute power relations'. He examines the ways in which different forms of inquiry, as a means for producing truth, function, at the same time, as mechanisms for exercising power. Consider, for example, how measurement, investigation, examination, inquisition, rationality, and confession function as both.

It is important to note that Foucault tries to document power relations and the strategies for the exercise of power, rather than attempting to evaluate them. One group exercises power over another by modifying its 'field of possible actions'. The exercise of power is an inescapable feature of all societies, and, hence, liberation from all power relations is not an ideal. Furthermore, not all power relations are bad. The aim of genealogy is to reveal how power is exercised and to show how the techniques of power are particular to specific historical conditions that may change. The application of this new approach is shown in the work Discipline and Punish (1975), in which Foucault narrates the birth of the modern prison as an instrument of social control. This work inspired left-wing activism in France directed to the closing of maximum-security prisons.

Foucault claims that, during the nineteenth century, power relations became more intense as a result of industrialization and population growth. The result is an

increase in the use of certain techniques for managing large groups of people, which Foucault calls 'normalization'. This technique involves describing and measuring people according to certain developmental norms and treating variation from the norms as deviancy, subject to the control of punishment.

Later Works: Techniques of the Self

Foucault's last works were two of the planned four volumes of the History of Sexuality: The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self. The first volume was published in 1976 and the second in 1984, the same month that he died of AIDS. Although Foucault studies how our understanding of sexuality changed with the political control of sexual relations, these later works also introduce two new dimensions to his thought. First, he examines how particular power techniques, such as training and discipline, can turn individuals into different kinds of subjects. Second, he observes the ways in which different techniques of the self enable individuals to reflect on and transform themselves, especially in relation to differing conceptions of the moral subject. Foucault conceives of ethics as the relationship of the self to the self within different kinds of moral life. For example, there are historically different conceptions of the goal of being an ethical person, of the ethical work required to reach that goal, and of the ways in which the self relates to moral obligations as modes of subjugation.

Foucault's Influence

In their different ways, Foucault and Derrida have contributed much to the attempt to usher the postmodern age into philosophy. In this regard, Foucault's writings have had an important influence on contemporary thought in at least four ways. First, his work on knowledge and power has drawn attention to the way knowledge claims can reflect power relations. He examines how claims to knowledge reveal the centralizing power structures in a society and how different forms of inquiry function as mechanisms for exercising power. Other writers have extended this overall approach in order to reveal how social practices oppress and marginalize minority groups.

Second, Foucault challenges the ideas that current philosophical theories present historical necessities and that they can operate in a historical vacuum. This challenge has influenced the philosophical climate. Many thinkers are more aware of the way in which their own theories are historically and culturally located and contingent. There is also perhaps greater suspicion of grand political theories, such as Marxism, conservatism, and liberalism. Foucault himself eschews such theories

for the more modest task of documenting how power relations function in particular historical contexts.

Third, in general, as a result of his work, many philosophers are more historically conscious in the sense that they would accept that understanding a theory requires one to see how it functioned in the social context of the time. Furthermore, Foucault's rejection of the Enlightenment notion of a universal history, a single narrative that describes the cultural development of humankind, has encouraged philosophers to look at the specifics of each period.

Fourth, because of the above points, Foucault's work has been seen as presenting a forceful challenge to the idea of the objectivity of knowledge, where 'objectivity' means roughly independent of any cultural and historical perspective. Furthermore, it has undermined the idea that inquiry can be a politically neutral and value-free search for universal truth. In this way, Foucault has been regarded as a figurehead for the view that the notion of objectivity should be replaced by the idea of an irreducible variety of perspectives within changing social systems, with no overarching single perspective that encompasses and explains this multitude.

In general, following Foucault, postmodern thinkers tend to regard with suspicion general theories that lay a claim to universal truth, and instead emphasize the historical nature of particular claims and their changing relation to the social context. In this regard, Foucault's influence extends beyond philosophy. His general approach to the nature of understanding has impacted political theorists and sociologists.

Answer the following questions:

1. What ideas do recent French thinkers, such Foucault proclaim?
2. Why are they sometimes called postmodern thinkers?
3. Who was Foucault's main source of philosophical inspiration?
4. What were Foucault's political activities?
5. What claim does Foucault apply to the concept of human nature?
6. What were Foucault's early works? What were they about?
7. What is one of the main philosophical ambitions of these early works?
8. What problems does Foucault study in his works 'The Order of Things' and 'The Archeology of Knowledge'?
9. What ideas are proclaimed in Foucault's last works?
10. Foucault's writings have had an important influence on contemporary thought in four ways. Describe each of them.

APPENDIX 1

ANCIENT INDIAN AND CHINESE PHILOSOPHY

The first collection of Indian philosophy that was written down was the Vedas. The word 'Veda' comes from the Sanskrit 'vid', meaning knowledge – the Vedas are 'sacred knowledge'. Their exact date is controversial, it is possible that the knowledge dates back 10000 years BC, and this books were first written around 3000 BC. Vedas include knowledge concerning the nature of ultimate reality and the proper human ways of relating thereto. Philosophical teachings following or conforming to the Vedas named orthodox (**astika)**. These are Hinduism, Mimansa, Sankhya, Yoga, Nyaya, Vaishesika, and Vedanta. Those schools which did not accept authority of sacred books were called unorthodox (**nastika)**. The most known of them are Buddhism, Charvaka-Lokayata, Jainism. Hindus belief in reincarnation and involving the worship of one or more of a large pantheon of gods and goddesses, including Shiva and Vishnu (incarnate as Rama and Krishna), Kali, Durga, Parvati and Ganesh. **Hinduism** also called **Brahmanism** as it early stage. **Brahma** is the ultimate and impersonal divine reality from which all things originates and to which they returns. So Brahma is the creator god, which has to do with objective reality, who forms a triad with Vishnu and Shiva. **Vishnu** is an originally a minor Vedic god, now regarded by his worshippers as the supreme deity and saviour, by others as the preserver of the cosmos. Vishnu is considered by Hindus to have had nine earthly incarnations or avatars, including Rama, Krishna and the historical Buddha; the tenth avatar will herald the end of the world. **Shiva** is worshiped in many aspects: as destroyer, ascetic, lord of the cosmic dance and lord of beasts and through the symbolic lingam as a god associated with the powers of reproduction (a phallus or phallic object is a symbol of divine generative energy of Shiva).

According to Hinduism this material world is only **illusion (maya)**. Real existence refers to **Atman** or unchanging individual self, a person's soul. Atman is a Sanskrit word, literally translated as 'essence, breath'. The understanding of this infinite self-essence is a way to stop transmigrations of soul **(samsara)** and achieve the transcendent state of blessedness and spiritual unity with Brahma **(moksha)**.

Hindu society was traditionally based on a caste system. There were four **varnas (classes)**: Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaishya and Shudra. **Brahmin** is a representative of the highest, priestly caste. Brahmins were unique in they right to learn Vedas. Therefore they named the guru or spiritual teacher. **Kshatriya** is a member of the second, military caste. The traditional function of the Kshatriyas is to protect society by fighting in wartime and governing in peacetime. **Vaishya** is a

member of the third caste, comprising the merchants and farmers. **Shudra** is a member of the worker caste, lowest of the four varnas. Their only function in a society is a submission to other classes.

One of the most significant unorthodox teachings of Ancient India was **Buddhism**. This philosophy was founded by **Siddhartha Gautama (c. 563–483 BC)**. **'Buddha'** was a pseudonym which meant 'enlightened', 'pure in spirit'. Buddhism has no god and gives a central role to the doctrine of **karma** as the sum of a person's actions in this and previous states of existence, viewed as deciding their fate in future existences. The **'four noble truths'** of Buddhism state that all existence is suffering, that the cause of suffering is desire, that freedom from suffering is nirvana, and that this is attained through the 'eightfold path' of ethical conduct, wisdom and mental discipline (including meditation). The final goal of Buddhism is nirvana. **Nirvana** is a transcendent, highest spiritual state in which there is neither suffering, desire, nor sense of self and the subject is released from the effects of karma.

The first major philosopher who lived in China was **Lao Tzu** (also **Lao Tse, Lao Tu, Lao Tsu, Lao Tze, Lao Zi, Laocius** and other variations), about 600 BC. Lao Tzu founded the philosophy of **Taoism**. The school derives its name from the word **'Tao' ('Dao')** which literally means the 'way' or the 'path'. There are two main meaning of the Tao: 1) source and reason of all that exist; 2) the universal law governing the world. The meaning of Tao Lao Tzu described in his work *'Tao-Te ching' ('The Book of the Way and Its Power')* (the word **'Te'** means incarnation of Tao in material objects).

Taoism emphasizes inner contemplation and mystical union with nature; wisdom, learning and purposive action should be abandoned in favour of simplicity and idea of **'wu-wei' ('non-action')**, 'doing by not doing' or letting things take their natural course). Lao Tzu believed that the way to happiness was for people to learn to 'go with the flow'. Instead of trying to get things done the hard way, people should take the time to figure out the natural or easy way to do things, and then everything would get done more simply.

Lao Tzu also thought that everything alive in the universe (plants, animals, and people) shared in a universal life-force. There were two sides to the life-force, which are called the **yin and the yang**. This picture is often used to show how the yin and the yang are intertwined with each other:  . The yin (the dark side) is the side of women, the moon, things that are still like ponds, and completion and death. The yang (the light side) is the side of men, the sun, things that move like rivers, and creation and birth. While the yang energy rises to from heaven, yin solidifies to become earth. Everyone has some yin and some yang in them, and

Taoism says that it is important to keep them balanced. Chinese doctors believed that a lot of illnesses were caused by too much yin or too much yang. So these two principles are mutually complementary.

Confucianism is a system of philosophical and ethical teachings founded by **Confucius (c. 551–479 BC)** in sixth-fifth century BC. Confucianism (as opposed to legalism) stresses the importance of education for moral development of the individual so that the state can be governed by moral virtue rather than by the use of coercive laws. In his main book *'Mandate of Heaven'* Confucius stated such manifestations: 1) anyone can become King, 2) the power and authority of the King or emperor is appointed by Heaven, 3) only Kings or emperors were allowed to perform ritual of praying and offering to Heaven, 4) all mortals must obey the order of Heaven, 5) since the mandate is granted by Heaven, it is only natural to name the Heavenly Court as the Celestial Court.

A specialized meaning in Confucianism has 'ritual'. The term **'ritual' ('li')** was soon extended to include secular ceremonial behavior and eventually referred also to the propriety or politeness which colors everyday life. One of the most important Confucius's creative works named *'The Book of Filial Piety'*. **Filial piety** is considered among the greatest of virtues and must be shown towards both the living and the dead (including even remote ancestors). The term 'filial' (meaning 'of a child') characterizes the respect that a child, originally a son, should show to his parents. This relationship was extended by analogy to a series of five relationships: 1) father to Son, 2) ruler to minister, 3) husband to wife, 4) elder brother to younger brother, 5) friend to friend (the participants in this relationship being equal to one another).

Confucius believed that social disorder often stemmed from failure to perceive, understand and deal with reality. Fundamentally, then, social disorder can stem from the failure to call things by their proper names and his solution to this was **'zhèngmíng' (literally 'rectification of terms')**.

In the political realm, a ruler, who embodies the ideal, will care about and provide for the people, who will be attracted to him; the moral example he sets will have a transforming effect on the people. Confucius as great humanist accepted meritocracy – a social system in which people get status or rewards because of what they achieve, rather than because of their wealth or social status.

APPENDIX 2

THE BASIC STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE UKRAINIAN PHILOSOPHY

The Kievo-Mohylyanska Academy, founded by the Metropolitan of Kyiv **Petro Mohyla (1596–1646)**, is one of the most distinguished and earliest among higher educational institutions in Eastern Europe and the center of Ukrainian philosophy. The Academy was first opened in 1615 as Kiev Brotherhood School. In 1632 the Kiev Brotherhood and Lavra schools merged into the Kiev-Mohyla Collegium. The Collegium was named Mohyla after Petro Mohyla, the proponent of Western educational standards at the institution. In 1658 the Collegium obtained the status of an Academy.

Taking his most dangerous adversary as his model, Petro Mohyla adopted the organizational structure, the teaching methods and the curriculum of the Jesuit schools. An objective in establishing this type of school was to raise the standard of Eastern European education to Western European degrees of excellence. From its beginnings, this school was conceived by its founder and first rectors as an institution of higher learning, offering philosophy and theology courses and supervising a network of secondary schools.

Philosophy of Academy was involved in the religious polemics of the time and the defense of the Orthodox faith, which in turn was closely associated with national consciousness.

The most outstanding alumnus of the Kievo-Mohylyanska Academy was **Grygorii Savych Skovoroda (1722–1794)**, philosopher, poet, teacher, composer and such an extraordinary and diversified personality who lived and worked in Ukraine and passionately and consciously identified with its people, differentiating them from those of Russia and condemning Russia's interference in his homeland. He has been referred to as the 'Ukrainian Socrates' for his principle of self-cognition and nomadic life. Educated Ukrainians also called him 'our Pythagoras', 'grassland Lomonosov'. For thirty years Skovoroda roamed along Ukraine roads with his wallet on his shoulder and sopilka (pipe) flute under his belt, taught people grammar, sang his songs to them, and gave them his living teaching about soul. None of his books was published during his lifetime, but everyone who knew him, especially his friends; his pupils and any who happened to study in Kiev Religious Academy did not admire him less for that. And Grigory Savvich spent his last days on Kharkov soils, just as he had spent his youth days. A legend says that he exactly knew the date of his death, and himself had dug his own grave in a park in Kalinovsky's estate, who he visited for the last time. His last will was for this short

inscription to be put on his grave: ‘The world was trying to catch me, did not succeed’. These were Master’s last words, words full of deep sense and humour.

Philosophy of the heart

‘The philosophy of the heart’ is one of the main characteristic of Ukrainian thought. This philosophy stands for three distinct theses:

1) that emotions have not only ethical and religious but also cognitive significance,

2) that conscious experience arises from a deeper source, a mysterious ‘abyss’ (heart) and

3) that man is a microcosm, which means that humankind is the representation in miniature of the universe.

Just as the ph`enomenon of the body has its ontological basis in the idea of body, so also the phenomenal psychic life of man must have its root in some deeper reality. This ultimate ontological principle of our thoughts Skovoroda calls the heart: ‘The true man is the heart in man. Deep is that heart and knowable only by God. It is the bottomless abyss of our thought; to say it simply, the soul, that is, the true being, the existing truth, the very essence (as they say) of our seed and power, of which our whole life consists and without which we are a dead shadow’.

Here in a capsule is Skovoroda’s whole doctrine of man’s heart. The heart, first, is not open to introspection, in the ordinary sense. It cannot be known as our psychic phenomena are known, by simple self-reflection. The heart can be known fully only by God. Man can have some insight into his heart, but only by faith, not introspection. Secondly, the heart embraces all reality, since its thoughts range freely through all reality, to all objects and are not prevented from penetrating to the most obscure secrets of reality. Thirdly, the heart is that principle which sustains the whole human composite in existence, the body as well as the psyche. This means that the heart contains as part of its structure the eternal idea of the body: ‘The heart is the root. In it lives your very leg and the external dust is its boot. Not only the leg but also the arms, eyes, ears and tongue and the whole circle of your dummy-like limbs are nothing else but the clothes. The true parts themselves are hidden in the heart’.

And just as it is the source of all being in man, the heart is also the source of all activities, activities of thought as well as bodily activities, since these are governed by thought. It not only determines the character of these activities, it is also the force and the power that makes all motion possible. ‘The flesh is nothing, the spirit is life-creating’. Since the heart is not only the source of the being of each man, but also the source of all manifestations be they actions, bodily characteristics, or thoughts, it is often called the ‘true’ or ‘exact’ man. ‘Everyone is that whose heart is in him’.

The heart for Skovoroda undoubtedly includes the faculties of reason and will. The heart as the source of thoughts and desires or volitions may be identified with reason and will respectively, but it is obviously much more than a faculty. It is the fundamental principle of being in man, that which accounts both for his true nature and his existence.

If the heart determines our thoughts and desires, then by analyzing these or more precisely their objects we may gain a general and vague notion of our heart. For Skovoroda the principle that like is known by like, 'the head by the head and force is known by force' plays an important role at this point. This principle enables him to deduce from the nature of the objects of our attention the nature of our heart. The objects we may love and desire or attend to are of two categories. They may be spiritual objects, the internal truth or God's ideas in things or they may be material objects or the external appearances. The heart is divided in the same way as its objects, into the inner and the outer heart. Thus, we discover a new level of contraries, a deeper dualism of the very heart: 'if there is a body above the body, then there is a head above the head and a new heart above the old heart'. This dualism is absent from sub-human creatures. Since these creatures cannot be aware of nor desire other than sensible objects, there can be no dichotomy in their heart or essence. Their heart is centered exclusively upon the needs and activities of the body, and therefore they lack choice, decision and freedom. They are like automata activated by the present program that God inserts into them as their essence. The distinction between man and animal will become clear only after we have discussed fully the nature of the outer and the inner hearts.

"The outer heart"

The outer heart is the source of those thoughts, desires and acts that are directed at the goods of the outer body. These goods include not only gross bodily necessities such as food, clothing and shelter, but also aesthetic delights such as we find in music, perfumes, painting and ornaments. These goods are all shadows for they are ephemeral, and the heart that concerns itself them is similar to them: 'You are only a shadow, emptiness and nothingness with a heart similar to your body. Nothingness is loved by nothingness'. We have seen that the body is necessary and therefore useful and good in some way. Now, since the outer heart provides for the body, attends to its welfare and thus supports its existence, the outer heart must also be good and useful. Like the body it may become a source of evil and perversion of man's true nature if it usurps the place of the true heart and establishes its monopoly over all of man's thoughts and desires. If kept in its place, as a subordinate principle, the outer heart is useful and helpful to man.

The ontological status of the outer heart must be distinguished from that of the ideal body. The divine idea of body in man is the source and ontological foundation of the outer body. This idea belongs to a more fundamental level of the heart than the outer heart. The outer heart must not be taken as an ontological principle, but rather as a faculty of the heart, a faculty of thought and volition occupied with the good of the temporal body. The outer heart itself is not self-sustaining, but is founded on a deeper principle – the inner heart. Being directed at the outer body, this heart is temporal. Unlike the ideal body, this outer heart is born and dies with the outer body. As long as the body exists, however, this heart cannot be eliminated, and it remains throughout life a threat to the higher principle in man. It must be constantly reminded of its subordinate position; otherwise it will eclipse the inner heart. Thoughts and concern over the body will displace all thoughts about man's true nature and the eternal truth. Thus, throughout life 'these two hearts in each man are eternally at war'. We now turn to the inner heart, a whose rightful place in our attention is threatened by the outer heart.

"The inner heart"

The inner heart, which is also called the true man in man, Christ in man or God in man, is the basic ontological principle in man, the principle that sustains and defines the whole structure of man and all his actions. The outer body and the outer heart are its shadows. Clearly, the inner heart is the eternal divine idea of man in man. Like any other creature man receives his being from God and is therefore totally dependent upon him: "You are the shadow of your true man. You are the chasuble, he is the body. You are the appearance and he is the truth in you. You are nothing and he is the being in you. You are mud and he is your beauty, image and plan, but not your image and not your beauty since he is not your doing, but is in you and sustains you, oh, dust and nothingness!"

The divine idea of man in each man is not only his better half, his true and immortal self. It is not only the divine element in him, for this is true of all creatures. All creatures are sustained by the divine idea in them. The divine idol in man, besides having its source in God, is divine in a second sense. It is the image of God himself or rather of God's Son, the second person of the Trinity. This is the most adequate and fullest manifestation of God in any creature. The power of thought and the freedom of self-determination make man the creature closest to God, the most adequate manifestation of God. "He gave us his very highest Wisdom which is his natural portrait and stamp". For this season, Skovoroda often speaks or the inner man as the one Christ in all of us.

