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POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE PROBLEM OF IDENTITY OF THE DISCIPLINE. METATHEORETICAL REFLECTIONS. PART 2

АНОТАЦІЯ

Діагноз кризи ідентичності політичної науки як академічної дисципліни є вихідною позицією у цій статті щодо рефлексії стосовно методологічних умов дисципліни. Ця стаття складається з трьох частин. У Першій частині дискутуються інституційні детермінанти науки про політику у Польщі та США. У Другій частині представлені аргументи, які за кінцевим рахунком є ключовими для визначення науки про політику в якості дискурсивної платформи. Третя частина пояснює механізми, які відповідають за уніфікацію – у формі платформи – науки про політику.

Ключові слова: наука про політику, методологія соціальних наук, дискурсивна платформа, трансверсальний розум, прагматизм, герменевтика.

АННОТАЦИЯ

Диагноз кризиса идентичности политической науки как академической дисциплины представляет исходную позицию этой статьи о рефлексии относительно методологических условий дисциплины. Эта статья состоит из трех частей. В Первой части дискутируются институциональные детерминанты науки о политике в Польше и США. Во Второй части представлены аргументы, которые в конечном итоге являются ключевыми для определения науки о политике в качестве дискурсивной платформы. Третья часть объясняет механизмы, которые отвечают за унификацию – в форме платформы – науки о политике.

Ключевые слова: наука о политике, методология социальных наук, дискурсивная платформа, трансверсальный разум, прагматизм, герменевтика.

SUMMARY

Diagnosis of the identity crisis of political science as an academic discipline is the starting point in the article for reflection on the discipline's methodological condition. The paper consists of three parts. Part One discusses the institutional determinants of the science of politics in Poland and in the United States. Part Two presents the arguments ultimately leading to the definition of the science of politics as a discursive platform. Part Three explains the mechanisms responsible for the unification – in the form of the platform – of the science of politics.

Keywords: science of politics, methodology of social sciences, discursive platform, transversal reason, pragmatism, hermeneutics.

SCIENCE IDENTICAL ON THE PLATFORM SCALE

I propose here theoretico-scientific reflection, which is intended to serve to strengthen the belief in the need to conduct comprehensive studies as part of political science. I assume at this point that a political scientist can locate his discipline in the system of sciences, which reflects the actual state of the unifying ordering of knowledge. The system of sciences that make up political science is based on comparative methodology providing the grasp of the whole of science and creating a wide discursive platform, on which diverse specialists meet and conduct studies both within their (usually/institutionally and/or methodologically) specified disciplines, telling one another about their results, and between these disciplines and at their intersections – so-called inter-and transdisciplinary studies (1).

In the case of political science we are dealing with a varied discipline, made up of jointly occurring subdisciplines, closely interconnected, mutually complementary in respect of 1) the subject matter, 2) tasks, and 3) fragmentariness of the types of cognition. In the first case there is complementation of objects of scientific cognition having a general (e.g. political theory, political philosophy) and particular (economic politics, social policy) character, and a qualitative (political theory, theory of state) and quantitative (international economy) character. Regarding

the tasks: social politics, theory of state, political sociology and others are praxeological sciences aiming at practical application, seeking optimum means to reach specific practical ends, constituting values such as e.g. democracy or welfare state. Besides them, there are also theoretical sciences, in the normative, axiological sense, which seek justification why certain values should be implemented, why one should act one way rather than another in politics. This is especially political philosophy (which, obviously, understands the notion of justification itself in different ways: metaphysical, pragmatic, linguistic). Finally, political sciences complement one another in respect of the fragmentariness of utilized types of cognition, different in the case of quantitative and qualitative studies, historical and systematic studies (political history and theory of international relations), descriptive and explanatory studies (political geography and political sociology), or with analytical and synthesis studies.

It follows therefrom that there are no formal, procedural foundations of unity for political science. Such (informal) factors as the object, tasks, and fragmentariness of cognition do not and consequently cannot (despite the expectations of the Central Qualifying Commission members and editors of the aforementioned American periodicals) bind political science strictly enough to avoid blurring the boundaries between its subdisciplines. To confirm my suppositions I will refer to the remarks of the methodologist Barbara Krauz-Mozer:

Political science is a synthesis of many disciplines, often with different, diversified object methodologies, and it deals with everything that is of political significance. This goal is too broad and ambitious for political science to be treated as a single separate discipline with its own methodology, hence this name is used with some exaggeration. But it is owing to this that in political science, like in no other discipline, there is revealed the fundamental unity regarding the object of study in social sciences, followed by common research problems – these two are analyzed and possibly solved by methodology sensu largo. Thus, whatever important is established by general methodology of sciences pertaining to the conditions of cognition in one of the social disciplines is also significant for all the others (2).

