

**SYSTEMIC RISKS OF DESTABILIZATION OF
SOCIAL SYSTEMS OF POST-INDUSTRIAL
SOCIETY IN THE CONTEXT OF ECONOMIC
CRISIS AND WAR**

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In the conditions of global civilizational transformations and the disintegration of stable international trade, economic and cultural ties on the continent, caused by the aggression of the Russian leadership towards Ukraine, the problem of the stability of social systems of post-industrial countries is becoming actualized. The study of this problem is carried out in the framework of multidisciplinary research within the framework of a number of modern theories: neo-institutionalist, structural-functional, conflict-related, socio-psychological and others.

This article, which aims at a general consideration of the causes of systemic risks of disruption of the stability of social systems of a post-industrial society, is based on the author's concept of the balance of resource potentials of actors of social-power relations, based on the position of neo-institutionalism.

The modern post-industrial society was formed as a consumer society, designed as an alternative to the class antagonistic society of the period of industrial production. In such a society, the source of well-being for the majority of the population (primarily the so-called middle class) was the state-guaranteed receipt of a basic level of income (tied to the official minimum wage of employees) and social services. At the same time, the

administrative and governmental maintenance of the level of consumer solvency through state regulation of the economic sphere was aimed at avoiding the causes of crises traditional for an unregulated market. However, a side effect of non-market maintenance of solvency became the systemic dependence of the receipt of benefits on the level of access to the centers of power decision-making, which led to the formation of rent-oriented behavior as a dominant strategy not only for ordinary citizens, but also for corporations.

In the long run, this trend creates a risk of transformation of market capitalism in the direction of a powerful rent-distributing model, where economic distribution becomes a derivative of the political order, determined by the dynamics of the institutional configuration of political subjects who distribute resources on non-economic grounds. Hence the risk of an accelerated flow of capital from the real economy to the political sphere, due to the higher profitability of investing in the status of a participant in making power decisions regarding the distribution of public resources compared to investing in economic projects. Investing in the development and reproduction of the socio-economic infrastructure of society, which is always more costly and risky than capital investment in trade and financial operations, is inevitably relegated to the periphery of economic activity.

A reduction in the amount of costs for the production of real material goods also results in a reduction in the amount of resources available for power distribution. This, in turn, inevitably exacerbates the competition for access to political rent and causes a constant increase in the share of resources that, instead of reproducing infrastructure and consumption, are alienated for competitive struggle. This was

the perspective in the last third of the 19th century. was described as the "decay" of the capitalist system.

During the 19th and early 21st centuries. the risks of "decay" were compensated by the capitalist market's absorption of the resources of pre-capitalist societies. At the same time, countries that are more developed in terms of technology, organizational management, and military actively used all their competitive advantages to institutionalize the order of asymmetric exchange of resources for their own benefit with states and societies that are less developed in these areas. This provided the ruling elites of the specified countries with a systematic opportunity to accumulate a resource of off-market support for the solvent demand of the main mass of their citizens while taking this mass beyond the scope of production of real material goods and services. Thus, despite the fact that the so-called middle class had real access to power decision-making in their states, it constituted the social support of the ruling elites thanks to the artificially supported illusion of quasi-elitist consumption, which allowed representatives of this class to self-identify with the existing social economic order. This model of social relations was called the liberal-democratic compromise of the countries of the "Western world" in the sociological literature, and its variant in Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and the post-Soviet republics of Central Asia was called the corruption compromise.

However, the system of international economic relations described above contributed to the accumulation of a critical mass of imbalances. It is impossible to eliminate them by traditional methods, because in the post-industrial period the possibility of endless expansion of the market

due to the absorption of territories and populations not included in the process of capitalist exchange has largely been exhausted. In addition, the developed economies of East Asia (Japan, South Korea, the People's Republic of China), EU countries and the USA have accumulated a huge amount of debt. It is impossible to return it within the framework of the existing economic system, as it will create unavoidable risks for the existence of the system itself. Therefore, old debts are repaid at the expense of creating new ones, which undermines the foundations of the global financial system.