Theory of the 'three worlds' and 'double nature'

Skovoroda's theory of 'the three worlds' in his tract *'The Serpent's Flood*' speaks about the principal, space world – the Universe, macrocosm – and two subworlds: one of them is the human world, microcosm, the other is 'symbolical', that is the biblical world. Every one of the three worlds has a double 'nature': visible and invisible, for the biblical world the two natures are correlated as 'sign and symbol'. All three worlds are made of evil and good, the biblical world is a kind of link between the visible and the invisible natures of microcosm and macrocosm. A person has two bodies and two hearts: corruptible and eternal, worldly and spiritual. The theory of double nature of man speaks about 'true' people as people whose 'inner' nature reigns over their 'outer' nature. A persons happiness is not in riches, not luxury, and not even in health, but in the soul's harmony. 'Where have you seen, or read, or heard about the happy person whose treasure was not inside him? It is impossible to find it outside of oneself. The true happiness is inside of us'. A human being can only reach harmony, if he or she does what accords with his or her natural inclinations, in 'one's own trade'. And if a person tries to acquire more than he or she actually needs, according to Skovoroda it only brings disaster. All creatures are distinct but inseparable from God. They are visible manifestations or symbols of God. Each thing is a composite of matter and divine idea; and while its appearing is temporal, its true being in God's mind is eternal.

Epistemological dualism

Skovoroda 's epistemological doctrine based on two ways of knowing, on the distinction of sensory knowledge, which attains only the surfaces of things and is temporally prior, from spiritual knowledge, which pierces through the surfaces and sees everything in its ultimate reality. Skovoroda discusses these two ways of knowing at great length. The act of faith has a central importance in his philosophy, because it is both the act of perceiving the real nature of things and also the starting point of his ethics.

Skovoroda gave consideration to self-cognition. It has much to do with his metaphysics and theory of 'the three worlds': 'All three worlds have a parallel structure, a dualism of appearance and reality, outer surface and inner core, inessential and essential, Thus, by studying one of the worlds, we at same time gain insight into the other worlds. Here, by studying the macrocosm I hope to learn something of the microcosm – man'. Also Skovoroda speaks of union with God as a discovery of one's true self, as a form of self-knowledge.

Skovoroda's aphorisms:

- The best of mistakes is that one which had been made during the studies.
- The human rest is the human death.

- The time is being used correctly by somebody who recognized what is worth to seek and what is necessary to avoid.
- Our kingdom is within us and to know God, you must know yourself.
- People should know God like yourself enough to see him in the world.
- Belief in God does not mean – belief in his existence – and therefore to give in to him and live according to His law.
- Sanctity of life lies in doing good to people.

APPENDIX 3

PHILOSOPHY OF GLOBALISM

Globalization is a process of world economic, political and cultural integration and unification. It's an objective trend of world development.

It is possible to highlight some features of the present stage of globalization:

1. Firstly, globalization has concerned only to a part of the world community. It almost does not involve Africa, much of Latin America, the vast regions of Asia and the Near East.
2. Secondly, a truly global is the only capital market. That capital without any obstacles migrates between developed countries and beyond.
3. Thirdly, globalization needs to unify the conditions of economic activity, although this is not real. Thus, for example, during the Asian crisis of 1998-1999, the U.S. exceeded all records of industrial growth, Europe has suffered from unemployment and China confidently went their way.
4. Fourthly, in modern conditions market does not look geographically global. Because a number of economic indicators of the leading countries of the world focused on domestic consumption.

The existence of society requires constant reproduction of population by continuous alternation of generations. Regularities of functioning of human populations, such as size, growth, density, distribution, vital statistics, sex, age and occupational characteristics are studied by **demography**. The founder of this science English scholar **Thomas Robert Malthus (1766–1834)** detected that Earth's population grows exponentially while livelihood in arithmetic progression (which is much slower). Only during the last forty years the world's population doubled, which can be called population explosion. In the modern world there is the largest mass migration of people from the countryside to the cities (**urbanization**). And there are only rare cases of opposite trend – **ruralization** (migration from the cities to the rural areas, closer to clean places and nature).

Experts predict growth of the population of our planet to 10 billion in 2100 and to 25-27 billion in the 2150. To prevent that there are a few precautions:

1. Conscious control over the reproduction of the population.
2. Economic sanctions in countries with high rates of growth of population (India, China) and financial incentives in countries with low population reproduction (Ukraine, developed countries of Western Europe).

The growing number of people on the planet reduces the average amount of resources available (per person) and increases the average amount of pollution produced. Ozone holes, global warming, deforestation, destruction of plants and animals, pollution of seas and oceans... It's only small list of results of human activity to live. However, the ways out of the environmental crisis exist. They are:

1. The transition to alternative, natural fuels (water, wind, solar).
2. Restoration of the nature and elimination of consequences of harm already caused to it.

3. Formation of a new humanistic outlook (a new ethics of responsibility towards nature, human perception of themselves as a part of the biosphere).

4. Nature protection. The imposition of penalties and punishment for it destruction.

APPENDIX 4

20TH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHY

ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

Experimental philosophy. An emerging field of philosophical inquiry that makes use of empirical data – often gathered through surveys which probe the intuitions of ordinary people – in order to inform research on long-standing and unsettled philosophical questions.

Logical positivism. The first and dominant school in analytic philosophy for the first half of the 20th-century.

Naturalism. The view that the scientific method (hypothesize, predict, test, repeat) is the only effective way to investigate reality.

Ordinary language philosophy. The dominant school in analytic philosophy in the middle of 20th-century.

Quietism. In metaphilosophy, the view that the role of philosophy is therapeutic or remedial.

Postanalytic philosophy. Postanalytic philosophy describes a detachment and challenge to mainstream analytic philosophy by philosophers like Richard Rorty.

CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY

Deconstruction. An approach (whether in philosophy, literary analysis, or in other fields) where one conducts textual readings with a view to demonstrate that the text is not a discrete whole, instead containing several irreconcilable, contradictory meanings.

Existantialism. Existential philosophy is the "explicit conceptual manifestation of an existential attitude" that begins with a sense of disorientation and confusion in the face of an apparently meaningless or absurd world.

Phenomenology. Phenomenology is primarily concerned with making the structures of consciousness, and the phenomena which appear in acts of consciousness, objects of systematic reflection and analysis.

Poststructuralism. Structuralism was a fashionable movement in France in the 1950s and 1960s that studied the underlying structures inherent in cultural products (such as texts), post-structuralism derives from critique of structuralist premises. Specifically, post-structuralism holds that the study of underlying structures is itself culturally conditioned and therefore subject to myriad biases and misinterpretations.

Postmodern philosophy. Postmodern philosophy is skeptical or nihilistic toward many of the values and assumptions of philosophy that derive from modernity, such as humanity having an essence which distinguishes humans from animals, or the assumption that one form of government is demonstrably better than another.

Social constructionism. A central concept in continental philosophy, a social construction is a concept or practice that is the creation (or artifact) of a particular group.

Critical theory. Critical theory is the examination and critique of society and culture, drawing from knowledge across the social sciences and humanities.

Frankfurt school. The term "Frankfurt School" is an informal term used to designate the thinkers affiliated with the Institute for Social Rasearch or who were influenced by it.

APPENDIX 5

GLOSSARY OF PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS

1.

Absolute – the ultimate basis of reality; that which is totally unconditioned, unrestricted, pure, perfect or complete.

Accident – (in Aristotelian thought) a property of a thing that is not essential to its nature.

Aesthetics – a branch of philosophy concerned with the study of the idea of beauty.

Agnosticism – an intellectual doctrine or attitude affirming the uncertainty of all claims to ultimate knowledge.

Alienation – a state of estrangement between the self and the objective world or between different parts of the personality. In Marxist theory is a condition of workers in a capitalist economy, resulting from a lack of identity with the products of their labour and a sense of being controlled or exploited (because they have no claim to ownership of the products they make).

Anamnesis – in Platonism means recollection of the ideas, which the soul had known in a previous existence, especially by means of reasoning.

Anthropocentrism – a concept that human beings may regard themselves as the central and most significant entities in the universe or that they assess reality through an exclusively human perspective.

Anthropogeny (anthropogenesis) – the study of the origin of humankind.

Anthroposociogenesis – the theory of the origin of the society.

Antinomy – a contradiction between two statements, both apparently obtained by correct reasoning; a paradox.

Antithesis – (in Hegelian philosophy) the negation of the thesis as the second stage in the process of dialectical reasoning.

Apeiron – a Greek word meaning unlimited, infinite or indefinite substance. The apeiron is central to the cosmological theory created by Anaximander in the 6th century BC. He believed the beginning or ultimate reality (arche) is eternal, infinite or boundless (apeiron), subject to neither old age nor decay, which perpetually yields fresh materials from which everything we can perceive is derived. Apeiron generated the opposites, hot-cold, wet-dry etc., which acted on the creation of the world. Everything is generated from apeiron and then it is destroyed there according to necessity. Philosopher believed that infinite worlds are generated from apeiron and then they are destroyed there again.

Aporia – an irresolvable internal contradiction or logical disjunction in a text, argument or theory.

Apperception – the mental process by which a person makes sense of an idea by assimilating it to the body of ideas he or she already possesses.

Arche – is a Greek word with primary senses ‘beginning’, ‘origin’ or ‘first cause’ and ‘power’, ‘sovereignty’, ‘domination’ as extended meanings.This list is

extended to ‘ultimate underlying substance’ and ‘ultimate undemonstrable principle’. In the language of the archaic period (8th-6th century BC) arche (or archai) designates the source, origin or root of things that exist.

Asceticism – the doctrine that a person can attain a high spiritual and moral state by practicing self-denial, self-mortification, extreme abstinence and the like.

Ataraxia – a Greek term used by Pyrrho and Epicurus for a lucid state, characterized by freedom from worry, emotional disturbance, anxiety or any other preoccupation; tranquillity.

Atom – the smallest particle of an element that can exist. Translated from the Greek this term means uncuttable or indivisible, something that cannot be divided further.

Attribute – a quality or feature regarded as a characteristic or inherent part of someone or something.

Axiology (also called **value theory**) – the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature of value and with what kinds of things have value.

Behaviourism – the doctrine that the mind has no separate existence, but that statements about the mind and mental states can be analyzed into statements about actual and potential behavior.

Being (entity, existence) – that which has actuality either materially or in idea.

Category – each of a possibly exhaustive set of classes among which all things might be distributed.

Concept – an idea or mental image which corresponds to some distinct entity or class of entities, or to its essential features, or determines the application of a term (especially a predicate), and thus plays a part in the use of reason or language.

Consciousness – the fact of awareness by the mind of itself and the world.

Contradiction – a combination of statements, ideas or features which are opposed to one another. This mental faculties is characterized by thought, feelings and volition.

Creationism – the belief that the universe and living organisms originate from specific acts of divine creation, as in the biblical account, rather than by natural processes such as evolution.

Culture – the arts and other manifestations of human intellectual and material achievement regarded collectively, as a system of shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviors and artifacts that the members of society use to cope with their world and with one another, and that are transmitted from generation to generation through learning.

Deduction – the inference of particular instances by reference to a general law or principle.

Deism – the belief that there is a God who made the world but does not influence human lives.

Determinism (**necessitarianism**) – the doctrine that all events, including human choices and decisions, have sufficient causes.

Dialectic – 1) the art of investigating or discussing the truth of opinions; 2) inquiry into metaphysical contradictions and their solutions; 3) the branch of methodology, which represent development as the spiral motion. Each new coil of history repeats previous, but introduces new products and changes.

Dualism – a philosophical theory that regards a domain of reality in terms of two independent principles, especially mind and matter (Cartesian dualism).

Empiricism – the theory that all knowledge is based on experience derived from the senses. Stimulated by the rise of experimental science, it developed in the 17th and 18th centuries, expounded in particular by John Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume.

Epistemology (gnosiology) – a branch of philosophy that investigates the origin, nature, methods and limits of human knowledge.

Eternity – infinite time; duration without beginning or end.

Ethics – the branch of philosophy dealing with values relating to human conduct, with respect to the rightness and wrongness of certain actions and to the goodness and badness of the motives and ends of such actions.

Existentialism – a modern philosophical movement (that came to prominence in Europe, particularly in France, immediately after World War II) stressing the importance of personal experience and responsibility and the demands that they make on the individual, who is seen as a free agent in a deterministic and seemingly meaningless universe.

Fact – a thing that is known or proved to be true. This term can refer to verified information about past or present circumstances or events which are presented as objective reality. In science, it means a provable concept.

Faith – 1) strong or unshakeable belief in someone or something without any evidence; 2) strong belief in God or in the doctrines of a religion, based on spiritual apprehension rather than proof.

Freudianism – teachings, which has to do with Sigmund Freud's doctrine, esp. with respect to the causes and treatment of neurotic and psychopathic states, the interpretation of dreams, etc.

Hedonism – the doctrine that pleasure or happiness is the highest good.

Hermeneutics – the science of interpretation, especially of Scripture.

Humanism: 1) the denial of any power or moral value superior to that of humanity; the rejection of religion in favour of a belief in the advancement of humanity by its own efforts and attaching prime importance to human rather than divine or supernatural matters; 2) a philosophical position that stresses the autonomy of human reason in contradistinction to the authority of the Church; 3) a cultural movement of the Renaissance, based on classical studies which turned away from medieval scholasticism and revived interest in ancient Greek and Roman thought; 4) interest in the welfare of people. Renaissance humanism was predicated upon the victory of rhetoric over dialectic and of Plato over Aristotle. On the whole, humanist beliefs stress the potential value and goodness of human beings, emphasize common human needs and seek solely rational ways of solving human problems.

Idealism – the philosophical doctrine, which can be divided in: 1) objective idealism – belief that absolute idea (in religious idealism – God) is primary (determinant) reality, for it causes of existence and development of the objective (nature) and subjective (consciousness) reality; 2) subjective idealism – the systems of thought, in which the objects of knowledge are held to be in some way dependent on the activity of mind.

Ideology – 1) the study of the nature and origin of ideas; 2) the set of beliefs by which a group or society orders reality so as to render it intelligible.

Induction – the inference of a general law from particular instances.

Infinity – infinite space, time or quantity.

Language – a system for the expression of thoughts, feelings, etc., by the use of spoken sounds or conventional symbols and gestures.

Law – a rule, principle or convention regarded as governing the structure or the relationship of an element in the structure of something.

Logic – the science that investigates the principles governing correct or reliable proof and inference.

Materialism – the monist doctrine that matter is the only reality and that the mind, the emotions are merely functions of it.

Matter – physical substance in general, as distinct from mind and spirit.

Metaphysics – 1) a part of philosophy which is concerned with understanding reality and developing theories about what exists and how we know that it exists; 2) the form of methodology which defines development as a cyclic repetition of events.

Method – a way of cognition or empirical method of inquiry; a manner or mode of procedure, especially an orderly, logical or systematic way of instruction, inquiry, investigation, experiment, presentation, etc.

Methodology – 1) a system of methods used in a particular area of study or activity; 2) philosophical theory of development.

Monism – any of various theories holding that there is only one basic substance or principle as the ground of reality, or that reality consists of a single element.

Monotheism – the doctrine or belief that there is only one God.

Movement – a change or development in something.

Myth – 1) a traditional or legendary story, usually concerning some being or hero or event, with or without a determinable basis of fact or a natural explanation, especially one that is concerned with deities or demigods and explains some practice, rite or phenomenon of nature; 2) (in the writings of Plato) an allegory or parable.

Mythology – 1) a collection of myths, especially one belonging to a particular religious or cultural tradition; 2) the study of myths.

Natural philosophy (philosophy of nature) – he study of nature and the physical universe before the advent of modern science.

Necessity – the principle according to which something must be so, by virtue either of logic or of natural law.

Nominalism – (in medieval philosophy) the doctrine that general or abstract words do not stand for objectively existing entities and that universals or general ideas are mere names without any corresponding reality. Only particular objects exist, and properties, numbers and sets are merely features of the way of considering the things that exist. Important in medieval scholastic thought, nominalism is associated particularly with William of Occam.

Object – a thing external to the thinking mind or subject.

Ontology – the branch of philosophy that deals with the nature of existence.

Outlook – a way of spiritually-practical person's attitude towards world (and himself). It can be represented in the form of the scheme 'man ↔ world', which shows mutual influence and dependence.

Pantheism – the doctrine that god is the transcendent reality of which the material universe and human beings are only manifestations: it involves a denial of God's personality and expresses a tendency to identify God and nature.

Philosophy – the academic discipline concerned with the fundamental nature of knowledge, reality and existence by means of rational argument concerning their presuppositions, implications and interrelationships. Philosophy has many branches that explore principles of specific areas, such as knowledge (epistemology), reasoning (logic), being in general (metaphysics), beauty (aesthetics) and human conduct (ethics).

Pluralism – the philosophical theory that recognizes more than one ultimate substance or principle.

Pragmatism – a philosophical movement that includes those who claim that an ideology or proposition is true if and only if it works satisfactorily, that the meaning of a proposition is to be found in the practical consequences of accepting it, and that impractical ideas are to be rejected. Pragmatism, in William James' eyes, was that the truth of an idea needed to be tested to prove its validity. Pragmatism began in the late nineteenth century with American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce.

Principle – a fundamental, primary or general law or truth from which others are derived.

Psychoanalysis – a system of psychological theory and therapy which aims to treat mental disorders by investigating the interaction of conscious and unconscious elements in the mind and bringing repressed fears and conflicts into the conscious mind by techniques such as dream interpretation and free association.

Rationalism – the theory that reason rather than experience is the foundation of certainty in knowledge.

Reduction – the process by which one object, property, concept, theory, etc., is shown to be explicable in terms of another, lower level, concept, object, property, etc. For example, we say that physical properties such as the boiling point of a substance are reducible to that substance's atomic properties, because we are able to explain why a liquid boils at a certain temperature using only the properties of its constituent atoms. Thus we might also describe reduction as a

process analogous to absorption, by which one theory (or concept, or property, and so on) is wholly subsumed under another.

Reflection (introspection) – observation or examination of one's own mental and emotional state, mental processes, etc.; the act of looking within oneself.

Relativism – the belief that the truth is not always the same but varies according to circumstances.

Religion – the belief in, worship of, or obedience to a supernatural power or powers considered to be divine or to have control of human destiny.

Science – the systematic study of the nature and behaviour of the material and physical universe, based on observation, experiment and measurement, and the formulation of laws to describe these facts in general terms.

Scientism – the belief that the assumptions, methods of research, etc., of the physical and biological sciences are equally appropriate and essential to all other disciplines, including the humanities and the social sciences; the application of, or belief in, the scientific method.

Sensualism – the belief that cognition should be based on senses and emotions, rather than reason and logic.

Soul – 1) the principle of life, feeling, thought and action in humans, regarded as a distinct entity separate from the body and commonly held to be separable in existence from the body; 2) the emotional part of human nature; the seat of the feelings or sentiments; 3) the spiritual part of humans regarded in its moral aspect.

Spirit –all of many differing meanings and connotations, relating to a non-corporeal substance contrasted with the material body. The spirit of a human being is thus the animating, sensitive or vital principle in that individual, similar to the soul taken to be the seat of the mental, intellectual and emotional powers. The term may also refer to any being imagined as incorporeal or immaterial, such as demons or deities, in Christianity specifically the Holy Spirit experienced by the disciples at Pentecost.

Subject – a thinking or feeling entity; the conscious mind; the self or ego, especially as opposed to anything external to the mind.

Substance – 1) something that exists by itself and in which accidents or attributes inhere; that which receives modifications and is not itself a mode; something that is causally active; something that is more than an event; 2) the essential part of a thing; essence; 3) a thing considered as a continuing whole.

Substratum – a foundation or basis of something; substance, considered as that which supports accidents or attributes.

Synthesis – (in Hegelian philosophy) the final stage in the process of dialectical reasoning, in which a new idea resolves the conflict between thesis and antithesis.

Theory – a supposition or a system of ideas intended to explain something, especially one based on general principles independent of the thing to be explained.

Thesis – (in Hegelian philosophy) a proposition forming the first stage in the process of dialectical reasoning.

Thinking – the process of considering or reasoning about something.

Time – the indefinite continued progress of existence and events in the past, present and future regarded as a whole; finite duration.

Truth – conformity with fact or reality; actuality or actual existence.

Unconscious – the part of the mind which is inaccessible to the conscious mind but which affects behaviour and emotions.

Wisdom – absolute knowledge (knowledge of all) and perfect lifestyle, corresponding to it; the ability to use experience in order to make sensible decisions or judgments.