What is so important that general methodology of sciences finds concerning political science? That it is above all a discipline of multi-faceted studies, today referred to as inter-and transdisciplinary or network studies, conducted with various methods. That in most cases these studies are in a functional interrelationship, or one that consists in that pursuing one discipline facilitates practicing another, that one creates the conceptual apparatus utilized in another, that it draws heuristic or illustrative models from it. Which is why, in my view, the following general methodological reflection can apply to political science, to the whole discipline and its particular subdisiciplines:

What seems paradoxical is that the diversity itself of an individual discipline is an element that binds it stronger with the whole knowledge. The variety of problems in some science or methods used in solving it causes this science to be closer to other sciences according to the affinity of individual problems and methods. Which is why so-called transitional, intermediate, intersected, or borderline etc. disciplines not only do away with clear-cut borderlines and isolation but they also help find the 'common interdisciplinary language (3).

This is the case with political science: it is methodologically indeterminate and open-ended in the sense that the number of its subdisciplines is not limited – new ones keep arising and will do so (e.g. biopolitics or European studies) in response to the currently changing cultural-social-political reality: to its non-transparency, complexity, plurality, and homogeneity. That is why political science so understood is described with the category of identity defined by means of the term 'insert' in social studies. Insert identity is one that is always open to new proposals of self-definition, always calculating what is the determinant of its 'being itself'.

In order to scientifically describe the reality in question and explain it in a practical way, i.e. one that allows us to prognosticate about its future, supervise and control its processes, it is necessary not only to redefine traditional political categories but also (humbly) accept the fact that the degree of accuracy of our cognition of them depends – and nothing has changed about this indeed since Aristotle and Oakeshott – on the nature of the object of cognition, while today we also know that it depends on the instrument, or

the language, that we use to cognize it.

And there are now languages (of political science) aplenty because the object itself is extremely (increasingly – this is a process) complex, dynamic, variable, synergistic, thereby allowing us even more so to show „the truth, only roughly and in general outline" (4). Almost twenty-five centuries after its emergence, this ancient maxim means the same to us today as it did at its beginning: that social science is a special – methodological, explanatory – extension of reason, used in everyday life. This reflection still holds true for political science.

Since the expectations that political science will reach the stage of epistemological autogenism are, as we have established, an ideological illusion only (let us repeat – speaking of its own 'methodology' in political science is somewhat exaggerated), we have to accept that we are dealing with a synthesis of its kind of many disciplines. Its specificity is a derivative of this insert identity: for that reason it is a rather loose whole because, as has been said, it is linked by (mostly) functional connections. There are no hierarchical, structural interrelations among them. Their suggestive image can therefore be the platform, upon which different discourses meet, or (in a spirit of Michel Foucault) the ways of producing knowledge through language, or, to put it differently: the ways of giving a meaning to political phenomena and practices. This is how a number of political science subdisciplines behave, which themselves are essentially transitional, intersected, borderline disciplines without clear-cut boundaries between one another, using interdisciplinary language, always shared only partially.

It is as a discursive platform that political science is naturally exposed to the incessant concern about its unsinkability – the concern manifested in continuously repeated questions addressed to it about its own integrity and stability. In other words, the concern about the bond – the community of language, approaches and research objectives that bind into one the material, on which floats the 'wreckage' coming from other objects floating in the ocean of humanities and social sciences. The standpoint according to which one can unequivocally determine the criteria, necessary and sufficient conditions, for a given type of cognition to be political science cognition, is sometimes termed

naturalizing: it assumes that politics is a defined object discipline, established regardless of our experience (in this sense – natural), which can be intellectually grasped/discovered (with the mind's eye like in Plato). The intellectual categories thus arisen allow us only then to make political reality the object of empirical studies. This view has its sources in the prejudice of hypostasis: politics becomes ontologized, all phenomena associated with it becoming seemingly natural. Then, for example, the object of political science decision analysis will be political reality as such rather than views, interests, conditions, or the vision of reality of decision-makers (5).