In terms of sustainability of social systems of post-industrial societies, this contributes to the emergence of another risk. The level of consumption of the middle class was not fixed for him by access to control over the sources of this consumption, which in the conditions of the cartel-controlled oligopoly financial system prevented the accumulation in the hands of the bulk of citizens of the resource base due to the systematic depreciation of accumulations. A significant share of such accumulations was redirected not to real consumption, but to speculation in securities and cryptocurrencies, which are ultimately controlled by the same cartels of financial oligopolies. As a result, a speculative financial pyramid was created, which ensures the control of the population's resources by the ruling elite. Violation of the stability of this pyramid due to a systematic increase in the bank interest rate contributes to a significant decrease in the rate of profit (primarily from the disposal of securities) in developed economies. The reduction of the resource base of the post-industrial society caused by this fall led to the collapse of the liberal-democratic social compromise and the consolidation of the systematic reduction of the state's social expenditures. This, in turn, clearly

demonstrates to the representatives of the middle class the precariousness of their position in the existing economic system, which ceases to be comfortable for them and perceived as "their own".

The above-mentioned risks of destabilization of the social system are superimposed on the problem of rebranding models of socialization of the individual at the stage of transition from modern industrial society to post-industrial post-modern society.

During the last three decades, a model of socialization based on the principles of liberalism was actively introduced into the political consciousness of Ukrainian society. This model is based on the principles of individualism, orientation to personal success (based on obtaining the greatest individual benefit at the lowest cost), rejection of the paradigm of equality in favor of the paradigm of freedom, independence of the individual from society. These principles determine the maximum distancing of the individual from the political sphere and his free right to choose his affiliation to any political community, including the choice of citizenship.

The functionality of this model was clearly manifested in the transition from a centralized economic system with a developed public sector to a decentralized private economy. During this period, the effect of a specific model of political consciousness was noted, which in political analysis received the name corruption social contract. The essence of this agreement is that in exchange for maintaining sufficient volumes of state investments in the social sphere, the bulk of society does not interfere in the process of large-scale privatization (which was actually an administrative, non-economic mechanism for the redistribution of public property). At the

same time, access to the already built infrastructure with a huge amount of resources available for appropriation through the privatization mechanism became the basis for acquiring a powerful status. Thanks to this, a tiny part of the population received excess profits, converting the received resources into resources of power over society. In domestic realities, the model of political socialization based on the principles of liberalism served as the task of legitimizing just such a system of socio-economic relations.

Since the majority of citizens with such a system of resource distribution do not have the possibility of real access to the centers of power decision-making, a political regime of this type cannot be correlated with democracy in its classical sense. However, the neoliberal ideology of the transition from totalitarianism to democracy required the identification of post-socialist systems with a de facto oligarchic form of government precisely as democracies, albeit inferior ones. As a result, the typology of "democracies with adjectives" was supplemented by the definition "democracy with limited access", which describes an oligopoly regime with a democratic facade.

In domestic conditions, such an oligopoly contributed to a rapid increase in the share of public profit appropriated by the ruling elite, which is not critical for the restoration of infrastructure. Accordingly, for the elite, the economic need for investment support of the expensive scientific and industrial complex disappeared, since the profits from the appropriation of existing assets significantly exceeded the profits from the creation of new ones. For the main mass of the population, the illusion of stability in the case of non-working production during the first two and a half decades of independence was maintained by

means of increased import of consumer goods, for the purchase of which real assets were exchanged for short-term and rather expensive foreign loans.

As a result, the total volume of the country's resource base was sharply reduced, threatening the bankruptcy of the state, which primarily threatens the inability to maintain the existing order of redistribution of resources and protect the powerful status of political elites within the framework of the current balance of power. Accordingly, there was a need to reduce spending on the social sphere. The decline in the standard of living of the main mass of the population reduced the level of legitimacy not only of the ruling elite, but also of the state itself and the political system as a whole.

The transition of the bearer of political consciousness beyond the poverty line determines for him the replacement of the liberal concept of freedom with the desire for social support from the state. However, the possibilities of such support are limited to the amount of the share of the profit of the national economy that goes to budget funds. The lack of the possibility of financing large-scale state social programs actually contributes to the growth of the potential for a social explosion with the possible consequence of the division of society and the collapse of the state.