2.

Absolutism The view that there are some types of action that are strictly prohibited by morality, no matter what the specific facts are in a particular case. Some have held, for example, that the intentional torturing or killing of an innocent person is morally impermissible no matter what bad consequences could be prevented by such an action. Absolutism is an especially strict kind of *deontological* view. It is discussed by Thomas Nagel in "War and Massacre".

Accidental and **essential** A property is essential for an object if the object must have the property to exist and be the kind of thing that it is. A property is accidental if the object has the property, but doesn't have to have it to exist or be the kind of thing that it is. Suppose Fred has short hair. That is an accidental property of his. He would still be Fred, and still be a human being, if he let his hair grow long or shaved it off completely. An essential property is one that a thing has to have to be the thing that it is, or to be the kind of thing it fundamentally is. As a human being, Fred wouldn't exist unless he had a human body, so having a human body is an essential property of his. Statements about which properties are essential tend to be controversial. A *dualist* might disagree about our last example, arguing that Fred is fundamentally a mind that might exist without any body at all, so having a body isn't one of his essential properties. Someone who has been reading Kafka's *Metamorphoses* might argue that Fred could turn into a cockroach, so having a *human* body isn't one of his essential properties. Some philosophers argue that the metaphysical idea that underlies the accidental–essential distinction is wrong. Things belong to many kinds, which are more or less important for various classificatory purposes, but there is no kind that is more fundamental than all others apart from such purposes. Quine, a leading skeptic, gives the example of a bicyclist: If Fred is a bicyclist, is he necessarily two-legged?

Affirming the consequent Affirming the consequent is the logical fallacy committed by arguments of the following form: *If P, then Q. Q. Therefore, P.* This is an invalid argument form. Consider this argument, which affirms the

consequent: If Jones is 20 years old, then Jones is younger than 50 years old. Jones is younger than 50 years old. Therefore, Jones is 20 years old. Clearly, this argument is a bad one: Jones could be any age younger than 50. When someone affirms the consequent, often he or she is mistaking his or her inference as a harmless instance of *modus ponens*.

Agent-causation Agent-causation is a (putative) type of causation that can best be understood by contrasting it with *event-causation.* When a ball hits and breaks a window, one may think of the causal relationship here in terms of one event causing another, namely, *the ball's hitting the window* causing *the window's being broken.* In an instance of *agent* causation, it is not one *event* that causes another. Rather, an agent–a persisting substance–causes an event. Some philosophers, such as Roderick Chisholm (see Chisholm, "Human Freedom and the Self") have argued that agent-causation is required for genuine free will. Agent-causation is also (see Chisholm) sometimes referred to as *immanent causation,* and event causation sometimes referred to as *transeunt causation.*

Ampliative/nonampliative inference *See* **deductive argument.**

Analogy An analogy is a similarity between things. In an argument from analogy, one argues from known similarities to further similarities. Such arguments often occur in philosophy. In his *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion,* David Hume considers an argument from analogy that purports to show that the universe was created by an intelligent being. The character Cleanthes claims that the world as a whole is similar to things like clocks. A clock has a variety of interrelated parts that function together in ways that serve ends. The world is also a complex of interrelated parts that function in ways that serve ends, such as providing food for human consumption. Clocks are the result of intelligent design, so, Cleanthes concludes, probably the world as a whole is also the product of intelligent design. Hume's character Philo criticizes the argument. In "The Argument from Analogy for Other Minds," Bertrand Russell uses an argument from analogy to try to justify his belief that other conscious beings exist. Arguments from analogy are seldom airtight. It is possible for things to be very similar in some respects, but quite different in others. A loaf of bread might be about the same size and shape as a rock. But it differs considerably in weight, texture, taste, and nutritive value. A successful argument from analogy needs to defend the relevance of the known analogies to the argued for analogies.

Analytic and **synthetic** Analytic statements are those that are true (or false) in virtue of the way the ideas or meanings in them fit together. A standard example is "No bachelor is married." This is true simply in virtue of the meanings of the words. "No bachelor is happy," on the other hand, is synthetic. It isn't true or false just in virtue of the meanings of the words. It is true or false in virtue of the

experiences of bachelors, and these can't be determined just by thinking about the meanings of the words. The analytic/synthetic distinction is closely related to the *necessary–contingent* distinction and the *a priori–a posteriori* distinction; indeed, these three distinctions are often confused with one another. But they are not the same. The last one has to do with knowledge, the middle one with possibility, and the first one with meaning. Although some philosophers think that the three distinctions amount to the same thing, others do not. Kant maintains that truths of arithmetic are a priori and necessary but not analytic. Kripke maintains that some identity statements are necessary, but not analytic or a priori.

Analytical philosophy The term *analytical philosophy* is often used for a style of doing philosophy that was dominant throughout most of the twentieth century in Great Britain, North America, Australia, and New Zealand. This way of doing philosophy puts great emphasis on clarity, and it usually sees philosophy as a matter of clarifying important concepts in the sciences, the humanities, politics, and everyday life, rather than providing an independent source of knowledge. Analytical philosophy is often contrasted with *continental philosophy*, the sort of philosophy that has been more dominant in France, Germany, Spain, Italy, and some other European countries. The term was first associated with the movement initiated by Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore early in the twentieth century to reject the idealistic philosophy of F. H. Bradley, which had been influenced by the German idealism of Hegel and others. Moore saw philosophy as the analysis of concepts. Analytical philosophy grew out of the approach and concerns of Moore and Russell, combined with the logical positivist movement and certain elements of pragmatism in America. However, the term *analytical philosophy* now refers to many philosophers who do not subscribe to the exact conceptions of philosophy held by the analysts, logical positivists, or pragmatists. Indeed, there are really no precise conceptual or geographic boundaries separating analytical and continental philosophy. There are many analytical philosophers on the continent of Europe and many who identify themselves with continental philosophy in English-speaking countries. And there are important subgroups within each group. Within analytical philosophy, some philosophers take logic as their model, and others emphasize ordinary language. Both analytical and continental philosophers draw inspiration from the great philosophers of history, from the pre-Socratics, Plato, and Aristotle to Hume, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Mill, Frege, Husserl, James, and Dewey.

Antecedent *See* **conditionals**.

Anthropomorphism Anthropomorphism is the practice of ascribing to nonhuman beings properties and characteristics of human beings. In philosophy of religion, there is a general concern whether and to what extent our thought about God is problematically *anthropomorphic*. For instance, it is commonly held that

depictions of God as having a body are mere anthropomorphisms. But what about depictions of God as becoming angry or frustrated? Whether such depictions ought to be taken literally or treated as merely anthropomorphic is a matter of some controversy.

A posteriori and **a priori** A posteriori knowledge is based on experience, on observation of how things are in the world of changing things. A priori knowledge is based on reasoning rather than observation. Your knowledge that it is raining outside is a posteriori knowledge. It is based on your experience, your observation of what is happening outside. One couldn't figure out whether it was raining or not by just reasoning about it. Now consider the following questions: (1) Are there any married bachelors? (2) What is the sum of 38 and 27? After a bit of thought, you should conclude that there are no married bachelors, and 38 + 27 = 65. You know these things a priori. You didn't need to make any observations about what was happening. You just needed to reason. One important question about a priori truths is whether they are all analytic, or whether there are some synthetic a priori truths. The philosopher Kant thought that (1) above was a priori and analytic, whereas (2) was a priori and synthetic. *See* **analytic** and **synthetic** for further discussion. An *a priori argument* is one that uses no empirical premises. An *a priori concept* is one that is innate or could be acquired just by using one's reason. *See also* **analytic** and **synthetic; contingent** and **necessary; matters of fact** and **relations of ideas**.

A priori *See* **a posteriori** and **a priori**.

Argument from analogy *See* **analogy**.

Asymmetric attitudes To say that our attitudes toward two things are asymmetrical is simply to say that they are different. The asymmetric attitudes arise as a particular puzzle when the things toward which we hold asymmetric attitudes are apparently the same in relevant ways. A prime example of this is the asymmetric attitudes we hold toward the time before birth and the time after death. Both are long periods of time in which we do not exist. It would seem, then, that our attitudes toward them should be symmetric. Intuitively, though, it seems reasonable to regard death as a bad thing, and unreasonable to regard the period of prenatal nonexistence as comparably bad. That is, we hold asymmetric attitudes toward death and prenatal nonexistence.

Atheism Atheism is disbelief in a god. Strictly speaking, atheists are those who don't believe in any god or gods, but often writers will describe someone who does not believe in the god or gods in which they believe as an atheist.

Basic structure In "A Theory of Justice," John Rawls says that his theory of justice concerns a society's major social, political, and economic institutions. His examples include the existence of competitive markets, basic political liberties, and the structure of the family. Rawls calls this the *basic structure* of a society. G. A.

Cohen, in "Where the Action Is," argues that there is an important ambiguity in this idea.

Behaviorism Behaviorism is used in somewhat different senses in psychology and philosophy. In psychology, behaviorism was a twentieth-century movement that maintained that the study of behavior is the best or even the only way to study mental phenomena scientifically. It is opposed to the introspective methods for the study of the mind emphasized in much psychology of the nineteenth century. This is *methodological behaviorism*. A methodological behaviorist might even believe in an immaterial mind (*see* **dualism**), but maintain nevertheless that there was no scientific way to study the immaterial mind except through its effects on observable, bodily behavior. In philosophy, however, behaviorism opposes dualism; the term means some form of the view that the mind is nothing above and beyond behavior. *Logical behaviorists* maintain that talk about the mind can be reduced without remainder to talk about behavior. *Criteriological behaviorists* maintain that mental terms may not be completely reducible to behavioral terms, but they can only be given meaning through ties to behavioral criteria. Behaviorism is closely related to *functionalism*.

British Empiricism *See* **empiricism**.

Cartesian dualism *See* **dualism**.

Category-mistake According to Gilbert Ryle (see "Descartes's Myth") a *category-mistake* is committed (roughly) when one thinks of or represents things of a certain kind as being or belonging to a category or logical type to which they do not belong. Ryle's examples illustrate this sort of mistake nicely. Suppose someone visits your university, and you take him on a tour of the campus, showing him the student commons, the library, and so on. At the end of the tour he says, "This is all very well, but what I'd like to see is the *university*." Your friend would here be making a category-mistake. He apparently thinks that the university is yet another building in addition to the library, and so on, whereas in reality it is more like the sum total of such buildings and their relationships.

Causal determinism *See* **determinism.**

Cause and **effect** We think of the world as more than just things happening; the things that happen are connected to one another, and what happens later depends on what happens earlier. We suppose that some things cause others, their effects. The notion of cause connects with other important notions, such as responsibility. We blame people for the harm they cause, not for things that just happened when they were in the vicinity. We assume that there is a cause when things go wrong–when airliners crash, or the climate changes, or the electricity goes off–and we search for an explanation that discloses the cause or causes. Causation is intuitively a relation of dependence between events. The event that is

caused, the effect, depends for its occurrence on the cause. It wouldn't have happened without it. The occurrence of the cause explains the effect. Once we see that the cause happened, we understand why the effect did. Most philosophers agree that causal connections are *contingent* rather than *necessary*. Suppose the blowout caused the accident. Still, it was possible for the blowout to happen and the accident not to occur. After all, the world might have worked in such a way that a blowout was followed not by an accident but by the car's gradually slowing to a halt. On one common view, however, causation implies laws of nature in the sense that causal connections are instances of such laws. So causal relations are "relatively necessary": they are contingent only insofar as the laws of nature are contingent. It may be a contingent fact that the laws of physics are what they are. But, on this view, *given* the contingent fact that the laws of nature are as they are, the accident had to happen once the blowout did. Hume holds such a view. He claims that, at least as far as humans can comprehend things, *A* causing *B* amounts, at bottom, to the fact that events like *A* are always followed by events like *B*. Causation requires universal succession. (Such universal succession is sometimes called *customary* or *constant conjunction*.) At first this doesn't seem very plausible. After all, many blowouts don't lead to accidents. It seems more plausible if we assume that Hume is thinking of the total cause, the blowout plus all the other relevant factors that in this case led to the accident, including the design of the car and the skill of the driver. Taken this way, the universal succession analysis implies that if the blowout caused the accident, then if all of these relevant conditions were duplicated in another case, and there is a blowout, an accident would happen. If not, and if the blowout really caused the accident in the original case, there must be some relevant difference. This version of universal succession seems more plausible, but perhaps not totally convincing. Even if we grant the Humean relevant difference principle, there are difficulties with the idea that causation simply is universal succession. Consider what it means about the case of the blowout causing the accident. What is the real connection, according to the universal succession theory, between this particular blowout and this particular accident? It just seems to be that the blowout occurred, and then the accident occurred. That's all there really is to causation, as it pertains to these two events. All the rest that is required, on the universal succession analysis, has to do with other events–events *like* the blowout and events *like* the accident. It seems that there is more to causation than this. Hume offers a candidate for this additional something involved in causation. He says it is really just a certain feeling we have when we have experienced many cases of events of one type being followed by events of another. When we have had this experience, our minds pass from the perception of an event of the first kind to an expectation of one of the second kind.

Hume challenges us, if we are not satisfied that causation is just universal succession together with the feeling of the mind passing from perception to expectation, to identify what else there is.

Commodification We treat some goods as subject to norms of a market: They can be bought and sold for prices that are subject to pressures of supply and demand. This is how we see, for example, cars and computers: We treat cars and computers as *commodities*. Are there moral limits to such commodification–moral limits to the appropriate scope of markets? If so, what are they and what is their justification? These are questions Debra Satz explores in her "Markets in Women's Reproductive Labor."

Compatibilism and **incompatibilism** In philosophy, the term *compatibilism* usually refers to a position in the issue of *freedom* versus *determinism*. Intuitively it seems that freedom excludes determinism, and vice versa. But this has been denied by some philosophers; they claim that acts can be *both* free *and* determined, usually adding that the traditional problem is the product of confused thinking abetted by too little attention to the meaning of words. Hume held this position. In Section VIII of his *An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, he describes his project as one of "reconciling" *liberty* with *necessity*, these being his terms for freedom and determinism. Hume said that liberty consists of acting according to the determinations of your will; that is, doing as you decide to do. A free act is not one that is *uncaused*, but one that is caused by the wants, desires, and decisions of the person who performs it. Hence an act can be both free and an instance of a universal causal principle. On this conception, an unfree act is one that one must do *in spite of* one's own desires and decisions, rather than because of them. Some compatibilists go further and maintain that freedom requires determinism. The idea is that for our own will to determine what we do, our decisions must cause our actions, and causation in turn requires determinism. Given this distinction, the views of most philosophers on the issue of freedom and determinism can be located among the following possible positions: **1.** Incompatibilism: Freedom and determinism are incompatible. This view leaves open two main theoretical options: a. *Libertarianism:* There are some free acts, so determinism is false. b. *Hard determinism:* Determinism is true, so there are no free acts. **2.** Compatibilism: Freedom and determinism are compatible. This view is typically part of a view called *soft determinism*, according to which there are free acts and determinism is also true. This view in turn comes in two varieties: a. There are free acts. Determinism is as a matter of fact true, but there would be free acts whether or not determinism were true. b. There are free acts. Determinism is true and its truth is required for freedom. **3**. Freedom is incoherent: Freedom both requires and is incompatible with determinism, and hence makes no sense. Some philosophers

distinguish between freedom of action and free will. Free will involves more than having one's actions determined by one's decisions and desires. It involves having control over those desires and decisions themselves. Someone might have freedom, as the compatibilist understands it, without having free will. For example, a person addicted to smoking might be free in the sense that whether or not he or she smokes on a given occasion is determined by personal desire. But what if this person doesn't want to have or be controlled by that desire? Does he or she have the power to get rid of the desire, or weaken its hold? This is the question of free will. The issue of whether free will is compatible or incompatible with determinism can then be raised.

Conclusion *See* **deductive argument.**

Conditionals A conditional is a kind of statement that is made out of two others. The normal form of the statements is "If *P* then *Q*." *P* is the *antecedent* and *Q* the *consequent*. "If *P*, *Q*" and "*Q,* if *P*" are stylistic variations of "If *P* then *Q*." Conditionals can be in various tenses and in the indicative or subjunctive: Indicative: *If Susan comes to the party, then Michael brings the salad. If Susan came to the party, then Michael brought the salad. If Susan will come to the party, Michael will bring the salad*. Subjunctive: *If Susan were to come to the party, Michael would bring the salad. If Susan had come to the party, Michael would have brought the salad*. A *counterfactual* conditional, one in which the antecedent is false, will usually be in the subjunctive if the speaker realizes that the antecedent is false. One thing seems quite clear about conditionals: *If the antecedent is true, and the consequent false, then the conditional as a whole is false*. If Susan comes to the party, and Michael doesn't bring the salad, then all of the examples preceding are false. This is the basis for two clearly valid rules of inference: *Modus ponens:* From *If P, then Q* and *P*, infer *Q. Modus tollens:* From *If P*, then *Q* and *not-Q*, infer *not-P*. In symbolic logic a defined symbol (often "R") is called the conditional. The conditions under which conditional statements that involve this symbol are true are stipulated by logicians as follows: 1. Antecedent true, consequent true, conditional true 2. Antecedent true, consequent false, conditional false 3. Antecedent false, consequent true, conditional true 4. Antecedent false, consequent false, conditional true This defined symbol, then, agrees with the ordinary language conditional on the clear case, number 2, the case that is crucial for the validity of modus ponens and modus tollens. But what about the other cases? Suppose Susan doesn't come to the party, but Michael brings that salad (antecedent false, consequent true). The symbolic logic statement, Susan comes to the party Michael brings the salad is true in this case, because of part 3 of the definition. It isn't so clear that the ordinary language conditionals are true. Suppose that Michael says, "I brought the salad because Susan couldn't make it. If she had

come, she would have brought it." Are any or all of the ordinary language conditionals listed true in this case? False? What of Michael's second sentence, which is also a conditional? *See* **necessary** and **sufficient conditions.**

Consequent *See* **conditionals.**

Consequentialism Consequentialism is a view about what makes it right or wrong to do something. It maintains that the rightness of an action is determined by the goodness or badness of relevant consequences. *Utilitarianism* is a consequentialist theory that holds that what makes consequences better or worse is, at bottom, the welfare or happiness of sentient beings. A *deontological* ethics rejects consequentialism and holds that the rightness of action depends at least in part on things other than the goodness of relevant consequences. For example, someone who rejects consequentialism might hold that the principle under which an act is done determines whether it is right or wrong. Kant held a version of this view; *see* the Introduction to Part V. **constitutive luck** Constitutive luck is one of the four types of *moral luck* identified by Thomas Nagel. One is subject to constitutive luck insofar as the sort of person that one is (one's character, personality, etc.) is beyond one's control and yet the person is still seen as an apt candidate for praise and blame. *See also* moral luck.

Continental philosophy *See* **analytical philosophy.**

Continental rationalism *See* **rationalism.**

Contingent and **necessary** Some things are facts, but would not have been facts if things had happened differently. These are contingent facts. Consider, for example, the fact that Columbus reached America in 1492. Things could have turned out differently. If he had gotten a later start, he might not have reached America until 1493. So the fact that he arrived in 1492 is contingent. Necessary facts are those that could not have failed to be facts. The year 1492 would have occurred before the year 1493 no matter how long it took Columbus to get his act together. It is a necessary fact. Mathematical facts are a particularly clear example of necessary facts. The fact that 2 + 2 = 4 doesn't depend on one thing happening rather than another. Philosophers sometimes use the idea of a possible world to explain this distinction. Necessary truths are true in every possible world. Contingent truths are true in the actual world but false in some other possible worlds. Necessary falsehoods are false in the actual world and false in every other possible world, too. If one thinks of the distinction this way, one must be careful to distinguish between the truth of a sentence and the truth of what it says. It is easy to imagine a possible world in which the sentence "2 + 2 = 4" is false. Just imagine that the numeral "2" stood for the number three, but "4" still stands for four. But imagining the sentence to have a meaning that makes it false is not the same as imagining what it says, given its actual meaning, to be false. It is the latter that is

important when we ask if it is necessary or contingent that 2 + 2 = 4. The distinction between the necessary and contingent is a *metaphysical* distinction. It has to do with facts or propositions and truth. It is closely related to the epistemological distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori* and the distinction between *analytic* and *synthetic* statements. These three similar distinctions shouldn't be confused. Some philosophers claim that they are *coextensional*. But they are not *cointensional*, so this is a substantive philosophical claim. For example, some philosophers claim that there are mathematical facts that have nothing to do with the meanings of words, and may never be known at all, and are hence not knowable a priori, but are still necessary.