We deal with the problem of identity of political science when doubts arise about the possibility of abstracting the bond that holds it together, extracting it in its pure state. Then one calls into question the existence both of some separate object discipline and an intellectual program that would comprehend it. Under such circumstances there emerges the vision of a discursive platform – a labile object, difficult to identify because it has the insert identity. Certainly, one can live on it permanently but also reside temporarily: enter it legally and just as legally leave it. No wonder such an image frightens 'natural dwellers' – the permanent residents of the platform, who, deep-rooted aboard it, are hardly inclined either to perceive or call their abode in this way. And they accuse of betrayal (of the discipline) those who leave the platform, and of sabotage – all newcomers.

I assume that the acceptance of the platform-like shape of political science stems from methodological maturity, from understanding that such a form of unification of sciences is characteristic of applied/praxeological knowledge, with ambitions not only to describe and explain but also to supervise and control that which occurs as a result of purposeful political actions, and to forecast their effects.

Which is why all these properties at once justify (to use a somewhat different language of description) the treatment of political science as a discipline with a nature of an 'unstable compound', which is in fact „a complex set of practices, whose unity, such as it is, is given as much by historical accident and institutional convenience as by a coherent intellectual rationale" (Stefan Collini) (6).

Therefore, to show the methodological

identity/distinction of such a discipline is, by definition, extremely difficult. The platform seems an accurate metaphor to determine the methodological status and modus vivendi of political science, not only from a historical perspective (historicism). Both historians and systematicians who try to show the thus understood unity of political science use therefore such collective categories for the purpose as 'tradition', 'language', 'discourse' (7), or most often in Poland – 'thought'. By means of these special towropes they pull representatives of various academic disciplines aboard the platform. The most accurate definition possible of political science is thus as follows: political science is a discursive platform, or a set of traditions, languages, ideas, and practices, which provide the ways of speaking about political objects – concrete problems and themes, and about the forms of knowledge and conduct associated with them.

Owing to these ways of speaking, objects are included in the political scientist's field of vision and thereby recognized as politically significant (valent) on the basis of similarities obtaining between them (after Ludwig Wittgenstein) with a structure of family resemblance. This means that the compound whole in the case of such an intellectual construction as political science does not require that its individual constituents have some common (crucial) element. In order to identify all of them jointly as political science it is enough to recognize their partial resemblances only, which in this case denote functional affinity, which obtains between these ways of speaking, or ultimately the forms of rationality. And the functionally most efficient tool serving to penetrate into the diversity and complexity of multiple rationalities is, as has been said above, transversal reason – because it does not apply directly to objects but to their representations, i.e. intellectual images, whereby it can successfully resist this metaphysical tendency to seek the essence – the unambiguous distinctive feature of things. In other words, the notion of resemblance does not apply here to the relation that obtains between a model and its copy, as is the case with the assumption of a relationship between science and reality based on Plato's ontology (metaphysics). This means that it does not apply to simple, ideal qualities, fictional beings that would unequivocally define both politics

and the science of it once and for all. In that case, empirical reality, as the object of political scientist's studies, can only imitate these beings better or worse – it will never reach the ideal (in his eyes) anyway. A different thing is political science, which we understand as a platform, an unstable compound – it is based already on different ontologies pertaining to man, society and the historical process (8).

What they potentially have in common is a formal conviction that politics is a contextual relation, that it denotes the pluralist sphere of human activity, where it is impossible to separate facts from their meanings (values). At the level of scholarly reflection, this means that it is possible to distinguish between, but it is impossible to separate description from explanation, i.e. from theoretical knowledge. This means that science does not know pure or not interpreted facts; that its propositions make sense only within a given theoretical system, in which world-structuring categories are established.

Unification (making a synthesis) of political science on a platform basis takes place on two levels, which need not be separated in practice but can overlap (9). One of them is research practice in individual subdisciplines which, within their own object methodologies, have overcome the losses they suffered as a result of having applied the doctrine of 'pure facts' in their field and the accompanying distinction between empirical theory and normative theory. Now it is important for them to make boundaries between these theories 'permeable' so that they have something to tell one another and can meet on the same platform. The other level covers political science studies based directly on specified philosophical assumptions/pragmatics, which free political theories from metaphysical errors and thereby establish sufficiently broad-ranging models of scientificity in political science, which allow treating it precisely as a platform. I include here pragmatism and hermeneutics.

