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SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE NATURE OF "EMPIRICAL UNIVERSALS" IN C. GEERTZ' INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY

Автори розкривають природу і сутність «емпіричних універсалій». Вони експлікують схему формування понять. Автори роблять висновок, що інтерпретативна антропологія стикається з труднощами при узгодженні індуктивного методу формування понять з логікою значення.

Ключові слова: *інтерпретативна антропологія, універсалії, формування концептів, значення, репрезентація.*

Авторы раскрывают природу и сущность «эмпирических универсалий». Они эксплицируют схему образования понятий. Авторы делают вывод, что интерпретативная антропология сталкивается с трудностями при согласовании индуктивного метода образования понятий с логикой значения.

Ключевые слова: *интерпретативная антропология, универсалии, образование понятий, значение, репрезентация.*

Authors expose the nature and essence of "empirical universals". They explicate the scheme of conceptual formation. Authors arrive to conclusion that interpretive anthropology could hardly bind together inductive method of concept formation and the logic of meaning.

Key words: *interpretive anthropology, universals, conceptual constitution, meaning, representation.*

Theoretical achievements of C. Geertz have been thoroughly studied by numerous English-speaking social scientists (V. Crapanzano, P. Shankman, J. Spencer, etc.). They were explored in post-Soviet countries as well (A. Boscovic, Yu. Dzhulai, V. Kaplun, I. Kasavin, V. Kilkeev, A. Zorin, A. Yelfimov etc.).

Above-mentioned authors maintain that methodological basis of the interpretive anthropology needs further elaboration. For example, V. Kilkeyev admits that "inner logic" of C. Geertz' methodological deductions remains vague [2, c. 141-142].

Hence, the point we are focused on is the specific character of the conceptual constitution of interpretive anthropology.

The strategy of research for C. Geertz is "to hunt for universals in culture, for empirical uniformities that… could be found everywhere in about the same form, and, second, to an effort to relate such universals… to the established constants of human biology, psychology, and social organization". To meet validity demands interpretive anthropology must demonstrate "(1) that the universals proposed be substantial ones and not empty categories; (2) that they be specifically grounded in particular biological, psychological, or sociological processes, not just vaguely associated with "underlying realities"; and (3) that they can convincingly be defended as core elements in a definition of humanity in comparison with which the much more

numerous cultural particularities are of clearly secondary importance".
[6, p. 38, 39]. Herewith author spots "a logical conflict between
asserting that, say, "religion," "marriage," or "property" are empirical
universals and giving them very much in the way of specific content,
for to say that they are empirical universals is to say that they have the
same content, and to say they have the same content is to fly in the face
of the undeniable fact that they do not" [6, p. 39-40].

So, C. Geertz deduces concepts from the relevant aggregates of
phenomena. The "logical conflict", admitted by the author, is derivative
of the reverse correlation between the scope and the content of concept.
But he does not discern these aspects correctly, since he designates as
"content" the filling of concepts applied in case study and the whole
potential scope of their application. The author doesn't take into
account that concepts, applied to concrete cases, are constituents of
already formed representations, images of the object under
consideration. Consequently, the *scope* of concept becomes identical to
the *content* of representation. As a result, concepts lose capacity of
projecting onto the whole domain of potential data. The fact that the
scope of concepts is reduced to the already observed data stays
unnoticed. Ergo, C. Geertz discovers "logical conflict" *between the
abstract property of concept* as such *and the facts of its application* to
the variety of cases. So, one side of this "conflict" is an abstraction and
the reality is the other one.

Author of interpretive anthropology treats universals not as instruments of phenomena classification, but as "core elements", which exist beside secondary "numerous cultural particularities". Adjectives "particular" and "universal" are conceptual denominations of facts. They deliver predicates to facts and convey important aspect of cultural reality. But author transforms predicate into subject. Consequently, concepts turn to constituents of cultural reality itself. This is the way in which "empirical universals" are formed. We should notice, that he applies plural form ("universals") to reduce abstraction to the aggregate of facts cogently. Thus, the concept "empirical universal", (which, like any other concept, must meet the requirements of "*unum, verum, bonum*"), transforms into the multitude of "universal" collections. Reification of universals transforms into universal reifications. So, the universal / particular entanglement stays unresolved.