Corroboration *See* **deductivism.**

Cosmogony *See* **cosmos.**

Cosmological argument *See* **cosmos.**

Cosmology *See* **cosmos.**

Cosmos The cosmos is the universe considered as an integrated orderly system. Sometimes the cosmos is the orderly part of a larger whole, the other part being *chaos*. Any account of the origin of the universe as a whole, whether based on myth, religion, philosophy, or science is a *cosmogony*. An account of the nature and origin of the universe that is systematic is a *cosmology*. This term is used for the particular branch of physics that considers this question, and also for inquiries of a more philosophical nature. Cosmological arguments for the existence of God begin with very general facts about the known universe, such as causation, movement, and contingency, and then argue that God must exist, as first cause, or unmoved mover, or necessary being, to account for these facts. The first two ways of proving the existence of God listed by St. Thomas Aquinas are cosmological arguments.

Customary/constant conjunction *See* **cause** and **effect.**

Death The end of life; the cessation of the biological functioning of the body. All known living things eventually die.

Deductive argument Arguments have premises and a conclusion. The truth of the premises should provide grounds for the truth of the conclusion, so that the argument gives one who believes the premises a good reason for believing the conclusion. In a valid argument, the truth of the premises entails the truth of the conclusion. This means that it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. A valid argument may have a false conclusion because the validity of an argument does not imply the truth of the premises. If the premises of a valid argument are true, then the argument is sound. Clearly the conclusion of any sound argument will be true. An argument that aims at validity is *deductive*, or *demonstrative*. Such arguments are *nonampliative* in the following sense: The

conclusion does not contain anything not already found in the premises. In other words, the conclusion is simply "drawn out of" the premises. They are thus *necessarily truth preserving:* If the premises are true, the conclusion (because, logically, it says no more than the premises) must also be true. *Deductive logic* provides rules of inference that exhibit valid patterns of reasoning. An argument can provide those who believe its premises good reason for accepting its conclusion even if it is not valid. Among arguments that are not valid, we can distinguish between those that are strong and weak. A *strong* nondemonstrative or nondeductive argument makes the truth of the conclusion very probable. *Analogical arguments,* for example, are nondeductive but can be quite strong. Inductive arguments involve generalizing from instances. Having noticed that a certain radio station plays rock music on a number of occasions, you may infer that it always does so, or that it is at least very likely that it will do so next time you tune in. This process is called *induction by enumeration*. Inductive arguments are *ampliative* in character: The conclusion of these arguments "goes beyond" what is contained in the premises. Such inferences are not valid, but it seems that they can be quite strong and in fact the whole idea of using past experiences to guide our conduct depends on them. *See* **induction, problem of.**

Deductivism Deductivism is the thesis that science should focus solely on *deductive arguments* rather than *inductive arguments* because there is no good response to the *problem of induction*. Deductivism is most closely associated with the twentieth-century philosopher of sc\ience Karl Popper. Popper advocated the *hypothetico-deductive model* of science, which held that science should make *falsifiable* hypotheses about the world and then test them. Hypotheses that are not falsified despite severe tests are *corroborated* (although not *confirmed*). According to this model of science, the difference between scientific and (say) *metaphysical* claims is that scientific claims are *falsifiable*. For discussion, see Salmon, "The Problem of Induction."

Demonstrative/nondemonstrative inference *See* **deductive argument.**

Deontological ethics *See* **consequentialism**.

Deontology Deontology is the study of ethical concepts having to do with permissibility and impermissibility, e.g., rights, duties, and obligations. *See* deontological ethics.

Determinism Determinism is the doctrine that every event, including every intentional action of a human being, is determined by prior causes. This is usually thought to imply that there are universal, nonstatistical laws of nature covering every aspect of everything that happens. *See* **cause** and **effect.** Given the state of the universe at any time, these laws determine everything else that will ever happen. Some philosophers oppose determinism, because they think that the

ultimate laws of nature are statistical. Others oppose it because they believe there are free actions, and that no actions can be both free and determined. *See* **freedom, compatibilism** and **incompatibilism**, **fatalism.**

Difference principle A central idea of John Rawls's theory of justice, referred to as *the difference principle,* is that inequalities in the distribution of relevant goods are just if and only if these inequalities are needed to improve the plight of everyone, in particular of those who are the worst off. (*See* Rawls's second principle of justice, "A Theory of Justice," p. 578, and G. A. Cohen's formulation, "Where the Action Is," p. 599.)

Distributive justice *See* **justice**.

Double effect, doctrine of An act typically has both intended and unintended effects. For example, swatting a fly may have the intended effect of killing a fly, and the unintended effects of making a noise and waking up your brother. The latter effect may be unintended even though it is foreseen. You knew that swatting the fly would or at least might wake your brother. That's not why you were doing it; you were doing it to get rid of the fly. Perhaps you didn't much care whether or not your brother slept. Perhaps you hated to wake him, but it was very important to you to swat the fly. In these cases, swatting the fly is the intended effect of your act, and waking your brother is merely foreseen. According to the doctrine (or principle) of double effect, the moral status of intended effects differs from those that are merely foreseen. This principle is sometimes appealed to as a part of a *deontological* moral theory. According to this principle, it might be wrong to swat the fly with the intention of waking up your brother, but permissible to swat the fly with the intention of killing it, knowing it would wake up your brother. A more interesting example is abortion. Some people maintain that it is wrong to act with the intention of aborting a fetus, but that nevertheless certain operations may be permissible, even though abortion of the fetus is a foreseeable result, so long as they are done for some other purpose, such as preventing the injury to a mother that continued pregnancy might involve. Some philosophers maintain the distinction makes no sense. Others believe there is a coherent distinction between intended and merely expected consequences, but doubt that it has the moral significance it is given by the doctrine of double effect.

Doxastic/doxically Doxastic states are states having to do with beliefs. If I have the belief that *p*, I am in the doxastic state of believing that *p*. A consideration is *doxically* relevant if it is relevant to one's beliefs.

Dualism The term *dualism* has a number of uses in philosophy, but perhaps the most common is to describe positions on the mind-body problem that hold that the mind cannot be identified with the body or part of the body, or that mental properties are not physical properties. The form of dualism Descartes advocated is

called *Cartesian dualism* or *interactive dualism*. The mind is that which is responsible for mental states of all kinds, including sensation, perception, thought, emotion, deliberation, decision, and intentional action. Some philosophers maintain that this role is played by the brain, but Descartes argued that this could not be so. His view was that the mind was a separate thing, or substance, that causally interacted with the brain, and through it with the rest of the body and the rest of the world. Sensation and perception involve states of the world affecting states of sense organs, which in turn affect the brain, which causes the mind to be in certain states. Action involves states of mind affecting the brain, which in turn affects the body, which may interact with other things in the world. Other forms of dualism include *epiphenomenalism*, *parallelism*, and *property dualism*. The epiphenomenalist holds that the body affects the mind, but not vice versa. The mind only appears to affect the body, because the apparent mental causes of bodily changes (like the decision to lift my arm) coincide with the true bodily causes (some change in my brain). Parallelists hold that mind and body are two substances that do not interact at all. Property dualism maintains that the mind can be identified with the brain (or with the body as a whole), but mental properties cannot be reduced to physical ones. On this view, it is my brain that is responsible for sensation, perception, and other mental phenomena. But the fact that my brain is thinking a certain thought, for example, is an additional fact about it, one that cannot be reduced to any of its physical properties.

Effect *See* **cause** and **effect**.

Efficient causation Efficient causation is one of the four types of causation that Aristotle distinguished. Of these four types, efficient causation is the sort of causation that best fits contemporary usage of the word *causation*. The efficient cause of an event is (roughly) the agent or event that brings the effect about. If a ball breaks a window, the efficient cause of this event is roughly the ball's hitting the window. If Jones raises his hand, the efficient cause of this event is, according to some, Jones himself. When (as in this last example) an agent is supposed to be the efficient cause of some event, this is a (putative) instance of *agent-causation* (*see* **agent-causation**). For another type of causation distinguished by Aristotle, *see* **final causation**.

Egoism *Egoism* has many usages in philosophical discourse. On one usage, it refers to the view that human beings *ought* to pursue their own selfinterest. On another usage, it refers simply to the view that human beings *do* (perhaps exclusively) pursue their own self-interest.

Eliminative materialism *See* **materialism** and **physicalism**.

Embodiment An embodied thing has taken physical, tangible form. That which has been embodied has, literally, been put into a body. Embodiment can

mean either the process of taking form in this way, or the state of having been embodied. Philosophers are most concerned with the embodiment of *consciousness,* that is, with the way in which thinking, conscious things inhabit physical forms and how a conscious being relates to its embodiment.

Empiricism Empiricism is an epistemological position that emphasizes the importance of experience and denies or is very skeptical of claims to a priori knowledge or concepts. The empirical tradition in seventeenth-, eighteenth-, and nineteenth- century philosophy was centered in Britain, and Bacon, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Mill are often referred to as *British Empiricists. See also* **rationalism**.

Endurance *See* **perdurance** and **endurance**.

En-soi According to the existentialist philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, the world is divided between two sorts of beings: beings-in-themselves (en-soi) and beings-for-themselves (pour-soi). Beings-inthemselves are inanimate things like rocks, whereas beings-for-themselves are beings that exhibit feeling and agency.

Entails *See* **deductive argument**.

Epiphenomenalism *See* **dualism**.

Epistemology Epistemology is the theory of knowledge, the inquiry into its possibility, nature, and structure.

Ergon This is the Greek word for *function,* which is a concept that plays an important role in Aristotle's moral theory. For Aristotle, the *ergon* of an object is more than just what we may use that object for–rather, it is whatever activity makes that object the sort of thing that it is. For example, although we can use a knife to hammer a nail into a wall if we wish, this is not the knife's *ergon*. Rather, a knife's *ergon* is to cut. For discussion, see Thomas Nagel's "Aristotle on *Eudaimonia*."

Error theory Some philosophical views have the implication that we regularly but unknowingly fall into error when we make claims about some particular domain of inquiry. For instance, it is a consequence of J. L. Mackie's view in "The Subjectivity of Values" that although we regularly think that at least some of our moral judgments are true, they are in fact systematically false. Mackie thus provides an error theory about moral judgments. As Mackie points out, such theories require strong support because of the challenge they pose to common sense.

Essential *See* **accidental** and **essential**.

Eternalism and **presentism** Of course dinosaurs don't exist *right now,* but do they just plain exist? Again, of course my great-great-grandson doesn't exist *at this moment,* but does he exist nevertheless? According to eternalism, which is a view about past and future objects, the answer to these questions is "Yes." Just as The

Eiffel Tower exists even though it doesn't exist *over here*, so dinosaurs exist even though they don't exist *right now*. This view is often contrasted with a view called *presentism*, according to which the only objects that exist are those that exist *right now*. According to presentism, when dinosaurs went extinct, they didn't just cease to exist *from then on*–rather, they ceased to exist altogether.

Eudaimonia Eudaimonia–sometimes translated "happiness" or "flourishing"–is a central concept in Aristotle's ethics. *See* "Aristotelian Ethics" in Part V.

Euthyphro dilemma The original Euthyphro dilemma is found in one of Plato's dialogues in which Socrates is questioning an Athenian named Euthyphro about the nature of piety. When Euthyphro attempts to explain piety by saying that pious actions are those actions that the gods love, Socrates responds by asking whether the gods love pious actions because they are pious or whether pious actions are pious because the gods love them. This is a dilemma because either response is to some degree unsatisfactory. If Euthyphro says that the gods love pious actions because they are pious, then this seems to imply that there is something out of the control of the gods–namely what actions count as pious. But, on the other hand, if we say that pious actions are pious because the gods love them, then presumably the gods could have loved morally despicable actions, in which case it would follow that some morally despicable actions would be pious. More recently, the term *Euthyphro dilemma* has come to refer to the structurally parallel problem about moral rightness and wrongness, rather than piety. For example, are wrong actions wrong because God forbids them or does God forbid them because they are wrong? In general, the dilemma demands an order of explanation– is an action's being wrong explained by its being forbidden, or is God's act of forbidding the action explained by the action's being wrong?–and so any order of explanation dilemma, whether about God or not, may be considered a version of the Euthyphro dilemma.

Event-causation *See* **agent-causation.**

Evil, problem of Many philosophers have thought that the existence of evil poses a problem for those who believe that there is a perfect God. A perfect God, it seems, would be able to do anything (*omnipotence*), would know everything (*omniscience*), and would have all the moral virtues, such as benevolence. If such a God created the world, why is there any evil? Does God not care if we suffer? Then God is not benevolent. Is this world the best God could make? Then God is not omnipotent. Or perhaps God wanted to do better, and had the power, but didn't quite know what to do. Then God is not ominscient. A perfect God would have made the best of all possible worlds. So, the argument goes, the existence of our imperfect world, full of sin and suffering, shows that God does not exist, or is not

perfect. The problem of evil is pressed by Philo, a main character in Hume's *Dialogues on Natural Religion*. Both Philo and his main adversary, Cleanthes, give up the idea that God is perfect. Philo concludes that while the world was probably created by an intelligent being or beings, there is no reason to attribute benevolence to that being or those beings. Cleanthes allows that God may be only finitely powerful. Other philosophers have thought, however, that our problems with evil simply show how difficult it is for finite beings to grasp the plan of an infinitely perfect being. This is, contrary to first impressions, the best of all possible worlds. This is Leibniz's position in "God, Evil and the Best of All Possible Worlds."

Experiential blank The complete absence of experience. This is to be distinguished from the sort of 'experience of nothing' that results from sensory deprivation. An experiential blank is a complete absence of consciousness and awareness. It is typically assumed (in secular discussions) that both the time before our birth (or, perhaps better, conception) and the time after our death are experiential blanks.

Extension (alternate) Things that occupy space have *extension*. Some things that (apparently) exist lack extension including numbers, properties, and–according to *dualism*–minds or souls. This usage of *extension* should be distinguished from the usage that concerns the application of predicates; *see* **extension** and **intension.**

Extension and **intension** Consider a *predicate* like "human being." It applies to or is true of a number of individuals, those who are human beings. The set of these individuals is the extension of the predicate. The members of this set have the property of being a human being in common. This property (or, for some philosophers, the concept of this property) is the intension of the predicate. Terms that have the same extension are co*extensional*, terms that have the same intension are *co-intensional*. It seems that terms can be co-extensional without being co-intensional. Russell's example is "human being" and "featherless biped that is not a plucked chicken." These terms are not *co-intensional*, as the property of being a human being is not the same as the property of being a featherless biped that is not a plucked chicken. But they are *co-extensional*. If you set aside the plucked chickens, humans are the only bipeds without feathers. (Probably their extensions are not *quite* the same; after all there are plucked turkeys, too, but Russell thought the example was close enough to being correct to make the point.) The term *extension* is often used in an extended sense in which names and sentences have extensions as well as terms or predicates. (The terminology is due to Rudolf Carnap, and the idea it incorporates goes back to Gottlob Frege.) The extension of a name is the thing it names, the extension of a sentence is its truth value, true or false. This brings out the systematic connection among name, predicate, and

sentence. The sentence "Fido is barking" will have the extension True (i.e., be true), just in case the extension of "Fido" (i.e., Fido) is a member of the extension of "is barking." That is, the extension of the parts (the name "Fido" and the predicate "is barking") determines the extension of the whole sentence. Sentences like this, their truth-value being determined by the extension of their parts, are *extensional*. If a sentence is extensional, substitution of a name in it for another co-extensional name (or a predicate for another co-extensional predicate) won't affect the truth value. Suppose Fido is also called "Bad-breath." Then the substitution of "Bad-breath" for "Fido" will preserve the truth value of our sentence. If "Fido is barking" is true, so too will be "Bad-breath is barking." Not all sentences are extensional. Consider the true sentence "Bad-breath is so called because of his smell." If we substitute the co-extensional name "Fido" for "Bad-breath" the result is "Fido is so called because of his smell." This sentence isn't true. So our original sentence, "Bad-breath is so called because of his smell," isn't extensional, but *nonextensional*. We can generalize and say that any expression is extensional if its extension is determined by the extensions of its parts. Consider the predicate "is portrayed as a human being." Suppose this is true of Donald Duck, because he is portrayed in cartoons as having so many human characteristics. If we substitute "featherless biped" for "human being" we get the predicate "is portrayed as a featherless biped." This doesn't seem to be true of Donald, as he is always portrayed as a feathered biped. In these examples, it seems possible to pick out the expressions that lead to the nonextensionality. In the first example it is "so called," in the second it is "portrayed as." Expressions like these that give rise to nonextensionality are often called *nonextensional contexts*. Some concepts that are very important in philosophy seem to generate nonextensional sentences. Consider "Harold believes that Cicero was a great Roman." Because "Tully" is another name for Cicero, if this sentence is extensional, it seems we should be able to substitute "Tully" for "Cicero" without changing the truth value of the whole. But it seems that if Harold has never heard Cicero called "Tully," "Harold believes that Tully was a great Roman" would *not* be true. The term *intensional* is used in three ways, one strict and comparatively rare, one loose and very common, and one incorrect. Strictly speaking, an expression is intensional if its intension is determined by the intensions of its parts. This is the way Carnap used the term. It is common to use it loosely, however, simply to mean "nonextensional," so that an "intensional context" means a form of words, like "so called" and "portrayed as" and "believes," that leads to nonextensional predicates and sentences. *Intensional* is often confused with *intentional* in the broad sense that is sometimes taken to be the mark of the mental. This is understandable, because many words that describe intentional phenomena, such as *believes,* seem to be intensional, in the loose sense.

In *possible worlds semantics,* names, predicates, and sentences are said to have extensions *at* possible worlds–the set of things that the predicate applies to in the world. Sentences are also said to have extensions at worlds: their truth values in the worlds. The intension of a predicate is a function from worlds to extensions, and the intension of a sentence is a function from worlds to truth values.

Extensional *See* **extension**.

Extrinsic An extrinsic property is one that an object has partly in virtue of its relations to other things and their properties. A thing could lose such a property without really changing at all. For example, Omaha has the property of being the largest city in Nebraska. It could lose this property by virtue of Grand Island growing a great deal. Omaha wouldn't have to lose population to lose this property, or change in any other way. Being the largest city in Nebraska is thus an extrinsic property of Omaha. An *intrinsic* property, by contrast, is one that an object has because of the way it is in itself, independently of its relations to other things and their properties. The distinction is often useful, because a property that we might have thought to be intrinsic turns out to be extrinsic on closer examination. It is very difficult, however, to give a really clear and precise explanation, or unchallengeable list, of intrinsic properties of ordinary, spatiotemporally extended objects.

Falsifiability *See* **deductivism.**

Fatalism Fatalism is the doctrine that certain events are fated to happen, no matter what. This might mean that an event is fated to take place at a specific time, or that someone is going to do some deed, no matter what anyone does to try to prevent it. Fatalism differs from *determinism*. One way they differ is that a fatalistic view about the occurrence of a certain event does not depend on the laws of nature determining only a single course of events. There may be many possible futures that differ in many ways, but they all will include the fated event. Oedipus, for example, was (allegedly) fated to marry his mother and kill his father. This didn't mean that there was only one course of action open to him after hearing the prophecy, but that no matter which course he took, he would eventually end up doing that which he wanted most to avoid. A second way they differ is that an event may be determined by prior causes even though it was not fated to occur; for among those prior causes may be the decisions and efforts of human agents. So determinism does not entail fatalism about all events.

Feminism Feminism is an intellectual, social, and political movement. The movement is very diverse, but one strand that runs through all varieties is the conviction that important intellectual, social, and political structures have been based on the assumption, sometimes implicit, sometimes quite explicit, that being fully human means being male. Reexamination of these structures from a

perspective that appreciates the interests, values, styles, ideas, roles, methods, and emotions of women as well as men can lead to fruitful and in some cases radical reform.