THEORY ABOVE THE DIVISION INTO 'THE EMPIRICAL – THE NORMATIVE'

To illustrate the process of unification of political science subdisciplines (in the sense given to it by the platform metaphor) I will use the example of the bifurcation of political theory and international relations theory. When the

two disciplines came to be treated as separate areas of studies, political theory was assigned to deal with normative issues such as the nature of justice, freedom, equality, or right life. Theories of international relations, however, are usually regarded as being free from normative problems and subjects. The metatheoretical argumentation for the separation of 'should' and 'is' was broadened with historical reasons. From the World War II on and after the rise of the realistic school, international relations theory focused on what 'is', freed itself from the vocabulary and concerns of political theory, took up the issue of the survival of state in the existing international realities. In this way it rid itself of the burden of normative involvement in strengthening everlasting peace, characteristic of the 'idealist' attitude of first-generation scholars dealing with international politics as a reaction to the disaster of the World War I.

The observation of research procedures in political science dealing with various types of interrelations between facts in the global age and establishing their significance shows the blurring of boundaries between the two disciplines in question. This happens in response to the actual blurring of borders between internal politics and foreign politics, between that which is intra-state (domestic) and international. Previously, these boundaries were clear-cut, based on the assumption of stability of the Westphalian model of state, which the realists adopted. Today, bifurcations of political theory and international relations theory are beginning to be criticized for that reason, it is believed (David Held) that it is impossible to explain the modern democratic state without studying the global system and conversely; that „the creation of a general explanatory theory on the borderline between political theory and international relations theory is not only necessary but also possible". „Such a theory", Ziemowit Jacek Pietras goes on, „should at the same time cover two fundamental areas of the state's activity, both activities undertaken in the centralized sphere of internal relations and in the decentralized sphere of international relations" (10).

I assume we are talking about the theory that satisfies the platform requirements articulated above: 1) it is a methodological extension of transversal reason; 2) it sets itself both causal and interpretive explanations as its

objective; 3) it is a politicized theory, in the sense of being applied, close to practice, one that, in its pursuit of generality, does not lose sight of empirical significance. This type of theory does not therefore disregard changes in the sphere of internal relations – it witnesses the gradual devaluation of fundamental democratic principles: the majority rule, agreement, self-determination, which are taking place today by the impact of external forces operating under, above, and through the sovereign state. The fate of a sovereign community depends today more and more on decisions made by actors acting on a macropolitical scale, by non-state participants in international relations, which are transnational institutions such as party internationals, orporations, non-governmental organizations, churches, supranational organizations, e.g. NATO, WTO, the European Union (11). This new situation compels redefinition of the classic categories of political science, such as state or power, as a result of which a number of new concepts emerge, and the associated ways of analyzing political reality. Owing to these, the political platform today is constantly under self-reconstruction, and probably this why it does not lose its appeal and attraction, nor is it going to sink. These new categories, or tow-ropes in our metaphor, are for example 'cosmopolitan democracy', 'cosmopolitan sovereignty', 'cosmopolitan reason', 'cosmopolitan state and civil rights', 'political penetration', 'transnational space', or 'network state' (12). All these concepts refer to new orders of rationality – relations of power under the conditions of the globalized world. They all describe the (dynamic, vague, difficult-to-perceive) process of building up and self-transforming of politics and state in order to extend its possibilities of action in transnational institutions and in the global society, which they serve.

THE MAKING OF PLATFORM BY FREEING POLITICAL THEORY FROM METAPHYSICAL ASSUMPTIONS

Pragmatism

The fundamental challenge and task of political science today is to retain the plurality of the modern world of politics and provide knowledge of it, to be appropriate to practice or

to practical (applied) political theory. Separation between theory and practice is usually blamed – as has been said before – on ontology, which characterizes the correlates of evaluative statements as fictional (ideal) beings, which are the rational, non-political justification for political reality. The political culture based on them exhibits fundamentalist claims. Philosophical political theories were understood in that way from the emergence of politics to the attempts to undermine metaphysics in the twentieth century, which arose as part of critical philosophy, pragmatism, and philosophy of language. Here, 'theory' in reference to politics is almost synonymous with metaphysical philosophy; science based on it is ultimately normative: it treats of how things should be, for example what democratic institution should be like of the necessity that follows from the adopted theory of human nature.