Nevertheless, C. Geertz finds concepts in "things themselves". He endows abstractions with status of things which they were extracted from. We can put it the other way: "empirical universals" transform into the "things of second degree" — they turn into particularities, which must act as "generals". Author tries to force content to act like a form. C. Geertz admits that ethnographic description is "microscopic"; "anthropologist characteristically approaches broader interpretations and more abstract analyses from the direction of exceedingly extended acquaintances with extremely small matters". Researcher confronts the same "grand realities" that other social scientists: "Power, Change,

Faith, Oppression, Work, Passion, Authority, Beauty, Violence, Love, Prestige". These are "big words that make us all afraid", but they "take a homely form in such homely contexts" [6, p. 21].

We insist that size of object does not matter in interpretation of its sense. Large-scale interpretations are not more abstractive. C. Geertz covertly identifies content of representation with abstractness of concept. Herewith he ascribes to concepts (power, change, faith) the quality of "grand realities". Hence, reification of concepts is supposed. Author delves into extensive dimensions of concepts and forgets the procedure of filling with sense.

C. Geertz reduces the formation of conceptual apparatus to arrangement and interaction of representations. Author conceals the logical kernel of the problem under the layer of "extensive" rhetoric: the study of particular facts aimed on specificity he names "the study of small-scale object", the study of facts with abstractive intension he names consideration of "the great problems of reality". He forgets that positive heuristics, which he hopefully takes for basis of scientific validity, is the product of study focused on specificity. Wherein the object of research can't be "small" or "large". It must correspond to the aim of case research and be related to the specific nature of the given branch of knowledge. Power, change, faith, etc., are abstract concepts, but not "big problems of reality". Word combination "big problems of reality" denotes attitude of researcher to   phenomena, conveys their significance. Consequently, it has definite content (or, at least, content

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limited in certain aspect). But "power, change, faith" are abstract concepts (i.e. unapplied concepts). That is why they have no definite content, but scope — they only suggest potential volume of phenomena under consideration.

Nevertheless C. Geertz tries to reduce the *quality* of abstractness to the *size* of content. He does not take into account that the "size of object" is the property of phenomenon itself, whereas the size of content of representation is not [4, c. 78, 79, 85]. Hence concepts of anthropology, on his opinion, must picture cultural reality "itself". The author transforms mental act into existent "cultural model", finds his "real substitute", reifies it. This is the way he formulates "big problems of reality" — metaphors of the scope of concepts, images of layman's everyday mentality.

In similar way C. Geertz treats "major methodological problem" of finding the transition "from a collection of ethnographic miniatures… to wall-sized culturescapes of the nation, the epoch, the continent, or the civilization" and of "moving from local truths to general visions" [6, p. 21].

Thus epistemological problem of induction, which is inseparably entangled with the constitution of concepts, is transformed into the problem of summing up of representations. But pushed out of the door methodological problem comes back through the window in the guise of "general vision's" finding. And again author treats it through extensive constitution of concepts. Despite widely-accepted stance of

H. Rickert, who sees the goal of sciences of culture in the study of "historical individuum", C. Geertz takes extensive sum of representations for the key to the constitution of concepts. [3, c. 277]. Thus, interpretive anthropology could hardly bind together the inductive method of concept formation and the logic of meaning.

So, from one side, the logic of interpretive anthropology appeals to epistemological and mental tradition invoked by hermeneutically-apprehended concept of meaning deduced from "inner experience" of individual and, from the other side, to empirically oriented inductive logic of positively-molded science which rests upon underpinning of objective "outer" experience. This dualism is the driving force of conceptual construction of the whole interpretive anthropology enterprise.

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ПРОБЛЕМИ ІНФОРМИЦІЙНОЇ АДАПТАЦІЇ ТА ФІЛОСОФІЯ ШТУЧНОГО ІНТЕЛЕКТУ

У статті аналізується проблема сучасного етапу розвитку штучного інтелекту. Автор показує, що інформаційна картина світу формується за рахунок використання електронних носіїв, можливості яких удосконалюються швидкими темпами. У статті робиться висновок, що інформаційна адаптація сучасної людини в світі розвитку технологій стає проблемою.