Final causation According to the Aristotelian doctrine of final causes, the final cause (or *telos)* of a thing's existence is the purpose or end for which it exists. For instance, the final cause of a chair is sitting, and so on. *Teleology* is the branch of knowledge having to do with purposes and design. A fact is *teleological* if it is of or related to teleology or final causes. Some arguments for the existence of God are teleological in nature; such arguments appeal to the apparent design or purpose of human beings or the universe to argue for the existence of a cosmic designer.

First cause argument The first cause argument purports to prove the existence of God as the first cause. In the world we know, everything has a cause and nothing causes itself. The series of causes cannot go back to infinity, so there must be a first cause, and this is God. St. Thomas Aquinas's second way of proving the existence of God is a version of the first cause argument. Philosophers have challenged each step of the argument.

First-order desires *See* **second-order volitions.**

Formal The formal properties of representations are distinguished from their *content* properties. "All cows are animals" and "all houses are buildings" have different contents, but the same form: *All Fs are Gs. Formal logic* seeks to classify inferences in terms of their formal properties. Where *P* and *Q* are sentences, any inference of the following form, known as *modus ponens,* is valid, no matter what the content is. *If P then Q P Therefore, Q.* Some philosophers have argued that philosophical confusion can sometimes be avoided by putting claims into the *formal mode* rather than the *material mode*. To put a claim in the formal mode is to express it, as nearly as possible, as a claim about words or other symbols, rather than about the things the words purport to stand for. "Santa Claus doesn't exist" is a claim in the material mode, which may be confused or confusing because it looks as if we are saying something about a thing, Santa Claus, who isn't really there to say anything about. Better to say "'Santa Claus' doesn't refer to anything."

Formal logic *See* **formal.**

Formal mode *See* **formal.**

Freedom In ordinary conversation we call people free who aren't prevented from doing what they want to do and conducting their life as they see fit. In politics and political philosophy, freedom usually means having civil or political liberty, having certain basic rights or freedoms, such as those codified in the American Bill of Rights, the Rights of Man, or the Charter of the United Nations. In the realm of metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, the term *freedom* refers to a very basic feature of decisions or actions. When we perform an ordinary act, like drinking a

cup of coffee, or going to a movie, or helping a friend, we have a feeling that our action results from our own decision and *that we could have done otherwise*. It seems that only when this is the case do we take full responsibility (blame or credit) for our actions. A person might be free in this sense, although not enjoying freedom in the sense of political liberties. A writer under house arrest, and prevented from publishing, would not enjoy basic civil liberties. But many of her actions would still be free in this metaphysical sense. She has coffee in the morning; she could have had tea. Perhaps she writes her essays even though she can't publish them. This is a free act, in that she could have gardened or stayed in bed instead; if she had chosen to do those things, no one would have forced her to write. One fundamental question about freedom in this sense concerns its relation to *determinism*. If determinism is true, are any of our actions *really* free, or is freedom simply an illusion? This debate often turns on the exact definition of freedom. *Compatibilists* are likely to think of freedom as being able to act in accord with one's desires and decisions, even if those desires and decisions are themselves the influences of more remote causes, outside the agent. This is compatible with determinism, in that one's own desires and decisions might be the causes of one's actions, even though those desires and decisions were themselves caused by other things, and lie at the end of a chain of causes and effects that goes back to the time before the agent was born. An *incompatibilist* typically thinks of a free decision or act as one that is not caused by anything else, or is caused by the agent, independent of external causes. The term *free will* is sometimes used to contrast with *freedom of action*. One's *will* in this sense is one's decision, choice, or dominating desire. Even if one is free to follow one's strongest desire, and hence has freedom of action in the compatibilist sense, does one have any control over those desires and choices themselves? Can one influence the strength of one's desires, or are they determined by external influences? One might be a compatibilist with respect to free action and determinism, but an incompatibilist with respect to free will and determinism. In theological contexts, the question of free will is whether humans can have any choice if there is a god who has foreknowledge of what they will do.

Free will *See* **freedom.**

Functionalism The function of a thing is its operation within a system. It is the role the thing has, when the system is operating properly. For example, the function of a carburetor is to supply an atomized and vaporized mixture of fuel and air to the intake manifold of an internal combustion engine. One can contrast the function of a thing with its structure and the material from which it is made. The structure of a carburetor differs from that of a fuel injection system, although both have the same function and are made of the same types of materials. Functionalism

in the philosophy of mind is the view that mental states are real states definable by their functions, specifically by their causal role with respect to stimuli, other mental states, and behavior. Functionalism can be contrasted with Cartesian dualism and behaviorism**.** Functionalism agrees with Cartesian dualism in holding that mental states are real, but differs in that the latter maintains that the mental states are essentially states of an immaterial mind, defined by their basic nature, rather than their function. Functionalism agrees with *logical behaviorism* in seeing a definitional connection between mental states and behavior. They differ in that the logical behaviorist maintains that mental states are not real at all; the terms that seem to stand for them are just misleading ways of describing behavior. For the behaviorist, the definitions that connect stimuli, behavior, and mental states are reductive; they show how to eliminate reference to mental states in favor of reference to stimuli and behavior. For this reason, a behaviorist definition of a mental state cannot allow ineliminable reference to other mental states. The selection from Armstrong explain and defend versions of functionalism. Nagel criticizes functionalist views in "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?"

Greatest Happiness Principle *See* **utilitarianism.**

Hallucination, argument from *See* **illusion, argument from.**

Hard determinism *See* **compatibilism** and **incompatibilism.**

Hedonism *See* the discussion of utilitarianism. **hedonistic utilitarianism** *See* **utilitarianism.**

Hierarchical model of moral responsibility According to a hierarchical model of moral responsibility, a person is morally responsible for her actions only if there is a 'mesh' between her *higherorder preferences* and the *first-order preferences* on which she acts. First-order preferences are our preferences about things–like a desire to have sushi for lunch or to go on a date with your significant other. Higher-order preferences concern *other* preferences. I may, for instance prefer that my first-order desire for a cigarette not move me to action, or I might hope that my actions will be guided by my desire to meet my deadline, leading me to stay home and work rather than go out with my friends. When my higher-order preferences prevail and I am moved by the first-order preferences they designate, there is a mesh between my higher-order and first-order preferences. At the most basic level of analysis, a hierarchical model of the mind posits mental states of different orders (first-, second-, and so forth), and a hierarchical model of moral responsibility exploits this sort of model of the mind to give an account of moral responsibility.

Hypothetico-deductive method *See* **deductivism.**

Ideas There are two quite different uses of the term *idea* in philosophy. The term *idea* is used for the denizens of Plato's heaven. Sometimes *form* is used as a

less misleading translation of *eidos*. Plato's ideas or forms are not parts of our minds, but objective, unchanging, immaterial entities that our minds somehow grasp and use for the classification of things in the changing world, which Plato held to be their pale imitations. John Locke uses the term *idea* for that which the mind is immediately aware of, as distinguished from the qualities or *objects* in the external world the ideas are of. This use for the term leaves it rather vague. Idea can be the images involved in perception, or the constituents of thought. Hume calls the first *impressions*, the latter *ideas*, and the whole class *perceptions*. For Hume, the class of impressions includes passions (emotions) as well as sensations. A feeling of anger would be an impression, as would the sensation of red brought about by looking at a fire truck. Later memory of the feeling of anger or the fire truck would involve the ideas of anger and red. The conception of ideas as immediate objects of perception and thought, intervening between our minds and the ordinary objects we perceive and think about, was part of a philosophical movement, sometimes called "the way of ideas," greatly influenced by Descartes's *Meditations*. Descartes there uses a form of the *argument from illusion* to motivate the distinction between the mental phenomena we are certain of and the external reality that is represented by them.

Identity A thing is *identical* with itself and no other. If *a* is identical with *b*, then there is just one thing that is both *a* and *b*; "*a*" and "*b*" are two names for that one thing. It follows from this that the relation of identity is *transitive* (if *a* is identical with *b*, and *b* is identical with *c*, then *a* is identical with *c*), symmetrical (if *a* is identical with *b*, then *b* is identical with *a*), and confers indiscernibility (if *a* is identical with *b*, and *a* has property P, *b* has property P). The term *identity* is not always used in this strict sense. For example, in this sense, "identical twins" are not identical–they couldn't be twins if they were, as there would be only one of them. We sometimes use identity to mean close resemblance in one respect or another. It is best, in philosophical contexts, to use identity in the way previously explained and some other word, like *similar* or *resembles*, when that is what is meant. The terms *numerical identity* and *qualitative identity* are sometimes used, but are best avoided. One needs to distinguish between the identity of qualities (red is one and the same color as rouge) and similarity with respect to a quality (the couch and the chair are both red; they are similar in respect of color), and this terminology obscures the distinction. Some issues about identity are raised in the section on personal identity and in "The Paradox of Identity."

Identity theory David Armstrong in "The Nature of Mind" maintains that mental states are quite literally identical with physical states. Our concept of a mental state is of a state that occupies a certain causal role; it turns out that physical states do occupy those roles; hence, mental states are physical states. This

identity theory is a species of *materialism*. It is also, strictly speaking, a form of *functionalism*, because it maintains that mental states are definable by their function or causal role. Many functionalists, however, think that mental states cannot be identified with physical states. They maintain that the relation is a less stringent one, *supervenience*. Functionalism in this narrower sense is often contrasted with the identity theory.

Illusion, argument from Philosophers use the term *argument from illusion* for a general type of argument and for a specific version of it. These arguments are intended to show that what we are directly aware of when we perceive ordinary things are not those ordinary things themselves. We can distinguish three such arguments: the argument from perceptual relativity, the argument from illusion, and the argument from hallucination. The argument from perceptual relativity starts with the fact that perceptions of the same object in different circumstances involve different perceptual experiences. For example, a building seen from a great distance casts a different-sized image on your retina, and creates quite a different experience, than the same building seen from a few yards away. Consider seeing a quarter held at a ninety-degree angle to your line of sight, and the same quarter held at a forty-five-degree angle. In the first case a round image is cast on your retina, in the second an elliptical image. The perceptual experience is different, although the object seen, the quarter, is the same. The conclusion drawn is that there is something involved in the experience besides the agent and the quarter, which are the same in both, that accounts for the difference. This is the *immediate* object of perception. Some philosophers take these objects to be ideas in the mind of the perceiver that represent the external object; *see* **representative ideas, theory of.** Others have taken them to be nonmental sense data. Some philosophers have taken the ideas or sense data to be materials out of which external objects are constructed, rather than representations of them. The argument from illusion itself starts with the fact that two different objects can create the same experience. For example, a quarter held at an angle and an elliptical disk held at ninety degrees might cast exactly the same image on the retina and create the same experience. What is it that is the same? Not the objects seen, which are different. The answer again is an intervening object, which may be taken to be a subjective idea or something objective. The argument from hallucination considers the case in which it is to one as if one were seeing an object, although there is in fact nothing at all there. This sort of case, a true hallucination, is much more unusual than those noted for the earlier two arguments. What is it that is present in our perception when there is nothing seen? It is, again, the subjective idea or the objective sense datum.

Immanent causation *See* **agent-causation.**

Immaterialism Immaterialism is the metaphysical doctrine held by Berkeley. He maintained that reality consisted entirely of minds (including God's) and ideas. Ordinary things were collections or congeries of ideas. Berkeley thought his view came closer to common sense than that of the philosophers he opposed (Descartes and Locke, for example), which implied the existence of *material substances* in addition to minds and ideas. Berkeley explains in his *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous* that he thinks we have no evidence for material substances, that identifying ordinary things with such substances leads to skepticism, and in fact the very concept of a material substance is incoherent.

Immutability Immutability is a property often, and traditionally, attributed to God. Roughly, a being is immutable if and only if that being cannot change. However, it is a matter of some controversy whether and to what extent God is immutable. Some theists have thought that saying that God is immutable is theologically undesirable. According to these theists, God does things like creating the world and performing miracles, and (it is argued) an absolutely immutable being could not do such things, because doing them involves changing from doing one thing at one time to doing another at another time. Such theists typically argue that God's immutability should be restricted to God's character: God's character (or what God is like) cannot change.

Imperatives, categorical and **hypothetical** *See* the discussion of Kantian ethics.

Impressions *See* **ideas.**

Incompatibilism *See* **compatibilism** and **incompatibilism.**

Induction *See* **induction, problem of** and **deductive argument.**

Induction by enumeration *See* **deductive argument.**

Induction, problem of The problem of induction, sometimes known as *Hume's problem,* has to do with justifying a very basic sort of *nondeductive* inference. We often seem to infer from observation that some sample of a population has a certain attribute to the conclusion that the next members of the population we encounter will also have that attribute. When you eat a piece of bread, for example, you are concluding from the many times in the past that bread has nourished you, that it will also do so this time. But it is conceivable that bread should have nourished in the past, but not this time. It isn't a *necessary, analytic*, or *a priori* truth that the next piece of bread you eat will be like the ones you have eaten before. How does your inference bridge the gap? It is natural to appeal to various general principles that one has discovered to hold. But, as Hume points out, the future application of principles found reliable in the past presents exactly the same problem. For example, consider the most general principle of all, that the future will be like the past. All one has really observed was that, in the past, the

future was like the past. How does one know that in the future it will be? The problem of induction is stated in Hume's *An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding,* Section IV, and discussed by Salmon, "The Problem of Induction."

Inductive argument *See* **deductive argument.**

Infinity The concept of infinity is a fascinating, tricky, and complex one. It has been used in a number of philosophical arguments, such as Zeno's arguments about motion, and in some of St. Thomas Aquinas's arguments for the existence of God. In the last two hundred years mathematicians have given us a clearer framework for thinking about infinity than earlier philosophers had, but this doesn't mean all of the puzzles and problems are easy to resolve. *Infinite* means without end. Let's say that to count a collection of objects is to assign the natural numbers (1,2,3 . . .) in order to its members, so that every member is assigned a number and no number gets assigned twice. Let's say that *to finish counting a collection of objects* is to assign numbers in this way to every object in the collection. A finite collection of things is one that one could finish counting, at least theoretically, and say "it has *n* members" where *n* is some natural number. An infinite collection is one for which one could not finish counting. One can see from this that the set of natural numbers is itself infinite, for one would never finish counting it. Assigning objects from one set to those in another, so that each object is assigned to only one object and has only one object assigned to it, is called putting the sets in a one-to-one correspondence. Sets that can be correlated in this way, are the same size–they have the same number of elements. Using this idea, modern mathematics has shown that not all infinite sets are the same size, so that one needs to distinguish among different infinite or *transcendental* numbers. The number of natural numbers is called alepho. Somewhat surprisingly, this is also the number of even numbers, as there is a one-to-one correlation between numbers and even numbers (assign 2*n* to *n*). But it is not the number of points in a line for there is not a one-to-one correlation between the set of such points and the natural numbers. This is shown by a variation of Zeno's Racecourse Argument. Let the line be of length *m*. If we assign 1 to the point *m*/2, 2 to *m*/4, . . . n to *m*/2*n,* we will have paired a point from the continuum with each natural number, but no matter how long we go on, we will never assign a natural number to any of the points beyond *m*/2. In thinking about infinity, it is important to keep certain distinctions in mind. One might have two quite different things in mind when calling a magnitude "infinite": that it goes on forever, or that the process of dividing it could go on forever. A finite distance like ten feet is not infinite in the first sense, but seems to be in the second: One could take the first half, half of what's left, and so on without end. Intuitively, one can traverse a finite, but infinitely divisible, distance in a finite amount of time, but not an infinite distance. Zeno's Racecourse

Argument seems to show that one cannot even traverse a finite distance. But keeping this distinction in mind, what exactly does it show? Aristotle distinguished between the potential and actual infinite. When we say that a distance of ten feet is infinitely divisible, we don't mean one could actually divide it into an infinite number of parts, but only that there are an infinite number of points in which one could divide it. Aristotle thought that this distinction took care of Zeno's arguments.

Intension, intensional *See* **extension**.

Intentionality An intentional act or state is one that is directed at objects and characterized by the objects at which it is directed. Intentionality in this sense is a feature not only of intentions, but of many other mental phenomena. Some philosophers take it to be the essence of mentality and consciousness. Think about how you would describe your intentions. You don't say what they look like or feel like or sound like, or what material they are made of. You say something like, "I have an intention to paint my room." You say what your intention is an intention *to do*. This essential characteristic of your intention is its *object,* the event or state of affairs it is aimed at bringing about. Similarly, if you are asked to describe your wants, you would describe *what you want*–a new car, say, or world peace. The *object* of the want or desire, the thing or state of affairs that would satisfy it, seems essential to it. Beliefs and other *propositional attitudes* are also considered intentional. We describe our beliefs by giving the circumstances under which they are true: "Fred believes that San Francisco is the capital of California." The object of the belief is the *proposition, that San Francisco is the capital of California*. This proposition may be the object of the belief even if it is not true. The term *intentional* should not be confused with the term *intensional,* although they are related. Many of the concepts used to describe intentional phenomena are nonextensional, which is one meaning of intensional. For example, "Oedipus intended to marry Jocasta" is a true description of an intention of Oedipus. If we substitute "his mother" for "Jocasta," we change this truth into a falsehood. So the sentence is intensional.

Interactive dualism *See* **dualism**.

Intrinsic *See* **extrinsic.**

Intuitionism Moral or ethical intuitionism is the view that we can have some knowledge about right and wrong that is not acquired through inference. Rather, there are some moral truths that we can "just see" or "just know," perhaps through some faculty of moral intuition. J. L. Mackie criticizes this view in "The Subjectivity of Values."

Justice Issues about justice are traditionally divided into issues about justice in the distribution of benefits and burdens to different individuals and groups in a

society (*distributive justice*) and issues about the justice of various forms of punishment (*retributive justice*).

Laws of nature Many scientists take themselves to be engaged in the project of figuring out what rules and guidelines describe the universe and its inhabitants at the most general level. That is, they are attempting to figure out the laws of nature that govern our world. For instance, Einstein discovered the law of nature that nothing travels faster than the speed of light. Presumably there is some set of statements like this that is complete in the sense that these statements would completely describe the behavior of the physical universe. These statements would be all the laws of nature (sometimes also called the laws of physics). For a discussion of how the laws of nature relate to determinism and freedom of the will, see Peter van Inwagen's piece, "The Powers of Rational Beings: Freedom of the Will."

Libertarianism *See* **compatibilism** and **incompatibilism.**

Logical behaviorism *See* **behaviorism.**

Manichean/manichaeism Manicheanism was a gnostic religion that originated in Persia in the third century A.D. In philosophy, manicheanism primarily arises in connection with its interesting approach to the problem of evil. According to manicheans, there are two co-eternal powers of Light and Darkness that are in perpetual conflict. We find ourselves in the midst of this struggle. Because the manicheans, unlike traditional theists, give equal priority to Light and Darkness, they do not have the problem of explaining how evil came to exist in a world created by a perfectly good being (such as God).

Materialism and **physicalism** Materialism is the doctrine that reality consists of material objects and their material, spatial, and temporal properties and relations. Narrowly construed, materialism refers to material substances and properties as conceived in eighteenth-century physics and philosophy, so that material properties are confined to the primary qualities then recognized, including figure (shape), extension (size), number, motion, and solidity. A more general term is *physicalism*, where *physical properties* are taken to be whatever properties physics postulates in the best account of the physical world. The physicalist leaves open the possibility that the fundamental properties needed by physics will not be much like the primary qualities of the materialist. A chief obstacle to materialism or physicalism is the mind. *Cartesian dualists* claim that the mind is an immaterial or nonphysical object; other kinds of dualists claim that at least mental properties are above and beyond the physical properties. The physicalist response has taken the form of identity theories (the mind is the brain; mental properties are physical properties), behaviorist theories (mental terms are ways of talking about behavior), and eliminative materialism (there are no minds or mental properties; the terms

that seem to refer to them are just parts of a discredited theory of how people work). *Functionalism* is hard to categorize; perhaps it maintains the letter of property dualism but the spirit of physicalism.