Following the principles of theoria meant seeking legitimacy, foundations of political theory and practice – consequently, this resulted in political theories going too deep into the problems of epistemology, methodology, and philosophy of science or – generally – metascience, which ultimately caused the separation of political theory from politics. There are different ideas about how to bring closer the two sides of this relation. One of them is offered by pragmatism. This is a standpoint according to which political theory does not need to fulfill any legitimating function, either in relation to political practice or to empirical studies. Only by giving up this founding ambitions can it come closer to the current practice and improve that which is defective in it. Otherwise, this threatens with various pathologies, the basic one consisting in tendentiously describing phenomena only to prove the correctness of an a priori theoretical standpoint. This is a reductionist error: theory-driven studies burden their object only with one type of description-explanation. They are, therefore, one-sided and inadequate, they disregard other approaches, and do not wish to get to know the achievements of a diversified group of scholars who deal with them.

Ian Shapiro distinguishes between investigations that are theory laden and those that are theory driven. The former refer to the well-known methodological principle, according to which there is no neutral, theory-free and pure description of 'facts' and 'figures'. Each description of a given political activity or phenomenon is theory laden, which can be observed especially when we ask it the question 'why?'. It then makes possible different types of explanations. A political scientist has thus to decide which one is the most accurate. In the latter case, with theory-driven investigations, the choice of this explanation, let us repeat, is determined in advance by the adopted 'favorite approach'. What should the task of a pragmatist-political scientist then consist in? How can he make theory return to public affairs, or, in other words, make academic political theorists leave their ivory tower and become involved in current political disputes? This is what Shapiro answers: for this purpose they have to undertake the task of carefully showing, exposing concealed preferences in political science studies for one 'favorite' theory or one model of explanation, especially if it is hegemonic, normative, already inherent in the formulation of the problem itself. Political theorists have to speak on behalf of the wider democratic public, in which they succeed when they test and expose theory-driven approaches and offer alternative solutions in place of them. The most important challenge that political theorists face today consists, as Shapiro puts it, in „serving as roving ombudsman for the truth and right by stepping back from political science as practiced to see what is wrong with what is currently being done and say something about how it might be improved" (13).

This distance from a science based on the wrong conviction that it seeks general explanations for the phenomena investigated has its justification in Shapiro's view, apart from concerns for the ontological correlates of explanatory propositions, also in the characteristics of the political scientist's profession. A pragmatist observes that it often happens that political scientists produce their theories, esoteric discourses, only to prevent journalists who specialize in politics from having their say. They want to show in this way that they are better than the latter. Shapiro condemns such motivations, posing the following task to political theorists: „When tackling a problem, we should come to grips with the previous attempts to study it, by journalists as well as scholars in all disciplines who have studied it, and then try to come up with an account that explains what was known before – and then some" (14).

Theory should thus return to practice at the expense of giving up not only the ambitions to legitimate it philosophically but also social and professional ambitions of political scientists themselves.

Deconstruction of traditional political theory, carried out from the pragmatist standpoint, ultimately leads to a new theory of politics that does not have philosophical foundations. Pragmatism in its theoretico-scientific reflection takes the stance that all scientific search for the objective truth (i.e. the truth about some independently existing metaphysical and/or religious order) is unnecessary and politically suspicious: for it always reflects the political interests of those who do not discover the truth but shape it. This anti-essentialist and anti-fundamentalist attitude (e.g. in the version of Richard Rorty's or Stanley Fish's contextualism (15) means, when applied to political science, that it is no longer concerned with explaining/presenting the world of politics as it objectively is. In order to be objective, one has to view it from outside, which is impossible to do. A purely mental experiment and nothing more. As has been said, political space, especially that of today, is the area of activity with extremely blurred contours. In developed countries and societies, termed late modern or postmodern, the situation of political science is also becoming additionally complicated because theoretical political cognition is losing its legitimacy. The advanced orders of capitalist policy no longer (or, to put it more carefully; less and less) need their legitimacy for two essential reasons.