Therefore, today the primary problem of preserving the integrity of society has become the question of restoring the status of Ukraine as a high-tech country. The national economy requires large and targeted investments to create new centers of economic growth. However, private business focused on accelerated low-cost profit making is not interested in financing costly long-term projects. The only way out is the implementation of large state economic

programs. At the same time, as the experience of economic modernization of developed countries shows, the lack of public funds can be compensated only by increased exploitation of the labor force while limiting consumption norms.

Adapting to the systemic decline in the legitimacy of power and the tasks of reindustrialization, democracy with limited access shows a tendency to transform into a mobilization-type democracy. This type needs a model of political socialization based on the principles of self-sacrifice in the name of the nation and the state, rejection of the concept of individual autonomy and free choice of civic identity, which does not consider patriotism as a duty. At the same time, the individualistic desire for unlimited consumption while minimizing personal costs, including the costs of participating in the implementation of state-authority decisions, fixed in public consciousness under the influence of the liberal paradigm, is a significant obstacle to the formation of a political culture based on mobilization principles. Therefore, the mobilization model of political socialization is in contradiction with the model already fixed in the public consciousness, which is based on liberal principles. The result is the cognitive dissonance of the consumer, who is required to abandon his usual way of life and become a soldier of the state.

Already last year, there was a noticeable decrease in the consumption of the middle class (not to mention the masses of social assistance recipients) in the "first world" countries, which in the short term creates a risk for them of a significant reduction in market capacity and, as a result, revenues to state budgets. Hence, it becomes inevitable that competition for access to the right to dispose of

limited resources for representatives of the ruling elite will intensify. At the same time, additional allocation of resources for intra-elite struggle sharply reduces the effectiveness of traditional rent-oriented strategies for all non-elite social groups, radicalizing all existing, including frozen political contradictions between them, which were smoothed out by rent distributions. The result of the aggravation of social contradictions, in turn, is the quite noticeable adaptation of social institutions, in particular the institutions of power, to the tasks of cutting off the main mass of citizens from any influence on the adoption of socially significant governmental decisions, which is reflected in public life as a sharp restriction of rights and freedoms and citizens under the pretext of their own safety.

Along with the collapse of the liberal-democratic social compromise, an important way out of the systemic crisis is entering a new cycle of economic growth based on the development of a new social infrastructure, for which it is necessary to reset the existing one. Such a task was solved twice in the past century due to the destruction of the social infrastructure of developed European countries due to world wars, while the economic growth engine was the US economic system, which was not destroyed during military operations and received excess profits from the execution of foreign military orders and the disposal of significant amounts of capital of the belligerent countries. The current large-scale war in the center of Europe began with the aggression of the Russian Federation, but the main beneficiaries of the war are not the Russian ruling elites, but global financial and oligarchic groups, whose goal, obviously, is the destruction of the developed social infrastructure of Europe and North America in order to "clear the place" for the beginning of a

new economic cicada. Not being interested in the fastest possible and complete victory of Ukraine, they block international military aid to it and dosedly support the level of the Russian economy sufficient for waging a long-term, low-intensity war. At the moment, it does not contribute to the growth of the focus of the military conflict to a global scale, but it creates additional risks for the economic systems of the leading EU countries, the profitability of which was largely provided by cheap raw materials and energy carriers from the Russian Federation, as well as the absence of significant defense costs. The decrease in the competitiveness of European economies undermines their ability to maintain the usual the balance of social and power relations puts them in dependence on global financial and oligarchic groups.

Accordingly, the power lines of the main political conflicts and fault lines of the near future will inevitably be related to the right of systemic control for certain social groups, political groups and the state as subjects of the distribution of resource flows at different levels of the political and economic infrastructure; a differentiated change in the principles of access of citizens and social groups to public resources; rights to political rent and the exclusion of a significant part of the population from the system of rent access to public goods.

An alternative scenario of political transformation is associated with the transition of society to a more complex stage of institutionalization of social relations, based on the principles of general societal control over the preparation and adoption of socially significant power decisions, primarily aimed at establishing the order of access to resources and power.