Matters of fact and **relations of ideas** This is Hume's terminology for the *analytic–synthetic* distinction, which Hume didn't distinguish from the *a priori–a posteriori* distinction and the *necessary–contingent* distinction. Hume thought our thinking is conducted with simple ideas that are copied from impressions of external objects and complex ideas that result from combining the simple ones. The mind can put ideas together in new ways not derived from perception, so complex ideas need not correspond to external objects. These ideas also serve as the meanings of words. *Relations of ideas* are truths that simply reflect the way these ideas are related to each other and don't depend on whether the ideas actually apply to anything. Hume's examples are "that three times five is equal to the half of thirty" and "that the square of hypotenuse is equal to the square of the two sides." Such truths "are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe." The contrary of a relation of ideas will imply a contradiction and is impossible. In contrast, matters of fact have to do with what the world is like, and not just how ideas are related. The contrary of a matter of fact is possible and doesn't imply a contradiction. Hume's example is "that the sun will rise tomorrow." This is true, and we are quite certain of it, at least most of the time. But it is true because of what happens tomorrow, not because of the way ideas are related. Its contrary, "that the sun will not rise tomorrow," is not a contradiction. Hume maintained that only relations of ideas can be discovered a priori, and that no matter of fact can be demonstrated with only relations of ideas as premises. He argued that many principles philosophers had claimed to know a priori, such as that nothing happens without a cause, were matters of fact and could not be known that way. Most philosophers agree that mathematical truths, like Hume's examples cited earlier, are necessary and knowable a priori. But many do think that they are not analytic–are not simply a matter of relations of ideas, in Hume's sense.

Means-end analysis To give a means-end analysis of some concept is to define it as a particular way of achieving some goal or purpose. Thus giving a means-end analysis involves two parts: a description of the goal to be achieved (the end), and a description of the way of achieving that goal (the means). For instance, we might give a means-end analysis of the concept of *intimidation*. We could specify the goal or end by saying that intimidation is a way of bringing it about that another acts in accord with one's wishes. We can then specify the means by saying that intimidation achieves this goal by making threats of one kind or another. On

this means-ends analysis, then, intimidation is bringing it about that another acts in accord with one's wishes by making threats of one kind or another.

Mechanisms On the account of moral responsibility suggested by J. M. Fischer, one is morally responsible insofar as one acts from one's own, appropriately reasons-responsible mechanism. A mechanism here is not thought of as a "thing," but, intuitively, as a "way" of acting or "process" that issues in a choice and action.

Metaphysics Metaphysics considers very general questions about the nature of reality. It includes the study of the basic categories of things (*ontology*). Questions such as whether there are universals, events, substances, individuals, necessary beings, possible worlds, numbers, ideal objects, abstract objects, and the like arise here. Metaphysics also includes questions about space, time, identity and change, mind and body, personal identity, causation, determinism, freedom, and the structure of action.

Methodological behaviorism *See* **behaviorism.**

Mind-body problem The mind-body problem is the problem of accounting for the way in which our minds interact with or are related to our bodies. The mind-body problem thus comprises a central area of the subfield of philosophy called *philosophy of mind*.

Modus ponens *See* **conditionals.**

Modus tollens *See* **conditionals.**

Moral luck As Thomas Nagel uses the term in his article of the same name, a person is subject to moral luck whenever he or she is still treated as a candidate for praise or blame even though the action in question depended in some significant way on factors outside of his or her control. Nagel identifies four types of moral luck: *constitutive luck,* luck in one's circumstances, luck in the consequences of one's actions, and luck in the antecedents of one's actions. When we act, our actions are thoroughly situated in a context that includes the sort of person that we are (our constitution), the circumstances in which we find ourselves, the events that led up to our actions, and the events that will follow from whatever we do. To the extent that we lack control over any of these aspects of the context and yet are still treated as candidates for praise and blame, we are to that extent subject to moral luck.

Moral responsibility If an agent is morally responsible for her actions then those actions can make her the appropriate target of certain attitudes and practices. A morally responsible agent can be an appropriate target for what Peter Strawson dubbed the *reactive attitudes*. These include resentment, indignation, gratitude, and approval. She can also be the appropriate target for our practices of praise, blame, reward, and punishment. We should distinguish moral responsibility from *causal*

responsibility. One can be causally responsible for something, but not morally responsible for it. For instance, if you spill a glass of water on my computer, then you are causally responsible for the damage that ensues. You are also morally responsible–it could be appropriate for me to resent you for not being more careful. If, however, it is my cat that spills the water, then the cat, though just as causally responsible for the damage as you would be, is not morally responsible. It makes no sense for me to resent my cat: cats just are not an appropriate target for the reactive attitudes. It is fairly easy to see why the cat is not morally responsible: the cat is not a person, and only persons can be morally responsible for their actions. However, not all persons are morally responsible for their actions. For instance, children are persons, but are not generally taken to be fully responsible for their actions. Philosophers disagree about the conditions under which persons are morally responsible–about just what makes someone an appropriate target for reactive attitudes and practices of praise and blame.

Mutual awareness Two people are in a state of mutual awareness when they are not only aware of one another, but also each aware of the other's awareness. For instance, suppose we are both attending a crowded party, and I recognize you from across the room. I am now aware of you, but you are not yet aware of me. Someone else engages me in conversation for a moment, and you hear my voice and spot me across the room. You are now aware of me, as I am of you. This, though, is not yet mutual awareness: I am unaware that you have noticed me, and you are unaware that I have noticed you. Once we make eye contact and realize that we have recognized one another, then we are each aware of the other's awareness. This is a state of mutual awareness.

Naive realism *See* **realism.**

Natural evil In discussions about the philosophical *problem of evil*, a distinction is commonly made between *moral evil* and *natural evil*. Moral evil is (roughly) evil that is brought about by the bad actions of human beings (or other created beings), whereas natural evil is evil that is (seemingly) brought about by nonagential forces (e.g., hurricanes, tornados, drought, and so on). A deer's being badly burned in a naturally caused forest fire is a paradigmatic instance of natural evil. It is important to see that responses to the problem of moral evil are not necessarily good responses to the problem of natural evil.

Naturalism Naturalism is a powerful if somewhat vague philosophical view, with both epistemological and metaphysical sides. All knowledge derives from the methods we use to study the natural world, sense-perception extended by the methods of the natural sciences. The only objects and properties that we should countenance are those that we perceive in the natural world, and those that are required to explain natural phenomena by our best theories. Thus, in the title of his

Dialogues on Natural Religion, the word *natural* tells us that Hume will consider whether basically scientific methods of inquiry and argument can lead us to a belief in an intelligent creator. Naturalism in ethics maintains that good and bad, right and wrong are definable in terms of natural properties, such as pleasure and pain, and that there are no special methods of knowledge for moral facts.

Natural religion The term *natural religion* occurs in Hume's *Dialogues*. It is basically opposed to *revealed religion*. Natural religion is religous belief based on the same sorts of evidence that we use in everyday life and science: observation and inference to the most plausible explanations for what is observed by principles based on experience. It is in this spirit that Cleanthes puts forward his analogical argument for the existence of an intelligent creator. In contrast, revealed religion relies on sacred texts and the authority of tradition and Church.

Necessary *See* **contingent** and **necessary**.

Necessary and **sufficient conditions** In the phrases *necessary condition* and *sufficient condition,* the term *condition* may be used for properties, statements, propositions, events, or actions. The basic idea is always that: A *is sufficent for* B. Having (being, doing) *A* is one way of having (being, doing) *B;* nothing more is needed. You may not need to have *A* to have *B,* for there may be other ways of having *B.* But *A* is one way. A *is necessary for* B. Every way of having (being, doing) *B* involves having (being, doing) *A. A* may not be all you need; it may be that every way of having *B* involves not only having *A* but also something more. But you've got to have *A* to have *B.* For example: Having a car is sufficient, but not necessary for having a vehicle. One could have a bicycle instead. But having a car is certainly enough. Having blood is necessary for being alive, but not sufficient. A dead man can have blood; more than blood is required to be alive. But you can't do without it. Being in England is necessary, but not sufficient, for being in London. Being in London is sufficient, but not necessary, for being in England. Given these explanations, there is a symmetry to necessary and sufficient conditions: If *A* is necessary for *B, B* is sufficient for *A.* Indeed, if we take conditions to be statements we can say: When: If *P*, then *Q*, *P* is sufficient for *Q*, and *Q* is necessary for *P*. Philosophers are often interested in finding an *analysis* of some interesting condition. This involves finding a set of conditions that are *individually necessary and jointly sufficient*. If *A, B, C* are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for *D,* then each of *A, B,* and *C* are necessary, and the conjunctive condition *A* & *B* & *C* is sufficient. For example, being a male, being unmarried, and being an adult are (arguably) individually necessary and jointly sufficient for being a bachelor. It is necessary, finally, to distinguish different kinds of necessity and sufficiency. Is the relationship a matter of logic, metaphysics, the

laws of nature, or something else? The necessity of blood for human life, for example, seems a matter of natural or causal necessity, not logic or metaphysics.

Necessarily truth preserving *See* **deductive argument.**

Normative/normativity Normative judgments or statements concern how things should or ought to be, rather than simply how things as a matter of fact are.

Object The term *object* is used in different ways by different philosophers, and one has to be careful when one encounters it. Sometimes it means any sort of things at all, whether abstract or concrete, universal or particular. On this usage numbers, people, rocks, properties, moods, propositions, and facts are all objects. Sometimes it is used for objects of thought. Sometimes it has the connotation of an ordinary material thing.

Omnipotence Omnipotence is one of the traditional attributes of God. In common usage, to say that God is omnipotent is to say that God is "all powerful" or that God can (in some sense) "do anything." However, it has been notoriously difficult to analyze satisfactorily the concept of omnipotence. For instance, it is commonly held that omnipotence must be restricted to what is *logically possible to bring about*. That is, one might think that although God can do anything that is *logically possible,* he cannot do that which is logically impossible; he cannot, say, create a square circle or bring it about that 2 and 2 equals 5. Descartes, however, apparently denied this thesis, holding that God's omnipotence is unrestrained by logical possibility. Other problems associated with the thesis that God is omnipotent involve the question of whether God can sin. If God cannot sin, as has been traditionally held, it appears that there is something that God cannot do, and thus God is not omnipotent. This problem has led various philosophers and theologians to maintain that omnipotence should not be thought to entail the ability to sin, or to deny that omnipotence is a property that ought to belong to the greatest possible being.

Omniscience Omniscience is one of the traditional attributes of God. In common usage, to say that God is omniscient is to say that God is "allknowing" or that God "knows everything." More carefully, a common analysis of omniscience is that a being is omniscient if and only if that being knows all true propositions and believes no false propositions. However, some philosophers have sought to analyze the concept of omniscience in terms of what is *possible* to know. These philosophers argue that a being is omniscient if and only if that being knows all that is *possible* to know.

Ontology *See* **metaphysics**.

Original position *See* **veil of ignorance.**

Paradox A paradox is an argument that appears to derive absurd conclusions from acceptable premises by valid reasoning. Quine distinguishes veridical

paradoxes from falsidical paradoxes and antinomies. In the case of a veridical paradox, the premises are acceptable and the reasoning valid, and we must accept the conclusion, which turns out not to be absurd under close analysis. A falsidical paradox really does have an absurd conclusion, but upon close analysis the premises turn out to be unacceptable or the reasoning invalid. An antinomy defies resolution by close analysis, for the paradox brings to the surface a real problem with part of our conceptual scheme that only revision can eliminate.

Parallelism *See* **dualism**.

Particulars *See* **universals** and **particulars**.

Perceptual relativity, argument from *See* **illusion, argument from**.

Perdurance and **endurance** It certainly seems that objects can lose parts over time without ceasing to exist. In fact, we gain and lose cells at such a rate that we are made up of completely new cells perhaps as quickly as every decade. But this simple fact gives rise to a philosophical puzzle: If I don't right now still have any of the same atoms in my body as those that were there when I was 5 years old, then how can the person writing these words be the same person as that little 5-year-old? What is it for a person to persist through time and change? According to the view called endurance, the relationship between my 15-year-old self and my 5-year-old self is identity. On this view, a single object–me–moves from one instant of time to the next as time passes, leaving nothing behind. According to another answer to this question, which has come to be known as perdurance, I am actually a four-dimensional object, extended not only in the three dimensions of space but in the one dimension of time, as well. Thus I have not only spatial parts–like my right hand and my left hand–but I also have distinct temporal parts– like my 5-year-old self and my 15-year-old self, and so on. According to perdurance, a single object "moves" through time by having a distinct temporal part at each moment of that object's existence.

Personal identity Problems concerning personal identity are about what makes us persons. What are the essential properties of persons, or those properties without which a person would not be a person? What makes one person the same person from one moment to the next? What sorts of changes can a person undergo while still being the same person? Such questions are questions of personal identity. *See also* **perdurance** and **endurance.**

Perversion In general, a perverse act is one that deviates from what is regarded as normal or proper. Typically perversion carries a pejorative tone–to say that something is perverse is to at least suggest that it is bad or wrong. This, though, need not be the case. Various artistic and especially comedic acts are deliberately abnormal–e.g., using a fish as a sword or making a dress out of meat. In such cases the artistic or comedic force comes precisely from the perverse

nature of the action. Thus in calling such acts perverse, we might be merely characterizing or even complimenting rather than criticizing them. Perversions, especially sexual perversions, are often characterized as unnatural. This is to say that the norm the perverse act flouts is in some sense a norm of nature. Nature here might mean the natural world, as opposed to the world of human creations, but it need not. The nature in question might instead refer to the nature or essence of the thing in question. If something is partly defined as the sort of thing it is by its function or purpose, then that purpose is part of its nature. In this sense, any use of the thing that runs counter to that purpose or ignores it entirely would, in that sense, be unnatural and perhaps perverse. For example, a skillet is for cooking–this is its function, and it is the sort of thing it is in virtue of this function. Thus using my skillet to hammer nails runs counter to the essential nature of the skillet. Thus it is in some sense unnatural and perhaps perverse.

Petitio principii The petitio principii is the Latin name for the fallacy of "begging the question." One has committed the fallacy of petitio principii or has "begged the question" (roughly) when one assumes in one's argument what one ought to be (or is trying) to prove. This fallacy is often called the fallacy of *circular argument:* When one assumes what one ought to be (or is) trying to prove, one is relying on the truth of one's conclusion when making one's argument, and is thus arguing "in a circle."

Phenomenal character/qualia *See* **qualia**.

Phenomenology Phenomenology is an approach to some philosophical issues developed by Edmund Husserl and his followers. It conceives of philosophy as the study of phenomena as revealed to consciousness, "bracketing" the assumptions of an orderly external world that are made by science and common sense. Phenomenology emphasizes the intentionality of consciousness. The term *phenomenology* is also used more loosely, to indicate a survey of experience connected with some topic conducted as a preliminary to theorizing. The phenomenology of an experience, in this sense, refers to how an experience seems to the person experiencing it.

Physicalism *See* **materialism**.

Platonism and **platonism** Platonism refers to the philosophy of Plato (428–348 B.C.) and the movements specifically inspired by it. Uncapitalized, platonism has become a technical term in *ontology* for those who countenance abstract entities that are not merely abstractions from or constructions out of particulars, and specifically, in the philosophy of mathematics, for those who maintain that numbers are such objects. Although Plato was a platonist in this sense, most modern platonists do not hold many of Plato's most important doctrines in metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics.

Possible world *See* **contingent** and **necessary**.

Pour-soi *See* **En-soi**.

Practical wisdom (phronesis) Practical wisdom is a virtue–a quality of character–that allows for the proper application of a general, theoretical understanding of morality to particular, concrete cases. Someone has practical wisdom inasmuch as they are able to make competent judgments about ethical matters.

Predicate The term *predicate* traditionally refers to the part of a sentence that characterizes the subject. In "Sally kissed Fred," "Sally" is the subject and "kissed Fred" is the predicate. Philosophers and logicians extend this notion, so that a sentence with one or more *singular terms* removed is a predicate. Predicates are 1-place, 2-place, and so forth, depending on the number of singular terms needed to make a sentence. A predicate is said to be *true of* an object or sequence of objects if a true sentence would result if terms referring to that object or those objects were inserted. From our example, we can get these predicates: 1. (1) kissed Fred. 2. (1) kissed (2) 3. Sally kissed (2) 4. (1) kissed (1). (1) is a 1-place predicate, true of Sally and whoever else has kissed Fred. Predicate (2) is a 2-place predicate, true of the pair of Sally and Fred, and any other pair, the first of which has kissed the second. Number (3) is a 1-place predicate, true of Fred and others Sally has kissed. And (4) is a 1-place predicate, because it only takes one referring expression to complete the sentence, although it must be inserted twice. It is true of people who have kissed themselves. The notion of a predicate does not necessarily fit very well with the categories linguists use to describe the structure of sentences. For example, the words *Sally kissed*, which remain after *Fred* is removed from our sentence, giving predicate (3), are not usually considered a syntactic part of the original sentence.

Premise *See* **deductive argument**.

Presentism *See* **eternalism** and **presentism**.

Primary and **secondary qualities** Locke distinguishes *ideas* from the modifications of bodies that cause ideas in us, which he calls qualities. Among qualities, he distinguishes primary qualities from secondary qualities. Primary qualities include solidity, extension (size), figure (shape), motion, and number. Secondary qualities include colors, sounds, tastes, and smells. According to Locke, primary qualities are inseparable from objects through alteration and division, and resemble the ideas they cause. Secondary qualities are merely powers that objects have, in virtue of the primary qualities of their insensible parts, to produce ideas in us. So when we see that a poker chip has a certain shape, an idea is being produced in us that resembles the quality involved in its production, and the poker chip will continue to have some shape or other even if it is bent or melted; if it is divided its

parts will have shape. When we see that the chip has a certain color, however, we are having an idea that is caused by the primary qualities of the surface of the chip, qualities that do not resemble the idea. If we divided the chip, at some point the parts would be too small to produce any color ideas at all and would be colorless. Locke's distinction, versions of which can be found in Descartes, Galileo, and Boyle, has been a source of controversy since he first proposed it. A favorite target of critics is the idea of a quality resembling an idea, which is not easy to make much sense of. Berkeley makes this criticism and others in his *Dialogues*.

Principle of alternate possibilities In Harry Frankfurt's article, "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility," he formulates this principle as the claim that a person is morally responsible for what he or she has done only if he or she could have done otherwise. The idea that this principle attempts to capture is related to the "garden of forking paths" picture described in Peter van Inwagen's article, "The Powers of Rational Beings: Freedom of the Will."

Principle of Utility *See* **utilitarianism**.

Problem of other minds The problem of how (and whether) one can know that other minds exist besides one's own. For discussion, see Russell's "The Argument from Analogy for Other Minds."

Properties and **relations** Consider these three facts: 1. Nixon was born in California. 2. Carter was born in Georgia. 3. Nixon was older than Carter. These facts have different things in common with one another. Facts 1 and 3 are about the same people, Nixon and Carter, but involve different relations. Facts 1 and 2 are about different *individuals*, but involve the same relation. The relation involved in 1 and 2 is *being born in*. This is a relation between people and places. Philosophers might say that 1 states that the relation *being born in* obtains between Nixon and California, 2 states that it obtains between Carter and Georgia, and 3 states that the relation *older than* obtains between Nixon and Carter. Being born in and being older than are both binary or 2-ary relations: relations that obtain between two objects. Three important properties of 2-ary relations are *transitivity*, *symmetry*, and *reflexivity*. Suppose that *R* is a 2-ary relation. Then: • *R* is *transitive* if it follows from the fact that *a* has *R* to *b* and *b* has *R* to *c* that *a* has *R* to *c*. For example, *being longer than* is a transitive relation: If *a* is longer than *b* and *b* is longer then *c*, then *a* is longer than *c*. However, *liking* is not transitive: From the fact that Bob likes Mary, and Mary likes Carol, it does not follow that Bob likes Carol. • *R* is *symmetrical* if it follows from the fact that *a* has *R* to *b* that *b* has *R* to *a. Being a sibling of* is symmetrical; *being a brother of* is not. • *R* is *reflexive* if it follows from that fact that *a* has *R* to *b* that *a* has *R* to *a*. If Bob is the same height as anyone at all–if he is the sort of thing that has height at all–then he is the same height as himself. Relations that are transitive, symmetrical, and reflexive are

equivalence relations. There are also 3- ary relations, and in principle there are *n*-ary relations for any *n*. When we say, "Nebraska City is between Omaha and Topeka," we are stating that a 3-place relation obtains among three cities. It is often useful to use variables to indicate the places of relations, so the relation here is *x is between y and z*. It is sometimes useful to talk about the *arguments* or *parameters* of a relation. Thus one could say that the place argument (or parameter) of the relation of being born in was filled in 1 by California and in 2 by Georgia. In the example in the last paragraph, we might say that Topeka filled the *z* argument of the relation of *x is between y and z*. When we say that a person is old, or tired, or silly, we are not saying something about a relation he or she stands in to someone or something else, but stating a property that he or she has or doesn't have by himself or herself. Properties are 1-ary relations. So far we have been ignoring time. Consider 4: 4. Carter lives in Georgia. Number 4 is true now, but wasn't true when Carter was president and lived in Washington, D.C. It seems that living in is really a 3-ary relation, among people, places, and times, even though it looks like a 2-ary relation. Similarly, because people can be old, tired, or silly at one time, while being young, energetic, and serious at others, these are all really 2-ary rather than 1-ary relations. When we take time into account, we need to think of most properties as 2-ary relations between individuals and times.