First, the state as the institution responsible for social integrity, using coercion in order to avoid a crisis of legitimacy, as has been said, gradually ceases to be a privileged political entity. Alongside 'territorial democracy', the global age is witnessing the realization of 'non-territorial, transnational democracy'. Today, also other mechanisms of social regulation begin to function, often more effective than state coercion. We are now governed not only by formal 'practices of governance' of the representative national state, but also in some other ways, for example as employees, suppliers and consumers of transnational corporations – the ways combined with new forms of electronic communication and the associated patterns of behavior within education, politics, art and, gender (culturally defined sex), etc. (16).

Second, in the so-called late modernity, which Anthony Giddens defines by means of the category of radical reflection, one more level of (political science) reflection is no longer able to justify or put anything in order, creating rather even greater uncertainty. Political scientists thus lose their social raison d'etre, becoming expendable. Their uncomfortable situation is additionally aggravated by the growing process of absorption of science (more broadly – the intellectual domain or culture) by the market. The end of the age of ideology, of legitimization of the political order through ideas and through demonstration and argumentation techniques, is connected with the advent of the age of imagology (many authors have grown fond of this concept of Milan Kundera's): prevalence of persuasive images and communication techniques of seduction. Some theorists, therefore, take a stance that if the contemporary political order is going through a legitimacy crisis, then political theory cannot really help because it is in a crisis itself (17).

Both these circumstances, inconvenient for political science understood in a naturalist sense (the sense I gave this term above), are conducive to pragmatism. According to this view, politics, just like the whole human world around it, does not have its inner nature. Owing to this, it can be ascribed to norms and standards, both trans- and international, and local, communal, and institutional. As a result, political science is here a form of rhetoric adopted by given interpretive communities rather than an autonomous science equipped with methods of disclosing hidden universal laws/meanings governing both language and political practices. These communities use variable paradigms and vocabularies, by means of which they continually create and process their objects. Political scientists, as these itinerant advocates of truth and right, meet on the common discursive platform when they behave professionally, i.e. when in their work they observe the principle of respect for diversity and plurality, exposing seeming truths and platitudes, hidden in scientific (and political) languages, which claim to be universally valid. They show the possibilities of improving the life of particular communities, where, according to accepted ways of thinking and/or recognized laws of development (in economy, society.), there are none. They form the platform-domain

of discourses in the public sphere, on which there is a climate conducive to attitudes that express intellectual and emotional distance to the time-honored orders of things: institutions, practices, values, etc.

Hermeneutic drifting on the platform

Categories like 'discourse', 'language', 'vocabulary', 'thought', 'interpretive community', which unite political science in the platform paradigm, are used for this purpose both by systematicians and by historians. They enable both kinds of scholars to draw attention to different orders/forms of rationality, within (in the presence of, versus, at the intersections of) which politics is realized and which influence both politics itself and understanding of it. They are established by religious, literary, legal, or philosophical texts, which originally control our everyday acts of speaking and activity, including those that have a political meaning. These texts are constantly explained, commented on, and interpreted anew, and in this sense they are constantly under transformations, constantly articulated and realized, still remaining to be articulated and realized (18).

This interpretive effort is also made by political scientists, who understand truth in a broader way than positivists consequently they adopt a different model of science than the latter. In accordance with the hermeneutic model of scientificity, the objective and task of political science is not to explain political phenomena but to describe and interpret in order to understand them. It is the representatives of this orientation in political science that appear to be most comfortable as far as the problem of identity of their discipline is concerned. Strictly speaking, they do not see this problem at all. They believe that the distance between political theory and practice stems from the wrong recognition of the relation itself.

They maintain that first of all it is a wrong belief that the task of theory consists in controlling investigations and thereby imposing alien, distorting categories upon reality. Theory, on the other hand, as Michael Walzer explains, is more concerned with interpreting political principles given in life forms than with discovering or looking for politics as a set of rational, universal principles. Owing to this, theory is closer to social criticism understood as the domain of ethical imperatives belonging to the 'level of activity', as a product of local values, practices, and moral and political customs rather than philosophical speculation. Political theory, understood as social criticism, resembles discussion inside society, and distances itself from relations of power and domination within a given group rather than from practices and customs (19). From this standpoint, there is no political theory without social practice. Both theorists and practitioners, they all operate in the same universe of norms and principles. Each political action has thus an axiological dimension: it is morally motivated and has a moral meaning (20).

Interpretive political theory, when articulating self-definitions formed in a given culture (or, to put it differently: hermeneutic self-reflections, which contain the concepts of power, justice, quality etc.), itself changes, i.e. coconstitutes its object of study. It corrects political activities at the level of self-understanding of a political community so they would correspond with moral motivations contained in them. Jon Simons observes that this is why it is not accidental that many scholars of this orientation are also communitarians. They are all united by the common will to find norms and values in the existing sociopolitical practice rather than by a fundamentalist need to regulate politics according to non-political, rationally set standards. Let us repeat that theory is inseparably linked here with practice – both are legitimated only by values contained in the ways of life of given political communities. If, as interpretive theory would have it, „fact and value do not differ by anything from each other, if studying politics is interpretive and constitutive at the same time because of its object, then empirical and normative theory already constitute one whole" (21). Under such conditions, political science is floating on the surface of political life, trying to take a critical stance on it from inside. Instead of being controlled, it chooses prudent drifting.

Hermeneutic/communitarian theorists do not therefore have grounds to feel isolated from the surrounding world of politics. They speak out in the debates going on in their political communities. They show among others that the positivist model of political science is a Western product, a recurring illusion determined by the Western languages of political and social

self-understanding. As such, this model cannot be therefore universal. A manifestation of ethnocentrism is the imposition of the model in question upon science and societies, not only non-European but also (from the Polish standpoint) upon Central European. We could point at many examples of the impact exerted upon Polish post-cold war political science by American behaviorism with its followance of the model of natural sciences, confining itself to observable phenomena, to applied studies, whose goal is to solve particular political problems, etc. The vision of an atomistic-instrumentalist political system, assumed in this type of studies, has hardly anything in common with the conceptions held by the people in Poland, involved in political practices over the last fifteen years, including the prior experiences of the democratic opposition in the days of the communist regime. Political science devoid of such local connotations does not notice collisions/asymmetry that take place between the realities (rationalities) of the postcommunist state, economy and market, and the logic of the neoliberal discourse. Nor can it, as a result, cope with the problems prevailing in the public and scientific discourse in Poland over the last fifteen years. These occur according to dichotomic categories of 'national – European', 'the individual – community', 'fundamentalism – liberalism', 'truth – freedom'.

There are very few examples of original political thought that takes up these problems drawing from native self-definitions. Such studies assume that to understand political life is not possible without referring to its various local and supralocal factors, without examining the subjective aspect of social reality, the interests, motivations, needs and intentions of those governing and the governed. For both sides, these are the starting grounds for political decisions (taken not randomly) about to what extent and how their tradition and national identity are to change, and about the type of community they are to aim for. Political science hermeneutically oriented, or, more generally speaking: one that assumes the existence of a permeable border between positivist and humanistic studies tries to articulate and reconstruct such decisions as well as indicate the lack of them. Consequently, it tries to describe and explain the phenomena that indicate the deformation of public and scientific discourses and the accompanying manifestations

of power crisis, political capitalism, destruction of the state, ritualization of democracy, weakening of social bonds, the policy of imitation of Western models, the imitative policy, externally controlled modernization, etc. But this is the stuff for quite another story.

FOOTNOTES

1. S. Kaminski, Pojecie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk (The concept of science and classification of sciences), Lublin 1981, p. 257.

2. B. Krauz-Mozer, Teorie polityki (Political theories), Warsaw 2005, p. 15.

3. S. Kaminski, op. cit., p. 255; also on the aspects and forms of unification, see: ibidem pp. 254–255.

4. Aristotle, Etyka nikomachejska (Nicomachean ethics), transl. by D. Gromska, Warsaw 1982, pp. 5–6 (1094 b, 11–25).

5. Such a perspective that naturalizes political science as a scholarly discipline is believed to prevail for example in the monograph devoted to the British studies of 20th-century politics [in:] (eds) J. Harward, B. Barry, A. Brown, The British Study of Politics in the Twentieth Century, Oxford University Press, 1999. See also: R. Adcock, M. Bevir, op. cit., pp. 3–4. On political decision-making in this respect see: Z. J. Pietras, op. cit., pp. 39–40.