Property dualism *See* **dualism**.

Proposition Consider the report, "Russell said that Hegel was confused." The phrase "that Hegel was confused" identifies a proposition, which was *what Russell said*. Others could assert the same proposition, and it could also be believed, doubted, denied, and the like. We could say, "Taylor doubted that Hegel was confused," "Moore believed that Hegel was confused," and so forth. It seems that the same proposition could be expressed in other languages, so a proposition is not just a particular sentence type. A proposition is an abstract object that has conditions of truth, and it is true or false depending on whether those conditions are met. Propositions are identified by statements and are referred to by "thatclauses," like "that Hegel was confused." The existence and ontological status of propositions are matters of controversy. Some philosophers believe that propositions are mysterious entities that should be avoided; we should get by just talking about sentences that are true, without bringing in propositions. Among philosophers who accept the need for propositions, some think they should be defined in terms of properties, facts, possible worlds, and other more basic categories, whereas others think they are primitive.

Propositional attitude The propositional attitudes are those mental acts and states, such as belief, knowledge, and desire, that have truth or satisfaction conditions, so that they may be characterized by the propositions that capture those

conditions. We say, for example, "Russell believed *that Hegel was confused,*" characterizing Russell's belief by a proposition that captures its truth conditions. And we say that Russell desired that *there would be no more wars,* thereby characterizing Russell's desire by a proposition that captures its satisfaction conditions.

Pyrrhonism Unless used in specialized historical contexts, Pyrrhonism is synonymous with *skepticism*. *See* **sceptic, skeptic**.

Qualia Consider what it is like to have a headache and how it feels. It is somewhat different from what it is like to have a toothache, and vastly different from what it is like to taste a chocolate chip cookie. We try to avoid headaches because of what it is like to have them, and we try to find and eat chocolate chip cookies, because of what it is like to taste them. What it is like to have a certain kind of experience is one aspect of that experience. Philosophers call such aspects *qualia*. Other terms that are used more or less similarly are *subjective characters,* and *phenomenal characters*. Philosophers such as Thomas Nagel in "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" and Frank Jackson in "What Mary Didn't Know" claim that the qualia or subjective characters of mental events and states cannot be identified with or reduced to physical aspects of those events and states. Thus even if we suppose that headaches *are* brain states, we have to admit that these brain states have nonphysical properties, their qualia. If we accept the arguments of Nagel and Jackson, we seem to have to accept some form of *dualism*. Minds may not be immaterial *things,* but at least they have immaterial *properties,* such as being in states with certain conscious aspects or qualia. David Lewis, in "Knowing What It's Like," claims that qualia can be handled by the physicalist.

Qualities *See* **primary** and **secondary qualities**.

Rationalism Rationalism is an epistemological position that emphasizes reason as a source of knowledge itself, not merely a way of organizing and drawing further hypotheses from knowledge gotten by sense perception. *Continental rationalism* is a term sometimes applied to Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and other seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury philosophers. *See also* **empiricism**.

Realism In philosophy the term *realism* is used in a context of controversy in which the reality of objects of some category has been denied in some way, usually by claiming that the objects in question are creations or constructions of the human mind. The realist in the controversy is one who defends the status of the controversial objects. A philosopher can be a realist about one issue, while denying realism with respect to some other. The two most common contexts in which the term is used are universals and the objects of sense perception. A realist about universals holds that they are real, in the sense of not being mere names or

concepts. A realist about the objects of sense perception holds that they are real, in the sense of enjoying an existence independent of the perceiving mind. *Naive realism* is the view that the objects of perception not only exist, but exist just as they seem to be. This position is often taken to be refuted by the various forms of the argument from illusion. *See* **illusion, argument from; representative ideas, theory of**.

Reason Reason is the ability or faculty to engage in theoretical and practical reasoning. A number of philosophical issues are concerned with the role of reason in various spheres of human life. *Rationalists* and *empiricists* disagree about the role of reason in the formation of concepts and the development of knowledge, the latter seeing it only as an aid to experience. Kant supposed that there were fundamental principles of conduct provided by practical reason, whereas Hume argued that in the practical sphere reason "is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions." *See* **reasoning, practical** and **theoretical**.

Reasoning, practical and **theoretical** Theoretical reasoning is aimed at assessing evidence and drawing conclusions about what is true. Practical reasoning is aimed at making decisions about what to do.

Reasons-responsiveness This is a family of ideas that specify that an agent (or an agent acting on a particular mechanism) has (or exhibits) a capacity to identify and act in accordance with reasons for action. Reasons are typically thought to be considerations that count in favor of actions. So a reasons-responsive agent (or mechanism) is capable of identifying and acting in accordance with considerations that count in favor of actions. Some philosophers (including J.M. Fischer, S. Wolf, and R.J. Wallace) have given accounts of moral responsibility in terms of reasons-responsiveness.

Reciprocity Engaging in reciprocity involves, as it were, 'returning the favor.' When we help others as we have been helped we are engaging in a reciprocal relationship.

Reductio ad absurdum Literally translated from Latin, this phrase means "reduction to the absurd." It is a form of argument in which some statement is shown to be true because its denial has obviously false consequences. For instance, suppose we are trying to establish that *p* is true. To argue for *p* by reductio ad absurdum would be to argue that the denial of *p* leads to the obviously false statement *q*. But because *q* is obviously false, it must have been wrong to deny *p* in the first place–so, *p* must be true.

Reductionism In philosophy the term *reductionism* occurs in the context of a controversy about the status of some kind of object. The reductionist maintains that talk and knowledge about such objects really amount to talk and knowledge about some class of objects that is usually thought to be quite different. Talk and

knowledge about the first kind of object are *reduced* to talk and knowledge about the second kind. For example, Berkeley thought that talk and knowledge about ordinary objects were really just talk and knowledge about ideas. A philosopher can be a reductionist about some categories of objects while being a nonreductionist about others.

Refers Philosophers use a number of terms for the relationship that holds between singular terms and the objects they designate or stand for. *Refers* is used both for the relation between singular terms and what they stand for, and for the act of using a singular term to stand for something ("'That piece of furniture' refers to the chair" vs. "Jane used 'that piece of furniture' to refer to the chair.") The thing referred to is often called the *referent. Denotes* is most properly used for the relation between a definite description and the object that uniquely meets the descriptive part, as in "'The author of *Waverley*' denotes Sir Walter Scott." But *denotes* is often simply used as a synonym of *refers*. The thing denoted is sometimes called the *denotation* and, less often, the *denotatum. Names* is used for the relation between a name and its *bearer* (or *nominatum*), as in "'Fred' names that man." *Designate* and *stands for* are used in a very general way, as the latter has been in this discussion. *See also* **extension** and **intension**; **singular term**.

Reflective equilibrium In the course of theorizing, one often has to make some sort of compromise between general principles and considered judgments about particular cases. Sometimes general principles will need to be amended in the light of conflicting considered judgments, and sometimes judgments will need to be revised in the light of otherwise successful general principles. To arrive at a balance between the two is to achieve reflective equilibrium. For more details and further discussion, see John Rawls, "A Theory of Justice."

Relation of ideas *See* **matters of fact** and **relations of ideas**.

Relativism The term *relativism* is used with reference to a body of statements or alleged truths about some sort of phenomena. The relativist maintains that these statements (1) are only true (or false) *relative* to some further factor or parameter, not explicitly mentioned in the statements themselves; (2) that this parameter is a person or group of people making the judgment, or something corresponding to a group of people such as a culture or a language; (3) hence there is no *objective* truth or falsity; that is, no truth or falsity merely concerning the objects involved in the phenomena independently of the subjects making those judgments. (In the terms explained in *properties* and *relations,* the relativist is claiming that an *n*-ary property is being treated as an (*n*-1)-ary property.) Here is an example where relativism is pretty plausible. Consider the comparative merits of the taste of food. Does the issue of whether carrots taste better or worse than cucumbers have an answer? The relativist, with regard to this issue, would say that there is an answer

only *relative* to a particular taster. Carrots may taste better than cucumbers *to* Mary, whereas cucumbers taste better than carrots *to* Fred. The relativist would say that there is no *further* question of who is right. The question whether carrots taste better than cucumbers *simpliciter*, without further reference to a person who does the tasting, makes no sense. On the relativist view, the judgments of Fred and Mary are misconstrued if they are taken to be opinions about some nonrelative truth. Because taste is relative, there should be no room for such a dispute. There are many types of relativism that are more controversial and so more interesting than relativism about the taste of food. *Ontological relativists* claim that existence is relative: that different languages, cultures, or conceptual schemes recognize different classes of objects and properties, and questions of existence make no sense considered outside of such *conceptual schemes*. Perhaps the most interesting example is *ethical relativism*. Ethical relativists claim that judgments of right and wrong are relative to individuals, societies, or cultures.

Representative ideas, theory of The theory of representative ideas maintains that knowledge of external things is mediated by ideas in the mind of the knower that represent those things in virtue of a twofold relation they have to them. The ideas are *caused by* the external things, and *depict* those external things as having certain properties. Suppose, for example, one perceives a chair in front of one. The chair causes light to fall on the retina in a certain pattern, which causes other events in the visual system, which ultimately cause ideas of a certain sort in the mind. These ideas have certain features, which depict the object causing it to be a chair of a certain sort. This theory allows an account of error and a treatment of the *argument from perceptual relativity* and the *argument from illusion*. The argument from perceptual relativity shows that which thing an idea represents and how it depicts that object to be do not depend just on the features of the idea, but also auxiliary beliefs. The same visual image might represent an object as elliptical or circular, depending on whether it was taken to be held at a right angle or acute angle to the line of vision. Normal errors and illusions occur when the idea caused by a thing does not accurately depict it, either because the auxiliary beliefs are wrong, or something unusual in the perceiving conditions or the perceiver's state leads to a wrong idea being produced. The more radical types of error involved in certain kinds of delusions, such as hallucinations, involve having an idea that is not caused by an external thing at all, but some disorder in the perceiver. Fairly explicit versions of the theory of representative ideas may be found in Descartes and Locke. Berkeley, Hume, and others have criticized the theory for various reasons, including that it leads to *skepticism*, as, it seems to provide no direct means of knowing the external objects, that the notion of depiction makes no sense, and that the whole picture of "double existence" is incoherent.

Revealed religion *See* **natural religion**.

Sceptic, skeptic *Skeptic* is an American spelling, *sceptic* the British. When a view is labeled *skeptical*, there are two things that must be ascertained, the type of skepticism and its topic. The skeptic can be advocating suspension of claims of knowledge or certainty, suspension of belief, or positive disbelief. Hume, for example, thinks that we cannot *know* through reason that the future will be like the past, but does not claim we should refrain from believing it; indeed, he thinks it is both natural to do so and impossible not to do so except for brief periods while doing philosophy. He describes this position as skeptical. Whatever type of skepticism is being advocated, a philosopher can be skeptical about some things and not others. For example, a philosopher might be skeptical about the existence of God, but not about the external world.

Second-order desires *See* **second-order volitions**.

Second-order volitions The theory of freedom that Harry Frankfurt constructs in his "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person" relies on the idea that our desires are structured hierarchically. On the first order, we desire objects or states of affairs in the world. For instance, my desire to have another cup of coffee is a first-order desire. But humans have enough psychological complexity to have second-order desires, as well, which are preferences in favor of or against having certain first-order desires. So, perhaps the only reason I desire another cup of coffee is that I'm addicted to caffeine, but I would rather not be addicted. In this situation, although I may have a first-order desire for another cup of coffee, I have a second-order desire not to have the desire for another cup of coffee. Roughly, to figure out what your first-order desires are, ask yourself, "What do I want?" To figure out what your second-order desires are, ask yourself, "What do I want to want?" In theory, the hierarchy of desires has no end (there can be third- and fourth-order desires as well), but after two or three the structure is quite difficult to think about clearly. Second-order volitions, as Frankfurt uses the term, are special sorts of second-order desires. Some second-order desires are simply desires to have a particular first-order desire. But others are desires that some particular first-order desire effectively move the agent to action. In other words, whereas sometimes we merely want to have certain first-order desires, other times we want those first-order desires actually to move us to act. These latter sorts of second-order desires are what Frankfurt calls second-order volitions. Frankfurt dubs creatures who lack second-order volitions *wantons.*

Secondary qualities *See* **primary** and **secondary qualities**.

Semicompatibilism Semicompatibilism is the doctrine that causal determinism is compatible with moral responsibility, quite apart from the issue of whether causal determinism is compatible with freedom to do otherwise. The view

presupposes that moral responsibility does not require freedom to do otherwise. (The term was first introduced by J.M. Fischer.)

Sense-data Some philosophers who accept that the various forms of the argument from illusion show that we do not directly perceive material objects, use the terms *sense-datum* and *sense-data* for what we do directly perceive. Unlike the terms *idea* or *sensation,* the term *sense-data* does not imply that the direct objects of perception are mental, but leaves that question open. Sense-data are objects of some sort, distinguished from the act of being aware of them. Sense-data are usually supposed to have all of the properties they seem to have. Suppose, for example, you see a blue tie in a store with fluorescent lighting, it looks green, and you take it to be so. A philosopher who believes in sensedata would say that you are directly aware of a sense-datum that is green; your mistake is in your inference from the fact about the sensedatum's color to the tie's color. **sex** Sex can refer to various forms of intimate, erotic activity. Exactly which activities of this sort are, properly speaking, sex is a matter of controversy, both in philosophy and elsewhere.

Simplicity Simplicity is a property traditionally attributed to God. Roughly, a being is simple if and only if that being lacks parts or composition. The doctrine of divine simplicity is very controversial; philosophers not only do not agree about whether God is simple, but do not agree about what the doctrine of divine simplicity means or entails. Classical theists such as Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas have defended the doctrine of divine simplicity. Of course, simplicity (lacking parts or internal structure) is a property that can be possessed by entities other than God.

Singular term Singular terms include proper names (John, Fred), singular definite descriptions (the author of *Waverley*, the present king of France, the square root of two), singular pronouns (I, you, she, he, it), and singular demonstrative phrases (that man, this ship). These terms all identify or purport to identify a particular object, about which something further is said. The category *singular term* is found in philosophy and philosophical logic more than in linguistics. The category includes expressions that are syntactically quite different, like definite descriptions and names, and separates things that syntactically seem closely related, like singular and plural definite descriptions ("the governor of Maryland," "the senators from Maryland").

Solipsism Solipsism is the thesis that only the self exists, or (alternatively) that only the self can be known to exist. Solipsism is one radical solution to the "problem of other minds," the problem of how it is that one can know that any minds besides one's own exist. According to the solipsist, one can't know that the (apparent) persons one interacts with actually have mental lives like one's own.

Sophism A sophism is a bad argument presented as if it were a good one to deceive, mislead, or cheat someone; *sophistry* is the practice of doing this. In Ancient Greece, the sophists were itinerant teachers of the fourth and fifth centuries B.C., some of whom, such as Protagoras and Gorgias, Socrates criticized vigorously. His negative view was based on the empiricism, relativism, and skepticism of their teachings; on the fact that they took a fee; and on the fact that they taught argument for the sake of persuasion and manipulation of others, rather than for the pursuit of truth.

Sound *See* **deductive argument**.

State of nature The state of nature is the hypothetical situation in which human beings would find themselves without the existence of any government or state that can exercise coercive force over them. **s**

Ubjective character *See* **qualia**.

Subspecie aeternitatis Literally, this phrase is translated as "under the aspect of eternity." It is used in roughly the same way as the phrase "from a God's-eye point of view" and is meant to indicate an impersonal, detached, and objective view of the world and its goings-on. Thomas Nagel invokes this notion while discussing the meaning of life in "The Absurd."

Substance The term *substance* has been used in a variety of ways in philosophy. In modern philosophy, a substance is a thing capable of independent existence. Substances are contrasted with qualities and relations, on the one hand, and complexes, on the other. These are all merely ways that substances are. Philosophers have had dramatically different opinions about what meets these conditions. Descartes thought that there were two basically different kinds of substance, material and immaterial, and there were many of each, and that no way of being material was a way of being mental and vice versa. Spinoza thought that there was but one substance, and material and mental reality were aspects of it. (He called this thing *God*, although many of his opponents thought his view amounted to atheism.) In "Of Scepticism with Regard to the Senses," Hume treats our perceptions as substances–the ultimate, independent constituents of reality.

Supererogation If you ought to do some action, then it is *obligatory*. If some action is not obligatory but would nevertheless be good to do, then it is supererogatory. Many think that to give money to famine relief, for instance, is to go "above and beyond" one's obligations and hence is to perform an action that is supererogatory. For a challenge to this view of giving money to famine relief, however, see Peter Singer's "Famine, Affluence, and Morality."

Supervenience A set of properties *A* supervenes on another set of properties *B*, if all objects with the same *B*-properties have the same *A*-properties. Many advocates of *functionalism* maintain that although mental properties cannot be

identified with physical properties (as the *identity theory* holds), they nevertheless *supervene* on them. Both the identity theorist and the supervenience theorist maintain that beings that are physically indiscernible will have the same mental properties. But the supervenience theorist allows that beings that are mentally alike, may be quite different physically. For example, a philosopher might think that agents built out of silicon-based computers, humans, and individuals from outer space with a completely different biology than ours could all have beliefs, desires, and intentions, in spite of the difference of their physical constitution and organization.

Syllogism A syllogism is a valid deductive argument or argument form with two premises and a conclusion, that involves universal and existential statements involving three terms. For example: All *As* are *Bs*. All *Bs* are *Cs*. Therefore, all *As* are *Cs*. Some *As* are *Bs*. No *Bs* are *Cs*. Therefore some *As* are not *Cs*. In these examples, *B* is the *middle term;* it appears in the premises to connect the terms in the conclusion, but does not itself appear in the conclusion. *A* is the *minor term* because it is the subject of the conclusion and *C* is the *major term* because it is the predicate of the conclusion. Much of the theory of syllogism was worked out by Aristotle. The class of valid deductive arguments studied in modern logic is much larger.

Synthetic *See* **analytic** and **synthetic**.

Teleological ethics *See* **consequentialism**.

Teleology/teleological *See* **final causation**.

Theodicy A philosophical response on the part of a believer to the *problem of evil*.

Transeunt causation *See* **agent-causation**.

Transitive *See* **properties** and **relations**.

Turing machine A Turing machine is not a real machine one can go out and buy, but an abstract conception invented by A. M. Turing to help think about computing and computers. The machine scans a square on a tape, erases what it finds there, prints something new, moves to a new square, and goes into a new state. What it prints, where it moves, and into what state it goes are all determined by the state in which it was in the beginning and what it found on the square. Computer scientists and logicians have shown that Turing machines–given enough time and tape–can compute any function that any computer can compute.

Types and **tokens** How many words are in this statement? An argument is an argument, but a good cigar is a smoke. There are twelve word tokens, but only eight word types. There are two tokens each of the word types “an,” “argument,” “is,” and “a” and one each of “but,” “good,” “cigar,” and “smoke.” The types are *universals,* whereas the tokens are *particulars*.

Uniformity of nature The principle of the uniformity of nature maintains that the same basic patterns or laws are found throughout nature; the future will be like the past, at least in terms of the basic operations of nature; and more generally the unexamined parts of nature will be like the parts that have been examined up to a certain point. This principle seems to underlie the use of past experience to form expectations about the future, but, according to Hume, it isn't itself susceptible of proof. The principle is discussed by Hume and Hempel; Goodman's new riddle of induction poses a puzzle about how this principle is to be understood.