6. Quoted after, R. Adcock, M. Bevir, The history of political science, „Political Studies Review", 2005, vol. 3, p. 5.

7. Ibidem, pp. 5–6.

8. One of them is proposed by e.g. Adriana Cavarero. Her reasoning is as follows: if the new ontology is to be the explanation of and justification for political institutions and activities in their present-day plurality and diversity, it must perceive them as collective uncovering of the individual and the unique. That is why the Italian writer speaks of 'ontology of plural uniqueness' (in reference to Hannah Arendt's idea of the political). It pertains to entities – individual and collective – whose participation in politics is not determined by having any identity: sexual, ethnic, religious, class etc. It is assumed here that what is the issue in politics is that entities communicate to one another above all their uniqueness, which is the absolute, unclassifiable and unstructurable difference. The value of uniqueness is the original principle of the political scene, says Cavalero. The crisis of the State model in the age of globalization

makes it easier, she believes, to see the local and accidental nature of action, in which plurality is the disclosure of uniqueness. See: A. Cavarero, op. cit., pp. 520, 528–529.

9. A unification perspective, of interest to us, which combines the two levels in question is offered by e.g. J. Habermas. His research project reads: Theory of politics and law, torn between facticity and validity, breaks up into factions, which have hardly anything to tell one another. Tension between the normativist approach, which is still exposed to the danger of losing contact with social reality, and the objectivist approach, which eradicates all normative aspects, can be understood as an admonishment not to hold too tightly onto the perspective determined by one discipline, but to be open to different standpoints with regard to method (participant vs. observer), to different theoretical objectives (the understanding/explication of the sense and conceptual analysis vs. description and empirical explanation), to perspectives determined by different roles (those of judge, politician, legislator, client, and citizen), and to different attitudes in research pragmatics (hermeneuticist, critic, analyst etc.). J. Habermas, Faktycznosc i obowiazywanie. Teoria dyskursu wobec zagadnien prawa i demokratycznego panstwa prawnego, transl. by A. Romaniuk and R. Marszalek, Warsaw 2005, p. 20. (Faktizitaet und Geltung. Beitraege zur diskursiven Theorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/Main 1992).

10. Z. J. Pietras, Decydowanie polityczne (Political decision-making), Warsaw 1998, p. 19.

11. See e.g.: B.C. Schmidt, Together again: reuniting political theory and international relations theory, „British Journal of Politics and International Relations", 2002, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 121–122, 127.

12. See e.g. U. Beck, Wladza i przeciwwladza w epoce globalnej. Nowa ekonomia polityki swiatowej, transl. by J. Lozinski, Warsaw 2005, pp. 270–298 (Macht und Gegenmacht im Globalen Zeitalter. Neue Weltpolitische Okonomie, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/Main 2002); J. Staniszkis, Wladza globalizacji (Power of globalization), Warsaw 2003, p. 17; Z.J. Pietras, op. cit., p. 21.

13. I. Shapiro, Problems, methods, and theories in the study of politics, or what's wrong with political science and what to do about it, „Political Theory", 2002, vol. 30, no. 4, p. 597.

14. Ibidem, pp. 605/606.

15. See e.g.: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth. Philosophical Papers, vol. I, Cambridge University Press 1991; S. Fish, Interpretacja, retoryka, polityka (Interpretation, Rhetoric, Politics), transl. by K. Abriszewski et al., Krakow 2002.

16. See e.g.: J. Tully, Political philosophy as critical activity, „Political Theory", 2002, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 538–539.

17. See: J. Simons, The exile of political theory: the lost homeland of legitimization, „Political Studies", 1995, vol. XLIII, pp. 694–697.

18. See: M. Foucault, L'ordre du discours, Paris, Gallimard 1971.

19. See: M. Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism, Cambridge, Mass. 1993.

20. This argumentation is believed to be developed most consistently by Charles Taylor. For him, political theory consists in articulating selfinterpretations, which motivate political life in a group and are its basis. These selfinterpretations are norms and descriptions, whose value lies in that practice becomes more predictable owing to them. „In other words – Jon Simons explains – given that humans are selfinterpreting beings, the task of theory is to match interpretation as closely as possible to action" (J. Simons, op. cit., p. 691). Out of the studies of interest authored by Ch. Taylor see e.g. Social Theory as Practice [in:] Ch. Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Science, Philosophical Papers 2, Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 91–115.

21. J. Simons, op. cit., p. 692.

Примітка редакції. Тут публікуємо третю частину цієї статті. Вступ та дві перші частини були надруковані у попередньому номері часопису «Філософія спілкування».