Universal causation, principle of The principle of universal causation holds that all events have causes, though not necessarily deterministic causes. *See also* **determinism**.

Universals and **particulars** A particular is what we would ordinarily think of as a thing, with a particular position in space at any one time. A universal is that which particulars have in common, or may have in common. The kind, *human,* is a universal; individual people are particulars. *Types* are universals, *tokens* are particulars. Properties such as being red are universals; philosophers disagree about whether it is red things (roses, barns) that have them in common, or particular cases of the property (the redness of the rose, the redness of the barn). Not all philosophers agree that there are universals. *Nominalists* maintain that universals are just names that we apply to different objects that resemble one another; metaphysics should recognize particulars that resemble each other in various ways, but not universals above and beyond those particulars. A nominalist might claim that the type–token distinction really amounts to providing two ways of counting tokens, not two kinds of object to be counted.

Use and **mention** Ordinarily when a word appears in a statement, it is being used to talk about something else. If one wants to talk about the word itself, one has to mention it. In the statement, The word "four" has four letters, "four" is mentioned the first time it occurs and used the second time it occurs. When a word is mentioned, one may be talking about the *token* or the *type*.

Utilitarianism Utilitarianism is a *consequentialist* ethical theory. Utilitarianism is usually connected with the more specific doctrines of Bentham and Mill, who took the goodness of consequences to be measured by their effect on the happiness or welfare of sentient creatures. (This is sometimes referred to as the principle of Utility or the Greatest Happiness Principle.) Bentham focused on pleasure, Mill on a more abstract notion of happiness that allowed him to maintain that "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied." For further discussion, see the Introduction to Part V.

Valid *See* **deductive argument**.

Veil of ignorance The term *veil of ignorance* is sometimes used to characterize the skeptical consequences of the *theory of representative ideas*. According to this theory, we only directly know the contents of our own mind; these then form a sort of veil between us and the external world. This term is also often used in religion, to suggest a fundamental feature of the human condition: All of experience is simply a veil of ignorance between us and what is most real, or matters most. The term was given a new use in ethics by John Rawls, as an important part of his characterization of the *original position*. The original position is a hypothetical state of affairs in which members of a society choose the principles of justice that will govern them. This choice is to be made behind a veil of ignorance in the sense that the persons making this choice are not to know their class, position, social class, intelligence, strength, and so forth. The underlying intuition is that by being ignorant of these specifics, these individuals will be led to make an impartial and fair choice.

Verificationism Although it comes in many varieties, verificationism is characterized by a general distrust of claims that cannot be shown to be true, or verified, using only empirical methods like those available to the natural sciences. Many held that because the claims of ethics, metaphysics, and religion cannot be empirically verified, they are meaningless. Although this view of meaning is largely discredited today, it was highly influential in the early twentieth century.

Virtue ethics *See* **virtue theory**.

Virtue theory (virtue ethics) This is an approach to ethical theory that is frequently traced to Aristotle and contrasted with approaches drawn from, for example, Kant and Mill. A virtue theory highlights questions about the nature of those character traits that are virtues–for example, courage. Such questions are seen as in some way fundamental to the theory.

Wanton *See* **second-order volitions**.

APPENDIX 6

Top 10 Greatest Philosophers in History

This list examines the influence, depth of insight and wide-reaching interest across many subjects of various "lovers of wisdom," and ranks them accordingly. It should be noted, first and foremost, that philosophy in its traditional sense was science – philosophers (like Aristotle) used rationality to come to scientific knowledge of the world around us. It was not until relatively modern times that philosophy was considered to be separate from the physical sciences.

1. Aristotle.

Aristotle topped another of this lister's lists, heading the category of philosophy, so his rank on this one is not entirely surprising. But consider that Aristotle is the first to have written systems by which to understand and criticize everything from pure logic to ethics, politics, literature, even science. He theorized that there are four "causes", or qualities, of any thing in existence: the material cause, which is what the subject is made of; the formal cause, or the arrangement of the subject's material; the effective cause, the creator of the thing; and the final cause, which is the purpose for which a subject exists.

That all may sound perfectly obvious and not worth arguing over, but since it would take far too long for the purpose of a top ten list to expound on classical causality, suffice to say that all philosophers since Aristotle have had something to say on the matter, and absolutely everything that has been said, and perhaps can be said, is, or must be, based on Aristotle's system of it: it is impossible to discuss causality without using or trying to debunk Aristotle's ideas.

Aristotle is also the first person in Western history to argue that there is a hierarchy to all life in the Universe; that because Nature never did anything unnecessary as he observed, then in the same way, this animal is in charge of that animal and likewise with plants and animals together. His so-called "ladder of life" has eleven rungs, at the top of which are humans. The Medieval Christian theorists ran with this idea, extrapolating it to the hierarchy of God with Man, including angels. Thus, the angelic hierarchy of Catholicism, usually thought as a purely Catholic notion, stems from Aristotle, who lived and died before Jesus was born. Aristotle was, in fact, at the very heart of the classical education system used through the Medieval western world.

Aristotle had something to say on just about every subject, whether abstract or concrete, and modern philosophy almost always bases every single principle, idea,

notion or “discovery” on a teaching of Aristotle. His principles of ethics were founded on the concept of doing good, rather than merely being good. A person may be kind, merciful, charitable, etc., but until he proves this by helping others, his goodness means precisely nothing to the world, in which case it means nothing to himself. We could go on about Aristotle, of course, but this list has gone on long enough. Honorable mentions are very many, so list them as you like.

2. Plato.

Plato lived from c. 428 to c. 348 BC, and founded the Western world’s first school of higher education, the Academy of Athens. Almost all of Western philosophy can be traced back to Plato, who was taught by Socrates, and preserved through his own writings, some of Socrates’ ideas. If Socrates wrote anything down, it has not survived directly. Plato and Xenophon, another of his students, recounted a lot of his teachings, as did the playwright Aristophanes.

One of Plato’s most famous quotations concerns politics, “Until philosophers rule as kings or those who are now called kings and leading men genuinely and adequately philosophize, that is, until political power and philosophy entirely coincide, while the many natures who at present pursue either one exclusively are forcibly prevented from doing so, cities will have no rest from evils…nor, I think, will the human race”. What he means is that any person(s) in control of a nation or city or city-state must be wise, and that if they are not, then they are ineffectual rulers. It is only through philosophy that the world can be free of evils. Plato’s preferred government was one of benevolent aristocrats, those born of nobility, who are well educated and good, who help the common people to live better lives. He argued against democracy proper, rule by the people themselves, since in his view, a democracy had murdered his teacher, Socrates.

Plato’s most enduring theory, if not his political theories, is that of “The Forms”. Plato wrote about these forms throughout many of his works, and asserted, by means of them, that immaterial abstractions possess the highest, most fundamental kind of reality. All things of the material world can change, and our perception of them also, which means that the reality of the material world is weaker, less defined than that of the immaterial abstractions. Plato argued that something must have created the Universe. Whatever it is, the Universe is its offspring, and we, living on Earth, our bodies and everything that we see and hear and touch around us, are less real than the creator of the Universe, and the Universe itself. This is a foundation on which #4 based his understanding of existentialism.

THE VISIBLE WORLD	THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD
The visible world consists of the things below the (main) line in the metaphor of the Divided Line: physical objects and their images, shadows and reflections.	The intelligible world consists of the things above the (main) line in the metaphor of the Divided line: images and Forms.
Physical objects are constantly changing (in flux, to use the Heraclitean term). They are transient and ephemeral.	The Forms are unchanging and eternal.
Physical objects are less real than the Forms. Physical objects get what reality they have by their participation in the Forms.	The Forms are what really exists; the physical world is a kind of shadow or reflection of the world of the Forms.
We learn about physical objects empirically, by means of the sen-ses: we look at them, taste them, listen to them, and so on. But none of the information we gain in this way is reliable or trustworthy: we don't have real knowledge of the visible world, just mere 'opinion'.	We learn about the Forms not by means of the sense but by means of Reason. We don't need to look at the Forms or listen to them; indeed we cannot do so. We figure out what they are by thinking about them. Empirical evidence is at best irrelevant, at worst misleading.
In a sense, though, knowledge of the forms also enables us to better understand the visible world. When we understand the Forms, we know what the visible world is a pale imitation of (as the person who returns to the cave better understands the shadows on the wall by virtue of knowing what they are shadows of).	
The sun is what allows us to see physical objects.	The Good is what allows us to understand the Forms. (This is why the genuinely just person can't be a creep. We're just to the extent that our appetites and our reason are both

	properly developed and work together harmoniously. But when reason is developed, it makes us aware of the Good, and – Plato thinks – we can't know the Good without wanting to do it. So unless we do the good, we will inevitably be in inner turmoil).
We have parts corresponding to the two worlds. Our physical bodies are a part of the visible world. Our bodies are responsible for our appetites. Our sense organs, by means of which we learn about the visible world, are also part of our physical body.	But there's also another part of us which links us with the eternal realm of the Forms, namely our soul (which for Plato is more or less identical with our reason). So one result of coming to learn about the Forms is that we will become less concerned with physical matters; we will be less governed by our appetites and less reliant on our unreliable senses for knowledge.

3. Paul of Tarsus.

The wild card of this list, but give him fair consideration. Paul accomplished more with the few letters we have of his, to various churches in Asia Minor, Israel and Rome, than any other mortal person in the Bible, except Jesus himself. Jesus founded Christianity. But without Paul, the religion would have died in a few hundred years at best, or remained too insular to invite the entire world into its faith, as Jesus wanted.

Paul had more than one falling out with Peter, primarily among the other Disciples. Peter insisted that at least one or two of the Jewish traditions remain as requirements, along with faith in Jesus, for one to be counted as Christian. Paul insisted that faith in Jesus is all that is required, and neither circumcision, refusal of certain foods or any other Jewish custom was necessary, because the world was now, and forevermore, under a state of Grace in Jesus, not a state of Law according to Moses. This principle of a state of grace, which is now central to all sects of Christianity, was Paul's idea (if not Jesus's), as was the concept of God's moral law (in Ten Commandments) being innately understood by all men once they reach the age of reason, by which law God will hold all men accountable on his Day of Judgment.

He is especially impressive to have systematized these principles flawlessly, having never met Jesus in person, and in direct opposition to Peter and several other Disciples. Many theologists and experts on Christianity and its history even

call Paul, and not Jesus, the founder of Christianity. That may be going a bit too far, but keep in mind that the Disciples intended to keep Christianity for themselves, as the proper form of Judaism, to which only Jews could convert. Anyone could symbolically become a Jew by circumcision and obedience of the Mosaic Laws (every one of them, not just the Big Ten). Paul argued against this, stating that as Christ was the absolute greatest good that the world would ever see, and Almighty because he and the Father are one, then the grace of Christ is sufficiently powerful to save anyone from his or her sin, whether Jewish, Gentile or anything else. If the religion were to have lasted to present day without Paul's letters championing the grace of Christ over the Law of Moses, Christianity would just a minor sect of Judaism.

4. Rene Descartes.

Descartes lived from 1596 to 1650, and today he is referred to as "the Father of Modern Philosophy". He created analytical geometry, based on his now immortal Cartesian coordinate system, immortal in the sense that we are all taught it in school, and that it is still perfectly up-to-date in almost all branches of mathematics. Analytical geometry is the study of geometry using algebra and the Cartesian coordinate system. He discovered the laws of refraction and reflection. He also invented the superscript notation still used today to indicate the powers of exponents.

He advocated dualism, which is very basically defined as the power of the mind over the body: strength is derived by ignoring the weaknesses of the human physique and relying on the infinite power of the human mind. Descartes' most famous statement, now practically the motto of existentialism: "Je pense donc je suis"; "Cogito, ergo sum"; "I think, therefore I am". This is not meant to prove the existence of one's body. Quite the opposite, it is meant to prove the existence of one's mind. He rejected perception as unreliable, and considered deduction the only reliable method for examining, proving and disproving anything.

He also adhered to the Ontological Argument for the Existence of a Christian God, stating that, because God is benevolent, Descartes can have some faith in the account of reality his senses provide him, for God has provided him with a working mind and sensory system and does not desire to deceive him. From this supposition, however, Descartes finally establishes the possibility of acquiring knowledge about the world based on deduction and perception. In terms of the study of knowledge therefore, he can be said to have contributed such ideas as a rigorous conception of foundationalism (basic beliefs) and the possibility that reason is the only reliable method of attaining knowledge.

5. Confucius.

Master Kong Qiu, as his name translates from Chinese, lived from 551 to 479 BC, and remains the most important single philosopher in Eastern history. He espoused significant principles of ethics and politics, in a time when the Greeks were espousing the same things. We think of democracy as a Greek invention, a Western idea, but Confucius wrote in his Analects that "the best government is one that rules through 'rites' and the people's natural morality, rather than by using bribery and coercion". This may sound obvious to us today, but he wrote it in the early 500s to late 400s BC. It is the same principle of democracy that the Greeks argued for and developed: the people's morality is in charge; therefore, rule by the people.

Confucius defended the idea of an Emperor, but also advocated limitations to the emperor's power. The emperor must be honest and his subjects must respect him, but he must also deserve that respect. If he makes a mistake, his subjects must offer suggestions to correct him, and he must consider them. Any ruler who acted contrary to these principles was a tyrant, and thus a thief more than a ruler.

Confucius also devised his own, independent version of the Golden Rule, which had existed for at least a century in Greece before him. His phrasing was almost identical, but then furthered the idea: "What one does not wish for oneself, one ought not to do to anyone else; what one recognizes as desirable for oneself, one ought to be willing to grant to others". The first statement is in the negative, and constitutes a passive desire not to harm others. The second statement is much more important, constituting an active desire to help others. The only other philosopher of antiquity to advocate the Golden Rule in the positive form is Jesus of Nazareth.

6. Thomas Aquinas.

Thomas will forever be remembered as the guy who supposedly proved the existence of God by arguing that the Universe had to have been created by something, since everything in existence has a beginning and an end. This is now referred to as the "First Cause" argument, and all philosophers after Thomas have wrestled with proving or disproving the theory. He actually based it on the notion. The Greek means "one who moves while not moving" – or "the unmoved mover".

Thomas founded everything he postulated firmly in Christianity, and for this reason, he is not universally popular, today. Even Christians consider that, since he derived all his ethical teachings from the Bible, Thomas is not independently authoritative of any of those teachings. But his job, in teaching the common people around him, was to get them to understand ethics without all the abstract philosophy. He expounded on principles of what we now call "cardinal virtues":

justice, courage, prudence and temperance. He was able to reach the masses with this simple, four-part instruction.

He made five famous arguments for the existence of God, which are still discussed hotly on both sides: theist and atheist. Of those five, which he intended to define the nature of God, one is called "the unity of God", which is to say that God is not divisible. He has essence and existence, and these two qualities cannot be separated. Thus, if we are able to express something as possessing two or more qualities, and cannot separate the qualities, then the statement itself proves that there is a God, and Thomas's example is the statement, "God exists", in which statement subject and predicate are identical.

7. Avicenna.

The last two words of his full name (ibn Sina) were Latinized into the more common form in Western history. He lived in the Persian Empire from c. 980 AD to 1037. The Dark Ages were not so dark. Aside from his stature as a philosopher, he was also the world's preeminent physician during his life. His two most well known works today are The Book of Healing (which has nothing to do with physical medicine) and The Canon of Medicine, which was his compilation of all known medical knowledge at that time.

Influenced primarily by #1, his Book of Healing deals with everything from logic to math, to music, to science. He proposed in it that Venus is closer than the Sun to Earth. Imagine not knowing that for a fact. The Sun looks a lot closer than Venus, but he got it right. He rejected astrology as a true science, since everything in it is based on conjecture, not evidence. He theorized that some fluid deep underground was responsible for the fossilization of bone and wood, arguing that "a powerful mineralizing and petrifying virtue which arises in certain stony spots, or emanates suddenly from the earth during earthquake and subsidence… petrifies whatever comes into contact with it. As a matter of fact, the petrifaction of the bodies of plants and animals is not more extraordinary than the transformation of waters".

This is not correct, but it's closer than you might believe. Petrifaction can occur in any organic material, and involves the material, most notably wood, being impregnated by silica deposits, gradually changing from its original materials into stone. Avicenna is the first to describe the five classical senses: taste, touch, vision, hearing and smell. He may have been the world's first systematic psychologist, in a time when people suffering from a mental disorder were said to be possessed by demons. Avicenna argued that there were somatic possibilities for recovery inherent in all aspects of a person's body, including the brain.

John Stuart Mill's five methods for inductive logic stem mostly from Avicenna, who first expounded on three of them: agreement, difference and concomitant variation. It would take too long to explain them in this list, but they are all forms of syllogisms, and every philosopher and student of philosophy is familiar with them from the beginning of education in the subject. They are critical to the scientific method, and whenever someone forms a statement as a syllogism, s/he is using at least one of the methods.

8. Zeno of Citium.

You may not be as familiar with him as with most of the others on this list, but Zeno founded the school of Stoicism. Stoicism comes from the Greek "stoa", which is a roofed colonnade especially that of the Poikile, which was a cloistered piazza on the north side of the Athenian marketplace, in the 3rd Century BC. Stoicism is based on the idea that anything which causes us to suffer in life is actually an error in our judgment, and that we should always have absolute control over our emotions. Rage, elation, depression are all simple flaws in a person's reason, and thus, we are only emotionally weak when we allow ourselves to be. Put another way, the world is what we make of it.

Epicureanism is the usual school of thought considered the opposite of Stoicism, but today many people mistake one for the other or combines them. Epicureanism argues that displeasures do exist in life and must be avoided, in order to enter a state of perfect mental peace (ataraxia, in Greek). Stoicism argues that mental peace must be acquired out of your own will not to let anything upset you. Death is a necessity, so why feel depressed when someone dies? Depression doesn't help. It only hurts. Why get enraged over something? The rage will not result in anything good. And so, in controlling one's emotions, a state of mental peace is brought about. Of importance is to shun desire: you may strive for what you need, but only that and nothing more. What you want will lead to excess, and excess doesn't help, but hurts.

9. Epicurus.

Epicurus has gotten a bit of an unfair reputation over the centuries as a teacher of self-indulgence and excess delight. He was soundly criticized by a lot of Christian polemicists (those who make war against all thought but Christian thought), especially during the Middle Ages, because he was thought to be an atheist, whose principles for a happy life were passed down to this famous set of statements: "Don't fear god; don't worry about death; what is good is easy to get; what is terrible is easy to endure".

He advocated the principle of refusing belief in anything that is not tangible, including any god. Such intangible things he considered preconceived notions, which can be manipulated. You may think of Epicureanism as "no matter what happens, enjoy life, because you only get one and it doesn't last long". Epicurus' idea of living happily centered on just treatment of others, avoidance of pain and living in such a way as to please oneself, but not to overindulge in anything.

He also advocated a version of the Golden Rule, "It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and well and justly (agreeing 'neither to harm nor be harmed'), and it is impossible to live wisely and well and justly without living a pleasant life". "Wisely", at least for Epicurus, would be avoidance of pain, danger, disease, etc.; "well" would be proper diet and exercise; "justly", in the Golden Rule's sense of not harming others because you do not want to be harmed.

10. John Locke.

The most important thinker of modern politics is the most directly responsible for Thomas Jefferson's rhetoric in the Declaration of Independence, and the rhetoric in the U. S. Constitution. Locke is referred to as the "Father of Liberalism", because of his development of the principles of humanism and individual freedom, founded primarily by #1. It is said that liberalism proper, the belief in equal rights under the law, begins with Locke. He penned the phrase "government with the consent of the governed". His three "natural rights", that is, rights innate to all human beings, were and remain "life, liberty, and estate".

He did not approve of the European idea of nobility enabling some to acquire land through lineage, while the poor remained poor. Locke is the man responsible, through Jefferson primarily, for the absence of nobility in America. Although nobility and birthrights still exist in Europe, especially among the few kings and queens left, the practice has all but vanished. The true democratic ideal did not arrive in the modern world until Locke's liberal theory was taken up.

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